Trust, but Verify

Edited by Martin Klimke, Reinhold Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann

Woodrow Wilson Center Press
Washington, D.C.

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California
2. “No Crowing”: Reagan, Trust, and Human Rights

Sarah B. Snyder

U.S. president Ronald Reagan is well known for using the phrase “trust, but verify” in connection with Soviet-American arms control negotiations. It has not yet been sufficiently associated with his thinking on Soviet human rights practices, but he clearly sought to reduce mistrust with Soviet leaders to enable progress on human rights—one of a range of issues that Reagan sought to improve during his presidency. This chapter addresses Reagan’s approach to negotiations with the Soviets over human rights issues, and the ways in which the development of a degree of trust facilitated Soviet progress in this sphere. It focuses in particular on Reagan’s interest in securing emigration visas for two Pentecostal families that had sought refuge in the US embassy in Moscow, his discussions with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev about human rights at the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik summits, and Soviet-American negotiations about improving Soviet human rights practices over the course of the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Review Meeting (1986–89). Taken together, these three cases show that Reagan’s willingness to pursue “quiet diplomacy,” a practice that was much maligned by observers in the Nixon years, may have been a key factor in establishing a greater degree of trust in Soviet-American relations and in facilitating Reagan’s accomplishments in this area. This analysis also fits into growing efforts to introduce the history of emotions and the senses into international history.

The relationship that Reagan forged with Gorbachev was surprising, given that before entering office Reagan had demonstrated a long record of anticommunism, dating to his efforts to root out suspected communist sympathizers in Hollywood during his leadership of the Screen Actors Guild in the early Cold War. He also expressed strong skepticism about the trustworthiness of Soviet leaders, particularly of their ability or willingness to uphold agreements. In his nationally syndicated radio broadcasts in the 1970s, Reagan had been broadly critical of negotiating with communist countries because, in his view: “violating agreements is standard operating procedure for communists.” Furthermore, during the 1976 presidential election, Reagan condemned President Gerald Ford’s signature of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. In Reagan’s view, this agreement, which Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev had also signed, offered the Soviets a considerable propaganda victory (an agreement to recognize the inviolability of frontiers) at little cost, given what he saw as the low likelihood that the Soviets would adhere to the act’s more onerous tenets (a pledge to respect human rights and facilitate human contacts in Europe). In particularly strong language, Reagan alleged that the agreement had “put the American seal of approval on the Red Army’s World War II conquests.”

He used even more incendiary language in his first news conference as president in January 1981. In response to a question about the “intentions” of the Soviet Union, which in his memoirs Reagan characterized as asking if the United States could “trust” the Soviet Union, the president replied that “the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that, and that is moral, not immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards. I think when you do business with them, even at a detente, you keep that in mind.” Reagan’s concerns about the trustworthiness of communist leaders were heightened with the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981, which shocked and angered Reagan.

Pentecostals in the Basement

Similarly unexpected was Reagan’s attention to human rights as president. Although Reagan did not rhetorically champion human rights in the way that his predecessor Jimmy Carter had done, he devoted considerable personal attention to a number of cases such as the Pentecostal families living in the US embassy in Moscow. In June 1978, the Vaschenko and Chmyhalov families forced their way into the US embassy in an effort to secure emigration from the Soviet Union. When permission to emigrate was not forthcoming, the two families began living in the embassy basement, fearing the consequences if they left the embassy. They did not leave for five years.

Reagan raised his concern for the Pentecostal families during his first meeting with Foreign Service officer Jack Matlock, who was returning from the US embassy in Moscow. According to Matlock, Reagan’s interest was driven by his concern for “identifiable human beings” and derived perhaps from his earlier work as a lifeguard in that he wanted to save people who needed help.
In January 1982, Reagan pressed Brezhnev for exit visas for the Pentecostal families, citing the Helsinki Final Act in support of their right to leave the Soviet Union.11 In February 1983, in his first one-on-one meeting with long-serving Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, Reagan asked that the two families be allowed to emigrate as a signal of goodwill to the United States. Promising that the United States would not draw negative attention to any Soviet action, Reagan pledged that there would be no “crowing.”12 Foreign Service officer Tom Simons reported that in Reagan’s meeting with Dobrynin, the president spent about “one-third of his time on human rights, with a special emphasis on the Pentecostals.”13 According to Dobrynin’s memoirs, Reagan’s request that the Soviets release the Pentecostals as a symbol of improved US-Soviet relations confused him, given all of the other pressing issues in their relationship.14

