

BEYOND THE COLD WAR

*Lyndon Johnson and the New Global
Challenges of the 1960s*

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THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DURING THE
JOHNSON YEARS

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Increased focus on human rights in US foreign policy in the 1970s is often attributed to congressional and popular reaction against Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's realpolitik, the administration's pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union, and immoral American actions in Chile and elsewhere in the world in this period.¹ Some accounts have highlighted members of Congress, such as Representative Donald M. Fraser (Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party-MN) and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), who were active in pressing human rights concerns onto the American diplomatic agenda.² A larger body of literature has argued that when Jimmy Carter became president in 1977 he reformulated US foreign policy to address such concerns, and Carter's emphasis on human rights was one element of an international human rights movement that gained increasing influence in the 1970s.³ Underlying these accounts is the conviction that human rights were of limited consequence in policymaking during the 1960s; indeed, political scientist David P. Forsythe has characterized the years from 1953 to 1974 as a period of American "neglect" for human rights.⁴ Although human rights was certainly not a dominant issue in US foreign policy during the Johnson years, it was considered at the highest levels of the National Security Council and the State Department. Efforts to emphasize attention to human rights actually began during Lyndon Johnson's administration, earlier than most accounts suggest, and were advanced by state and nonstate actors. The emergence of concern for human rights in the 1960s, in fact, facilitated its

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prominence in the years that followed. This chapter will examine US policy toward Greece and Southern Rhodesia, two very different cases in terms of who advocated greater attention to human rights, the extent to which human rights concerns were considered, and how each fit into larger Cold War politics. Both cases suggest human rights concerns were increasingly under consideration, but that the Johnson administration was not as uniformly supportive of human rights abroad as it was of civil rights at home.

A range of factors were important to enhanced interest in the role of human rights in American foreign policy in the 1960s; changes at the international level and new trends in American domestic politics spurred this development. The United Nations was particularly important to the issue's emergence; the organization's agenda changed as more African and Asian countries joined the General Assembly, leading the body increasingly to turn its attention to self-determination, racial discrimination, and concern for human rights. Debates on these issues at the United Nations (UN), especially during the years former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg served as Washington's ambassador to the organization (1965–1968), influenced US foreign policy, as Goldberg attempted to use his bully pulpit in New York to transmit concerns about human rights to Washington. The General Assembly's unanimous decision in 1963 to designate 1968 the International Year for Human Rights (IYHR) in honor of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also raised the profile of human rights. A temporary committee for human rights was established to facilitate American participation in the IYHR, and the United States attended the culminating International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968.⁵

Beyond the influence of the United Nations, the beginnings of what would become a significant nongovernmental movement for human rights emerged in the early 1960s and directed American attention to abuses in foreign countries. Amnesty International, which became one of the most prominent groups to advance the cause of human rights, was established in 1961 in response to an op-ed by British lawyer Peter Benenson that profiled six "forgotten prisoners" who were suffering for their religious or political beliefs.⁶ The organization's model of activism utilized letter-writing campaigns to secure the release of political prisoners and to exert pressure on countries to change their human rights practices.⁷ Amnesty International also undertook fact-finding missions and reported on allegations of human rights abuses, in particular Greek political repression in the late 1960s. It quickly became an international movement, establishing chapters in Switzerland, Italy, the United States, and France, among other countries; like the concern for global poverty that Sheyda Jahanbani describes elsewhere in this

volume, attention to human rights transcended national borders. Amnesty's international presence and vocal advocacy of the plight of political prisoners helped insert discussion of human rights into foreign policy debates.

Increased consideration for human rights was also influenced by interventions abroad and developments at home. Moral opposition to containment, which had led to American involvement in Vietnam, fueled critiques of US policy. At issue for many was the extent to which Cold War priorities were diminishing America's image abroad and undermining the morality of its foreign policy. International events, including the war in Vietnam, coups in Chile and Greece, and American intervention in the Dominican Republic, all influenced interest in human rights. In addition, support for human rights internationally was closely linked with domestic concerns about civil, political, economic, and social rights during the Johnson years.