Reagan viewed his commitment not to “crow” about positive steps taken by the Soviets as a means of building a relationship based on trust, which political scientist Deborah Welch Larson has argued is a “necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for states to cooperate.”15 Although there was not immediately a direct response, in Matlock’s view, Reagan’s personal emphasis facilitated the families’ emigration several months later, after bilateral negotiations spearheaded by Max M. Kampelman, the US ambassador to the CSCE review meeting in Madrid.16 The Soviet decision to allow the Pentecostals to emigrate was not unlike the confidence-building measures employed in the military sphere, in that Soviet action and Reagan’s low-key response to their emigration suggested that Soviet-American negotiations could be productive after years of stagnation.

In his first term, Reagan’s efforts at private diplomacy were largely unsuccessful.17 Political instability in the Soviet Union, combined with repeated Soviet refusals to negotiate with the United States on human rights issues, prevented Reagan from successfully pursuing a highly personal role. Reagan attempted to exert influence in correspondence with Soviet leaders; however, Brezhnev and his successors Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko were each unwilling to engage substantively on human rights questions, regarding US interest as undue interference.18 In his diary, Reagan recounts that in a draft letter he had assured Brezhnev that if the Soviet Union allowed Jewish refusenik Anatoly Shcharansky to emigrate to Israel, Brezhnev’s action on this matter would be “strictly between us.” Furthermore, Reagan wrote that if Brezhnev were to allow the Pentecostals to emigrate, “this is between the two of us and I will not reveal that I made any such request. I’m sure however you understand that such actions on your part would lessen my problems in future negotiations between our two countries.”19 Not surprisingly, Brezhnev reacted defensively in his response.20 Reagan also expressed interest in the plight of other individual activists, such as physicist Andrei Sakharov and Jewish refusenik Ida Nudel, in letters to the Soviet leader.21 For Reagan, building trust was not an end in itself but rather was one means to secure the release of certain individuals from the Soviet system. In another tact, Reagan wrote in his diary that he and Secretary of State George Shultz had agreed that in an upcoming meeting with Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, Shultz would “stay low key with regard to a summit[.] agree in principle but say we’d have to see some action. 1st – permission for Jews to emigrate, let the Pentecostals out of our embassy in Moscow. Seven of them have been trapped there for 4 years.”22 Yet Reagan’s focus on these individual cases was never separate from the Cold War context.

The United States raised its human rights concerns in a number of other ways, including meetings between Gromyko and secretaries of state Alexander Haig or George Shultz, and Max Kampelman’s meetings with the Soviets in Madrid.23 According to Kampelman, Reagan personally pushed him to negotiate with the Soviets at Madrid to help Jewish refuseniks, saying, “Max, see what you can do to help these people,” as he handed him a list of names.24 Reagan also asked Kampelman to press for the emigration of the Pentecostals as part of a package agreement. Kampelman estimates that he spent 400 hours in bilateral negotiations with the Soviets at Madrid.25

As a result of these negotiations, in May 1983 Kampelman’s Soviet counterpart outlined his country’s position: it was willing to grant twenty-three exit visas for the Pentecostals, three Helsinki monitors would be released and allowed to emigrate, and there would be possible movement on Shcharansky and five other prominent cases.26 According to one Soviet specialist, Andropov wanted to improve relations with the West and was therefore willing to make some “gestures” on human rights.27 The Soviets, however, reneged on the agreement to release Shcharansky and several other Soviet dissidents, sharply angering Kampelman and suggesting that a good degree of mistrust remained between the two sides.28 Ultimately, Kampelman did secure a pledge that if the Vashchenko and Chmykalov families left the American embassy, they would be allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union.29 The significance that the White House attributed to the Pentecostals’ plight can be seen in Shultz’s handwritten letter to Reagan once the families had emigrated:

Now that both Pentecostal families are out, you must feel relieved but also exhilarated. Giving freedom to a human being is a gift of great wonderment.

Few people know how this all happened and I happen to be one of them. As someone with a ring side seat, let me express to you my admiration for the way you have handled this. You are a real pro and a deeply human person.
As per its agreement with the Soviets, the United States did not publicize its role in aiding the Pentecostals. After the second Pentecostal family had emigrated, Reagan recorded in his diary, “quiet diplomacy is working.”