In Washington, attention to human rights was advanced primarily by members of Congress, who reacted to actions, or inaction, on the part of the administration. Historian Robert David Johnson has characterized members of Congress who wanted to emphasize cultural and economic elements of foreign policy over military ones as the "new internationalists." These members of Congress believed the United States had too willingly supported right-wing dictators and had become overly reliant on military solutions; they pushed instead for what they regarded as a more moral foreign policy.⁸ In the 1960s, members of Congress who subscribed to these tenets increasingly asserted themselves, criticizing US policy and pressing for changes in the country's relations with the world. These efforts culminated in the early 1970s, when the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements held a series of hearings in 1973 on human rights and ultimately pressed a number of measures that forced the US government to take greater account of the issue when formulating and executing its foreign policy.

A key issue for members of Congress was American policy toward Greece in the aftermath of the 1967 *coup d'état*, which prompted international outcry and engendered deep concern for the abrogation of human rights there.⁹ In the wake of the coup, the Greek junta dealt harshly with its perceived enemies, arresting them, subjecting them to torture, and imprisoning them in island concentration camps. Yet, Greece's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Cold War security concerns meant many governments were hesitant to criticize the regime too harshly. Although the Johnson administration condemned the nature of the Greek regime, repeatedly inquired with the junta about the fate of political prisoners, and implemented an embargo against heavy military exports to Greece,

the United States did not actively undermine the new leaders. Moreover, the selective embargo, implemented in May 1967, was later lifted, due to concerns that stemming the flow of military aid to Greece could weaken the NATO alliance. The Johnson administration became increasingly focused on access to Greek bases after the outbreak of war in the Middle East, which heightened the strategic significance of the Mediterranean. As a result, in the aftermath of the Six Day War, the United States lessened its criticism of the military junta in Greece, and the Johnson administration opposed and defeated Senate efforts to end military assistance to Greece.¹⁰

Concerns about the administration's tepid position toward Greece were raised in the context of a campaign against the politically repressive junta, and as Nick Cullather has shown with regard to Johnson administration policy toward famine in India, nonstate actors played a significant role in forcing the president and his aides to grapple with human rights concerns. Historian Barbara Keys has argued that "anti-junta activism helped lay the groundwork for the worldwide 'human rights boom' of the 1970s."¹¹ Amnesty International was very active in responding to reports of human rights violations in the aftermath of the Greek coup, and its reporting maintained international attention on the junta's repression. The group sent a delegation to Greece in December 1967, and its personnel stayed for four weeks, interviewing prisoners and taking testimony from their family members. In its January 1968 report, "Situation in Greece," Amnesty International outlined its argument that "torture as a deliberate practice is carried out by the Security Police . . . and the Military Police" and detailed twelve different physical methods being used to torture political prisoners. Its investigators found the psychological torture employed by the regime to be equally devastating to political prisoners and stated the Security Police and Military Police operated without any restrictions on their behavior.¹²

Such reporting inspired a range of governmental and nongovernmental actors to oppose ongoing US support for the regime. Many American critics viewed the government's attitude toward the colonels in the context of their own opposition to the war in Vietnam and intervention in the Dominican Republic.¹³ Representative Donald M. Fraser was particularly active in response to the Greek coup and expressed concern about support for the regime, especially in terms of military assistance, information policy, and public and private investment in the country. He pushed the State Department to do more than have a "hands off, no comment, position regarding the denial of human rights in Greece today," indicating he was particularly troubled at reports that the Greek regime was torturing its political prisoners.¹⁴

Fraser undertook steps on his own and acted in concert with a nongovernmental organization devoted to the issue, the US Committee for Democracy in Greece. In one instance, he wrote to the Secretary of State and the White House to express apprehension about political prisoners in Greece, raising the case of Andreas Papandreou, the son of prominent, deposed politician George Papandreou, a rising political leader, and a former professor at the University of Minnesota.¹⁵ In a different case, Fraser wrote to the Greek Ambassador to the United States to press his concerns about politically motivated arrests and the torture of prisoners.¹⁶ Fraser traveled to Greece in May 1968 to investigate US policy toward the junta, and his visit solidified his opposition.¹⁷ He later said:

I became interested in U.S. policies toward Greece after the military junta seized power there in the middle sixties. Once again United States interests seemed to outweigh those of the Greek people. I recall being in Athens and being shown a picture of some tanks which were moving down the streets of Athens. They were U.S. tanks, and they were being used to suppress students who were protesting against the military junta's destruction of democracy in Greece.¹⁸