Developing trust was complicated for Reagan and his ideological adversaries. As much as Reagan and Shultz were thrilled by the Pentecostals’ release, they repeatedly were disappointed by other Soviet actions. For example, during a July 1983 meeting reviewing negotiations with the Soviets, Reagan commented, “The Soviets are being devious about their promise to let [Anatoly] Shcharansky go. We’re going to hold them to it.”

Kampelman tried to encourage Soviet human rights progress by suggesting other potential areas for improvements in the US-Soviet relationship. He implied that “if they permit a plane load of monitors and activists to leave their prisons, many benefits to them would flow and we could be more flexible on specific human rights words in Madrid.” The concessions that Kampelman secured at Madrid were significant in that they demonstrated a Soviet willingness to negotiate on cases of humanitarian concern to the United States. Kampelman’s progress, however, was a small gesture, given the vast scope of the problem. A broader commitment by the Soviet government was necessary. The circumstances for such a shift did not seem possible until after Gorbachev had been in office for several months and the two leaders began to develop a personal relationship.

Establishing a Personal Relationship in Geneva

In an important step for human rights improvements over time and the possibility of introducing a greater degree of trust in their relationship, at the November 1985 Geneva summit Reagan expressed a willingness to avoid anti-Soviet propaganda if the Soviets made some concessions on human rights. Indeed, after the summit Reagan told his cabinet that he would no longer pressure the Soviet Union on human rights publicly. Political scientist Andrew Kydd has defined “trust” as “a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation.” In Kydd’s view, “mistrust” is “a belief that the other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit one’s cooperation.” Reagan thus wanted to remove the impression that he hoped to exploit Soviet cooperation. As part of Reagan’s new commitment not to “crow” when Gorbachev took positive steps on human rights, he declined to receive Soviet human rights activist Elena Bonner when she visited the United States for medical treatment.

Over time, Gorbachev and a group of close advisers helped foster a culture of reform within the Soviet government. These reforms began with respect to military and security measures, including a progressive agreement signed at Stockholm in 1986 to allow on-site military inspections for the first time, and gradually evolved to include an array of human rights improvements. Given the secretive nature of the Soviet regime, especially on military matters, it had strongly opposed on-site inspections. Soviet negotiators claimed repeatedly that the United States and the West were using the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe to gain “unilateral advantages” during the negotiations. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) diplomats, however, were demanding that the confidence- and security-building measures be “verifiable,” which was consistent with Reagan’s long-held concerns about Soviet willingness to adhere to agreements. The Soviet concession on on-site inspections was psychologically costly, demonstrating a real commitment to concluding the talks successfully.

Like his predecessors, Gorbachev initially was reluctant to address human rights with Reagan. In their first correspondence in early 1985, Reagan affirmed the United States’ commitment to human rights. When Gorbachev replied, he indicated an interest in a summit meeting to ease Soviet-American tensions, but did not address Reagan’s discussion of human rights. In a subsequent letter, Reagan raised questions about Gorbachev’s commitment to improving relations, citing continued Soviet human rights abuses in violation of CSCE agreements: “strict observance . . . of the Helsinki Final Act is an important element of our bilateral relationship.” Similarly, later that month, Reagan highlighted the gravity of human rights issues: “let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we believe strongly that strict observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Helsinki Final Act is an important element of our bilateral relationship.” Reagan’s futile efforts with Gorbachev and previous Soviet general secretaries highlight the limits to personal correspondence. Reagan would raise human rights in their one-on-one meetings with greater success.

Gorbachev’s overriding focus on invigorating the Soviet economy necessitated reducing Soviet military expenditures, which led to his strong interest in reaching arms control agreements with the United States. Arms control negotiations would succeed only with reciprocal (and often costly) concessions, which more likely would be achieved with greater trust. Gorbachev also saw that in addition to reducing military expenditures through arms control agreements, the moribund Soviet economy needed Western technology, trade, and financial support. In order to improve economic relations or garner international assistance, Gorbachev recognized that he would need to normalize relations with the West, which would be aided by the development of bilateral trust. A key element of enhanced trust would be a better Soviet.
human rights record. Gorbachev may have felt more comfortable taking such steps, given Reagan’s assurances that he would not use Soviet concessions for political purposes.

The 1985 Geneva summit offered Reagan and Gorbachev the opportunity to meet face to face, establish a personal relationship, lay a foundation upon which to build trust, and begin to forge agreements. There were also considerable risks. Nonetheless, according to Jack Matlock, Reagan, in his correspondence with Gorbachev, “stressed the need to build trust, reduce weapons to a common low level, and deal with regional issues and human rights.” At Geneva, the United States hoped to emphasize four main themes, one of which was human rights. To ensure that the Soviet-American relationship would not be dominated solely by arms control discussions, the Reagan administration developed a four-point agenda to be addressed in all bilateral talks. It included human rights concerns, regional issues, arms control, and bilateral issues. On human rights, Reagan’s briefing paper advised him to express American concerns at low Jewish emigration, human rights activist Andrei Sakharov’s internal exile, political prisoners, and spouses divided by the Cold War, among other concerns. It also reported that the Soviets were attempting to “eliminate all forms of internal dissent” and that they had succeeded in dismantling the Moscow Helsinki Group by late 1982. Reagan wrote notes to himself in advance of the meeting; of the four-and-a-half double-spaced pages that he drafted, one full page was devoted to his thoughts on human rights: “We are somewhat publicly on the record about human rights. Front page stories that we are banging away on them their human rights abuses will get us some cheers from the bleachers, but it won’t help those who are being abused.”

Pressing the Soviets on human rights would certainly earn Reagan support from the many private citizens and politicians who wrote urging him to raise human rights issues with Gorbachev at Geneva, although Reagan wanted to affect change as well as score political points. A number of commentators have suggested that Reagan’s approach may have been influenced by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s support for quiet diplomacy in the early 1970s. Political scientists Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus have argued that changes in the Reagan administration’s objectives led to a shift from public to private diplomacy on the issue of human rights; the White House no longer sought publicity and propaganda, but rather achievements on this issue. Such a clear shift in objectives is not borne out by the evidence, however; Reagan’s different tactics were more a reflection of the circumstances than a change in underlying US goals. For Reagan, vocal public diplomacy made more sense at a CSCE meeting, while quiet pursuit of Helsinki objectives was more effective at other times during his presidency.

Nonetheless, it was clear Reagan wanted to institute a new approach with Gorbachev. Describing his objectives at Geneva, Reagan said, “Our purpose was to begin a fresh chapter in the relations between our two countries and to try to reduce the suspicions and mistrust between us.” Gorbachev used the term mistrust as well, reporting that “one of the main results of my meeting with President Reagan is that, as leaders and as human beings, we were able to take the first step towards overcoming mistrust and to activate the factor of confidence.”

In their two days of meetings, among other issues, Reagan told Gorbachev about American concern for divided families, and he suggested that movement on human rights would facilitate other types of cooperation, such as trade. In an important step for human rights progress and the future of their relationship, Reagan also expressed a willingness to avoid propaganda on the issue if the Soviets made some concessions on human rights. Gorbachev, in response, charged that anti-Soviet groups and even Reagan himself were using the issue of human rights for political reasons. Reagan assured Gorbachev he would not claim responsibility if the Soviets moved forward on some cases, and Gorbachev agreed to look at the cases. The two did not make significant progress on human rights at Geneva, but discussing the issue seemed to have shifted the dynamic of their personal relationship.

After Geneva, Reagan wrote to Gorbachev to outline his concerns about Soviet human rights, emphasizing that movement on human rights was central to improving the broader US-Soviet relationship. He noted with pleasure Soviet efforts to reunite divided spouses in the aftermath of the summit but also outlined a number of other areas he hoped that Gorbachev would address, including dual citizens and family reunification requests. The issues, according to Reagan, included—

the broad question of emigration, whether members of such groups as Jews, Armenians and others, or of some internationally known individuals. In both categories, we are talking about quite poignant cases. The young pianist I mentioned to you falls into the category of someone whose requests to emigrate have been refused. The political importance of resolving such well known cases as the Sakharovs, Scharansky [sic] and [Soviet physicist and human rights activist] Yuri Orlov cannot be overestimated. We are not interested in exploiting these cases. Their resolution will permit greater prominence for other issues in our relationship... the issues I have laid out in this letter are serious ones. Progress here would provide an enormous impetus to the resolution of other outstanding problems. Lack of progress will only hold us back.
By ceasing to press human rights issues publicly, Reagan hoped to convince Gorbachev that respecting human rights was in the best interests of the Soviet Union, and he recognized that Gorbachev would be much more likely to implement changes if it did not appear that he was simply reacting to Western demands, particularly because Gorbachev had indicated that the Soviet Union would not change its policies under American pressure. Reagan argues in his memoirs that his Geneva commitment to Gorbachev to use quiet diplomacy facilitated progress on human rights over time.