After returning from Greece, Fraser gave a speech in the House of Representatives on the repressive nature of the regime in Athens: "Torture of political prisoners has occurred in some Greek prisons. . . . Arrests and imprisonment of persons who speak critically in public continue. Thousands of Greeks have been imprisoned." Fraser recommended steps to pressure the Greek junta, including American condemnation of the regime and a significant reduction in military assistance to the government.¹⁹

Fraser worked closely with the US Committee for Democracy in Greece, which was part of a broader network of groups and individuals in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, who were opposed to the Greek regime.²⁰ The US Committee for Democracy in Greece, which was organized by many well-known Washington-based liberals such as Representative Don Edwards (D-CA), former Attorney General Francis Biddle, labor leader Victor Reuther, and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), warned that the United States risked tarnishing its international image if it failed to separate itself from the leadership in Athens. In a newsletter to its supporters, the Committee cautioned: "The presence of the Greek dictatorship is a constant threat to the unity of the Western world. . . . By continuing assistance to the present regime, the United States would risk seriously

undermining the entire Western alliance."²¹ Although opponents of the regime in Athens made their case in hyperbolic terms at times, tensions were growing within NATO over the regime's human rights violations with Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway all initiating action against Greece before the European Commission on Human Rights in 1967.

In addition to his own personal concerns about the Greek junta, Fraser's constituents and others worried about the situation pressed him to act. Several hundred people wrote to Fraser on behalf of the Minnesotans for Democracy and Freedom in Greece.²² Amnesty International also encouraged Fraser to pressure the Greek government directly or through the State Department to permit Amnesty International to send a mission to Greece to investigate the plight of political prisoners.²³ His efforts drew the attention of the Greek opposition; for example, Margaret Papandreou, Andreas's American-born wife, later wrote to Fraser after his 1970 election victory: "The Greek democratic community celebrated your victory in many parts of the United States."²⁴

Fraser was one of the most prominent elected officials active on human rights violations in Greece, but the cause drew wide attention as former colleagues, friends, and supporters of Andreas Papandreou mobilized on his behalf in the United States. His wife, Margaret, also worked to keep international attention focused on her husband's plight and repeatedly appealed to the US embassy in Athens for assistance. She wrote to Galbraith, Stephen Rousseas of New York University, and George Linias at Purdue University to enlist their support for her husband, and academics from Minnesota, Leo Hurwicz and John Buttrick, let her know that they were working on behalf of her husband.²⁵ Overall, 250 economists were said to have written to the White House on Papandreou's behalf.²⁶ After the coup was launched, Galbraith heard that Papandreou might be executed by the Greek junta and many American academics, including fellow economists from Stanford, Minnesota, and Harvard, reached out to him for his assistance. Galbraith called Johnson aide Joseph Califano at the White House to express the widespread concern for Papandreou's fate in academic circles. Johnson reportedly said, "This is the first issue in history on which all the American economists seem to have agreed."²⁷ Galbraith reports that Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach called him later that evening to report a message from Johnson: "Call up Ken Galbraith and tell him I've told those Greek bastards to lay off that son-of-a-bitch—whoever he is."²⁸ Economist Walter Heller, who was particularly active, wrote to Johnson, "The academic grapevine was crackling from coast to coast last night with the good news that you were taking a direct hand in the Papandreou case.... The

word of your quick and direct interest is spreading fast and favorably."²⁹ White House aides were cognizant of the extent to which Andreas's incarceration focused attention on US policy toward Greece: "Our major problem here in the White House is domestic concern for the safety of Andreas Papandreou... Andreas' friends—Walter Heller, Carl Kaysen and others—have mounted a major telephone campaign, which some of us fear could cause real trouble."³⁰ In their responses, White House representatives wrote that the US embassy was pressing for the "safety of political prisoners."³¹