Reagan succeeded in convincing Gorbachev of his interest in human rights, as Gorbachev later wrote that Americans had “an almost missionary passion for preaching about human rights and liberties” despite what he termed “a disregard for ensuring those same elementary rights in their own home.” In his memoirs, Gorbachev recounted his discussions with Reagan at Geneva, suggesting they had lasting resonance for him:

Reagan began by saying that if the Soviet Union intended to improve its relations with the United States, it would do well to change its reputation with respect to individual freedom. He argued that the American public was very sensitive with respect to individual freedom. He argued that the American public was very sensitive about the issue and that therefore no American politician could ignore it.

Facing American and other entreaties on the issue, Gorbachev said that he was willing to discuss human rights broadly with the West, but not individual cases. His initial openness and overall less rigid demeanor compared with his predecessors offered American officials opportunities to influence Soviet policy in the long run. Larson has argued that more than simply a commitment to cooperation was required, but that “the identity of the individual leaders also mattered.” Reagan and Gorbachev may have been better suited to developing a working relationship than some of their predecessors.

For some observers, the 1985 Geneva summit marked a turning point in Gorbachev’s views on human rights policy. Others have suggested that his actions at the time were calculated to maximize the public relations value of each human rights move. Regardless, Gorbachev’s small steps, such as resolving divided family cases, raised American hopes that the Soviets might make more significant changes.

Reducing Mistrust in Iceland
As in Geneva, the principal issue under discussion at the October 1986 summit in Reykjavik was arms control, which in Reagan’s view required the development of trust between the two leaders. In addition, Reagan intended to press Gorbachev on human rights issues, announcing he would link them to other areas of the US-Soviet relationship: “I will make it amply clear to Mr. Gorbachev that unless there is real Soviet movement on human rights, we will not have the kind of political atmosphere necessary to make lasting progress on other issues.” At Reykjavik, Gorbachev agreed to discuss what he called “humanitarian issues” but resented Reagan’s efforts to press human rights before other, broader discussions occurred. In their talks, Reagan told Gorbachev that he wished that the Soviets could go further on human rights to facilitate more cooperation, and he gave Gorbachev a list of 1,200 Soviet Jews who were waiting to emigrate.

Reagan used the term trust when speaking to the American public about his summit meeting in Reykjavik:

For all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental. As President Kennedy once said, “And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?” I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev—again in Reykjavik, as I had in Geneva—we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we’re all from Missouri—you got to show us.

Reagan’s remarks show the clear correlation in his mind between improved human rights practices and the development of trust between him and Gorbachev. For Reagan, Soviet fulfillment of its pledges, whether in the Helsinki Final Act or elsewhere, would facilitate greater American trust of Soviet leaders. Such a connection is further demonstrated by Reagan’s December 1987 remarks to human rights activists: “The real joy will come, and trust between East and West will flourish, not only when prisoners are released but when the instruments of repression are dismantled and repressive laws and practices are abolished.”

Some observers see Reykjavik as marking an important shift in Soviet attitudes toward human rights. In November 1986, after the summit, Gorbachev
told the Politburo that the Soviet Union needed to improve its stance on human rights: “We need to work out a conception of human rights, both at home and abroad, and to put an end to the routine. It only produces dissidents.” Indeed, Matlock has argued that after Reykjavik, Gorbachev realized that he could achieve normalized relations with the United States only if he was willing to deal with “the full agenda of issues,” which included human rights. Yet other scholars such as political scientist Robert English have maintained that it was not Reykjavik, but rather the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in April 1986, that spurred Gorbachev to focus more on respect for human rights issues. Whether it was Chernobyl or Reykjavik that provided the tipping point, Gorbachev saw clear evidence that domestic problems and questions about Soviet trustworthiness prompted by noncompliance with the Helsinki Final Act and the secrecy surrounding the Chernobyl accident could negatively affect the Soviet image abroad. British prime minister Margaret Thatcher also warned Gorbachev that the Soviets would never develop international relations based on trust if they did not respect human rights and democracy. This series of events had highlighted for Gorbachev what Western leaders had emphasized for some time, that the United States under Reagan, Britain under Thatcher, and other like-minded governments determined their relations with the Soviet Union based on its commitment to upholding international agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act—or, in another sense, if it could be trusted. Reagan’s and Thatcher’s messages seem to have penetrated Gorbachev’s policymaking in late 1986, when his efforts to pursue domestic reforms to improve the Soviet image abroad accelerated during the Vienna CSCE Review Meeting, which opened in November 1986.

**Demonstrating Progress in Vienna**

Over the course of the Vienna meeting, Soviet and American negotiators developed a relationship of trust that enabled significant reforms in Soviet human rights practices. As a result of these negotiations, the Soviets ceased radio jamming, allowed increased emigration, released political prisoners, and altered their criminal code. Anatoly Adamishin and Richard Schifter, who negotiated on human rights for the Soviet and American sides respectively, wrote, “The Soviet-U.S. human rights dialogue of the late 1980s achieved significant results” because both Gorbachev and Reagan “wanted to remove the obstacle to good relations that disagreement on human rights issues presented.” The Soviet Union undertook meaningful steps during the Vienna talks to improve its human rights record. Of particular significance to the United States was the emigration of Jewish refusenik Ida Nudel, whose case had first come to Reagan’s attention in the 1970s. Shultz later said that he regarded the Soviet decision to grant Nudel an exit visa as one of his most significant accomplishments. In a further sign of increased willingness to resolve human rights cases, the Soviet government responded for the first time to congressional entreaties by resolving 137 cases of the 442 that the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a US government monitoring body, had raised several months earlier. Democratic representative Steny Hoyer of Maryland called the Soviet response “a positive move forward because it is the first time the Soviets have ever responded directly to a list presented by the official U.S. commission monitoring the Helsinki Accords. Hopefully this is an indication that the Soviets are willing to take specific steps to fulfill their Helsinki humanitarian commitments.” According to the commission, the 137 cases that the Soviets resolved involved more than 300 individuals who had long sought to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

As CSCE diplomats negotiated in Vienna, George Shultz, Richard Schifter, and Arthur Hartman (the US ambassador in Moscow) pressed the Soviets in bilateral channels as well. Schifter describes considerable diplomacy outside of formal negotiations. In the first half of 1988, Soviet and American officials were meeting every six weeks to discuss human rights concerns. According to Adamishin, by this point human rights had risen in significance as an issue in the Soviet view of its relations with the United States, such that at times it was regarded as being on a par with disarmament.

Shultz’s emphasis on the issue also slowly produced results, and he began to see genuine change in the Soviet position when Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze told him in September 1987, “Give me your lists and we will be glad to look at them.” Clearly, the Soviets saw such steps as being in their interest, and trusted that American officials would not exploit such concessions for propaganda purposes. By October 1987, the Soviets had granted exit visas to 6,000 people, more than six times the number given in 1986, although 7,500 cases remained. After meeting with Shevardnadze in Moscow, Shultz believed that the Soviet system of reviewing applications was finally effective. Not only was Shevardnadze an improvement over his predecessor Andrei Gromyko in his willingness to listen to Shultz’s concerns and occasionally act on cases that Shultz had mentioned, but by 1987, as Matlock has argued, “Shevardnadze actually began to try to change the system.” Nevertheless, the large number of exit visas outstanding indicated that many problems remained, raising questions about the depth of the Soviet commitment to change.

During the Vienna negotiations, Gorbachev and Reagan met several times. In one instance, when Reagan was en route to Moscow for a 1988 summit
meeting with Gorbachev, he stopped in Finland, where he delivered a speech heralding the Helsinki Final Act as "a kind of way through the wilderness of mutual hostility to open fields of peace and to a common home of trust among all of our sovereign nations. . . . The Final Act set new standards of conduct for our nations and provided the mechanisms by which to apply those standards." Reagan's rhetorical focus on trust suggests that he saw trust as an essential component of the improvement in Soviet-American relations. Yet he may have been slow to trust. In a June 1987 press conference, in response to a direct question, Reagan was not willing to say that he trusted Gorbachev. Several months later, Reagan remained reluctant to describe Soviet-American relations as based on trust. At the end of the year, Reagan acknowledged that there was "a certain chemistry between us," but would not characterize the relationship as one built on trust. This pattern continued in a March 1988 interview. It was not until December 1988, in his final news conference as president, that Reagan made a small but important concession. When asked if he trusted Gorbachev, Reagan said, "He hasn't shown me any reason yet that I shouldn't, but again, as I've said, that's why I kept referring to Dovorey no provorey—trust but verify." By the end of 1988, Gorbachev also asserted that "fears and suspicion are gradually giving way to trust and feelings of mutual liking." Reagan's final comments fit with a discernible shift in his rhetoric regarding trust and Gorbachev toward the end of his term, when he added a new line to his repetitive use of the "Russian proverb." In one speech, Reagan reportedly replaced "trust, but verify" with an American version—"Trust everybody, but cut the cards"—which suggests that even when trust exists, precautions should still be taken to ensure fair play.