In part due to the campaign by his supporters, the United States conveyed its concerns for Papandreou's safety.³² Indeed, it had been involved even before Papandreou's supporters had mobilized. Andreas Papandreou's father-in-law, Douglas Chant, visited the United States embassy the day of the coup to seek American intervention to protect Andreas. Ambassador Phillips Talbot reportedly told Chant that the United States "has and would by every means discourage Greek military leaders from any resort to violence or bloodshed."³³ Talbot warned that any harm suffered by political prisoners would "greatly increase complications of already complicated situation."³⁴ Several days later, the United States expressed concern about the fate of detainees in a meeting with the Greek Minister of the Interior who told Talbot that the regime "intends to kill no one."³⁵ In addition, Deputy National Security Adviser Francis Bator reached out to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Richard Helms, to highlight that Papandreou had a range of supporters in intellectual and academic circles in the United States. Bator also noted a "consular rationale,—Papandreou's wife and children were American citizens—for "special attention" to Papandreou's case.³⁶ Furthermore, internal State Department documents reveal that "Ambassador Talbot has expressed U.S. concern to the new Prime Minister about the fate of the prisoners, and he was assured none would be harmed... There is some uneasiness about the fate of the younger Papandreou should he remain incarcerated."³⁷ American analysts believed Papandreou was not in immediate danger, but noted, "The junta desires to eliminate Andreas from the Greek political scene." They hoped to avoid "summary action" against him.³⁸

Embassy officials in Athens sought to balance between ensuring Papandreou's rights were respected, especially given the attention of Greek-Americans to his case, while also avoiding angering the junta by seeming to champion one of its strongest opponents.³⁹ According to CIA analysis, Greek officials had "not taken kindly to what they regard as unwarranted American interest in the welfare of their 'enfant terrible', Andreas Papandreou."⁴⁰ Papandreou later wrote in his memoirs, "There was some

fear in the United States, I learned, that I was to be taken before a kangaroo court and summarily executed, and my friends in that country had been pressuring President Lyndon Johnson to intervene on my behalf. It was to the concern of those friends, I concluded, that I owed the fact that I was still alive."⁴¹ Margaret Papandreou also believed this pressure had been essential and wrote to Johnson expressing appreciation for his "swift humanitarian action" on behalf of her husband.⁴² The influence of the United States, however, is less clear as Andreas Papandreou reports that Talbot told him after his release that the junta had never planned to kill him and that the leaders had told Talbot that they would treat Papandreou well before Johnson's message arrived.⁴³

Beyond its immediate focus on Papandreou and a number of other political prisoners, the US government struggled with how to respond to the coup other than to make clear it was not involved.⁴⁴ The US Ambassador to Greece, Philip Talbot, in an initial cable back to Washington referred to the coup as the "rape of Greek democracy." Rostow suggested Talbot's characterization may have been overly dramatic, but noted in a memo to Johnson, "We do regret the coup."⁴⁵ Rostow wrote to Johnson on April 21, 1967:

At some point soon, I feel we should express regret—even if softly—that democratic processes have been suspended. I fear that our posture before the Greek Americans and the Greek people will look weak-kneed if we completely avoid judgment. Greek democracy is something all the world cherishes, and we have made a strong effort through Ambassador Talbot to stave this off. However, State logically argues that we should hold off on any substantive comment this morning lest we encourage violence against the coup government.⁴⁶

Several days later, Rostow reported to Johnson that the United States was "doing business with the new government, but Phil Talbot has made clear that our cooperation will depend on quick restoration of civil liberties and return to constitutional government as soon as possible."⁴⁷ State Department officials regarded US policy toward Greece in the wake of the coup to be "cool but correct." The State Department monitored human rights abuses in Greece, and as of June 9, 1967, they estimated Greece had 5,000 political prisoners incarcerated.⁴⁸

The administration had halted major arms shipments to Greece in the wake of the coup to signal its displeasure and to induce future reform, but it did not give too much weight to evidence of human rights abuses in formulating its policy toward Greece.⁴⁹ By late July, however, the State