As Reagan and Gorbachev's meetings progressed, the Soviet Union made greater strides in the Vienna meeting and in improving its domestic human rights record. When the two leaders met again in New York in December 1988 and discussed human rights, among other issues, there was increasing evidence of Soviet progress. Reagan advocated the release of the remaining political prisoners and action on all long-time refusenik applications, objectives that the Soviets moved toward achieving. In Shultz's view, the dialogue between Schifter and Adamishin "produced concrete results: an end to abuse of psychiatry [i.e., to confining political dissidents in psychiatric facilities], the release of political prisoners, the repeal of laws restricting freedom of expression, an end to the repression of religion, and a fundamental shift in the laws and regulations that governed emigration." Of particular note, when Schifter was in Moscow in November 1988, he made significant progress on speeding up emigration. He secured a Soviet agreement to resolve the cases of 120 refuseniks before Reagan left office, based on a calculation of the number of working days remaining. Schifter was unprepared for such a concession, which indicated the degree to which the Soviets wished to demonstrate their dedication to reform. As Larson has written, the "cost" of a concession indicates the depth of the conceder's commitment.

Conclusion
Throughout his administration, Ronald Reagan showed he wanted concrete improvements in the Soviet human rights record. That the Soviets were willing to take such steps to, in a word, "verify" their promises of reform earned them esteem from the Reagan administration. Concurrently, Reagan's quiet responses to their prisoner releases and exit-visa decisions signaled to Gorbachev that the president was a suitable negotiating partner. Most important, the establishment of a relationship of trust, built in part on human rights negotiations, helped facilitate the end of the Cold War.

Notes
1. This chapter uses Deborah Welch Larson's conception of trust as a "belief that the other has benevolent intentions toward us." Deborah Welch Larson, "Trust" (keynote address at "Trust, but Verify: Confidence and Distrust from Detente to the End of the Cold War," Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington, DC, November 2011). In the relationship discussed here, that between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in the late Cold War, diminishing mistrust was more easily accomplished than developing trust between the two adversaries. For discussion of a similar dynamic in their negotiations on arms control, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine's chapter in this volume.


8. Reagan’s support for human rights was episodic and clearly shaped by Cold War politics, in that he was largely inattentive to human rights abuses in South Africa, Central America, and countries allied with the United States.


10. Jack Matlock, interview by author, April 3, 2006. Reagan’s personal investment in these cases makes it unlikely he was only interested in the propaganda benefits of Eastern human rights abuses. Reagan did seem to sympathize with victims of communist repression, indicating that his strong anticomunism influenced his ideas on human rights.

11. Telegram, SecState to AmEmbassy Moscow, January 15, 1982, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev, Box 38, National Security Council Records (hereafter, NSC Records) Head of State, Executive Secretariat, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California (hereafter, Reagan Library). Brezhnev responded that the United States should not shelter the Pentecostals and instead force them to leave the embassy and seek exit visas through proper channels. Telegram, SecState to AmEmbassy Moscow, February 4, 1982, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev, Box 37, NSC Records Head of State, Executive Secretariat, Reagan Library.

12. Matlock, Reagan, and Gorbachev, 54. (For further discussion of Reagan’s “rhetorical restraint,” see Wheeler, Baker, and Condoleeza’s chapter in this volume.) In his account of the meeting, Dobrynin did not mention Reagan’s promise; however, Dobrynin did not know that Soviet officials in Moscow were frustrated that Reagan treated the fate of the Pentecostals as if it was “the most important issue between us.” Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Crown, 1995), 517–21.

13. Interview with Tom Simons, Folder 8, Box 3, Don Oberdorfer Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey. According to Haig, it was National Security Council staffers Richard Allen and Richard Pipes that spurred Reagan’s interest in the Pentecostals living in the Moscow embassy. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner, 1984), 110.


16. Matlock’s account offers important insight into the level, style, and areas of Reagan’s personal involvement in United States foreign policy. Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 57–58.
32. Ibid., 166. Shechansky was not released until February 1986 as part of an exchange for a Soviet spy.
37. Perhaps this was Reagan’s own form of a confidence-building measure.
40. Gorbachev to Reagan, March 24, 1985, USSR GSG 8590272-8590419, Box 39, Executive Secretary NSC Head of State File, Reagan Library.
41. Reagan to Gorbachev, April 30, 1985, USSR GSG 8590475-8590495, Box 39, Executive Secretary NSC Head of State File, Reagan Library.
45. In each of these areas, not just human rights, the United States tried to reduce mistrust with the Soviet Union. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 266.
47. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 152.
48. For a representative example, see Hammen to Reagan, October 18, 1985, Folder 6, Box 2, FO 006-09, WHORM, Reagan Library; Adram to McFarlane, September 9, 1985, Folder 4, ibid; Broomfield to Oglesby, November 4, 1985, Folder 16, ibid; and Flis to Reagan, October 29, 1985, Folder 12, ibid; Specter et al. to Reagan, October 24, 1985, Folder 7, ibid; and D’Amato et al. to Reagan, November 5, 1985, Folder 1, Box 32, PR 007, ibid.
54. Shultz to Reagan, December 4, 1985, USSR GSG 8591241-8591245, Box 40, Head of State File, Executive Secretary NSC, Reagan Library; and Reagan to Gorbachev, December 7, 1985, ibid.
56. Matlock, interview, April 3, 2006; and Memorandum, Shultz to Reagan, January 14, 1986, 90024, Box 40, USSR GSG 8690024-8690124, Head of State File, Executive Secretary, National Security Council, Reagan Library.
60. Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 205.
62. According to Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY), the Soviet Union was making tactical concessions to disguise continued repression: “There is reason to believe that recent promising developments were nothing more than another cynical attempt by Soviet leaders to manipulate the Western media and, through them, Western political leaders and public opinion.” Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing, “Human Rights and the CSCE Process in the Soviet Union,” February 27, 1986, 99th Congress, 2nd Session.
63. For further discussion, see Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation*, 112.


73. Shultz describes Nudel’s phone call to him from Israel upon her arrival there as “a very emotional moment” for him. Rozanne Ridgway Interview, Folder 30, Box 2, Oberdorfer Papers; George Shultz Interview, Folder 2, Box 3, ibid.; and George Shultz Interview, December 18, 2002, Reagan Presidential Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia.

74. "Soviets Announce Resolution of Case Concerns," *CSCE Digest*, April 1987, CSCE Digest, Box 6, JBANC.


76. Anatoly Adamishin, August 5, 1989 Interview Transcript, Folder 1, Box 1, The Hoover Institution and the Gorbachev Foundation (Moscow) Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California.


84. Ronald Reagan, "The President’s News Conference," December 8, 1988, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35251. Reagan’s slow progress to this point, despite his admission in his memoirs that he was usually quick to trust, suggests that may have conceptualized “trust” as separate from the personal friendship he developed with the Soviet leader. For more on the distinction among friendship, sympathy, and trust, see Ute Frevert, "Emotions in History—TRUST and Confidence" (keynote address at "Trust, but Verify: Confidence and Distrust from Detente to the End of the Cold War," Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington, DC, November 2011).


3. Trust between Adversaries and Allies: President George H. W. Bush, Trust, and the End of the Cold War

J. Simon Rofe

"You can’t develop or earn this mutual trust and respect unless you deliberately work at it.” George H. W. Bush wrote these words in recounting a difference of opinion with Henry Kissinger regarding personal diplomacy and national interests when the latter was national security advisor to President Richard M. Nixon and embarking on the policy of détente. As can be seen in his correspondence with Kissinger, Bush felt that trust was required to operate at the highest level of US and international politics.

This chapter argues that trust, and its double-edged capacity, was a hallmark of the George H. W. Bush administration’s diplomacy and foreign policy making at the end of the Cold War. The reliance on trust was seen in three different capacities. First, with advisers such as Brent Scowcroft and James A. Baker III, Bush required trust to be able to contemplate unpalatable policy options and make decisions. Second, with allies like West German chancellor Helmut Kohl, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, and French president François Mitterrand, trust was political capital that enabled Bush to garner

---

The author would like to thank the editorial team of Martin Klimke, Christian Ostermann, and Reinhold Kreiss for their unstinting patience on this project, and to express gratitude for offering the opportunity to contribute to the colloquium in Washington, D.C., in November 2011, and subsequently to contribute to this volume. Equally, I would like to add my thanks to Shannon Granville and her colleagues at the Wilson Center. Elements of an earlier version of this analysis appeared in Michael Patrick Cullinane and Clare Frances Elliott, ed., International Perspectives on Presidential Leadership: An International View of the White House (New York: Routledge, 2014).