Department believed the arms suspension was no longer effective.⁵⁰ A July 1967 memorandum to Johnson suggested the decision to withhold arms shipments was inspired as much by domestic political considerations as by the message it would send to the junta. Rusk argued existing US policy was "no longer useful," particularly given US interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East.⁵¹ Increasingly, the United States prioritized stability and security in the Mediterranean, containment, and allied unity over strong opposition to the junta.⁵² Interestingly, several memoranda suggested Greece could follow Charles de Gaulle's lead and leave NATO's integrated military command if the United States did not end its suspension.⁵³ Rostow argued the United States could "make a convincing case that the foreign policy considerations should override our understandable distaste for doing business with a military regime in a country like Greece."⁵⁴ Rostow was hesitant to face inevitable congressional displeasure when the United States resumed arms shipments to Greece; he wrote that, given congressional debates on military aid, "this obviously isn't the best time." When the administration signaled it might shift its policy on aid to Greece a range of actors and groups cabled the White House asking that it not begin arms shipments again.⁵⁵

The abrogation of democratic principles in Greece, given its history and location, inspired considerable dismay; that the United States would not act in defense of democracy and human rights disheartened many and led to increasing disillusionment with Johnson's foreign policy. Rostow, however, doubted that American influence would lead to Greek reform: "We reluctantly conclude that our best bet is to go on applying what pressure we can in the full knowledge that nothing we do short of unlikely military intervention will change this Government's course very radically."⁵⁶ Although in a sign that it needed to take human rights violations into account when formulating its policy, the White House weighed resuming aid to Greece against a possible backlash by "a group of liberal Democrats" who might abandon the president's foreign aid bill.⁵⁷ In congressional debate regarding American policy, Fraser said that the United States "ought to come down firmly on the side of free and open societies and firmly against those repressive and oppressive governments which are characterized by the present regime that rules Greece."⁵⁸ Several months later, with the issue still under discussion, Rostow continued to urge the president to focus on Greece's strategic value rather than its repression: "the time has come to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics... it doesn't make sense to let our security relationships with Greece—NATO role, common facilities, Sixth Fleet support—deteriorate further."⁵⁹ According to Rostow, an American decision to send equipment to Greece

that had been frozen after the coup would garner domestic opposition: "A vocal group on the Hill will object to any resumption. You have already had letters from Congressmen Edwards and Fraser, who are active with Melina Mercouri and other friends of Greek democracy."⁶⁰ At the same time the United States considered renewing military shipments, Talbot weighed how far the United States could or should push the regime to reform: "Although I recognize the risks in terms of our long-term relations with Greece inherent in unduly [*sic*] protracted effort to convert present Greek regime into democratic and representative government, particularly in absence of concrete evidence from Papadopoulos and co. of some genuine intention to move in this direction, I believe we can still allow them a little more rope before we are faced with critical decision of whether only acceptable alternative is to support concerted attempt to depose them."⁶¹ US policy toward Greece remained muddled throughout Johnson's remaining time in office, and the American relationship with Greece became increasingly controversial during the Nixon administration, heightening existing concerns about the character of American foreign policy.

Debates over policy toward Greece in the wake of the coup preview many of the trends that made human rights rise in prominence in the subsequent decade. The plight of an identifiable political prisoner such as Papandreou served as a rallying point for disparate actors in the United States. A range of academics, concerned citizens, international human rights groups, and ad hoc NGOs succeeded in keeping attention on human rights violations and limiting the Johnson administration's policy options. Although policy-makers ultimately prioritized their military alliance with Greece over concerns about the country's internal politics, to signal such precedence too openly risked angering influential members of Congress within the president's own party, suggesting the issue was increasingly important in political calculations.

As was the case in Greece, the crisis over Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Great Britain in 1965, intended to ensure the continuation of white minority rule, heightened American and international attention to human rights issues during Johnson's presidency.⁶² In response to Smith's declaration of independence, the United States withheld recognition of his government, recalled the American consul, shelved its US Information Agency activity, froze loans and credits to Smith, opposed American travel to Rhodesia, and demanded those who did travel there have British visas. In addition, the United States put in place an embargo against shipments of military equipment and arms, encouraged American businesses to cease dealings with Rhodesia, and suspended sugar

imports from the territory. Furthermore, the United States and Great Britain supported ending the shipment of oil and petroleum products to Rhodesia.⁶³

The administration's response provoked opposition from the Right and the Left, including proponents of human rights who wanted the White House to act more forcefully against the white minority regime.⁶⁴ US policy on Rhodesia and its approach to Africa more broadly were driven by a number of factors: the desire to build upon the goodwill Johnson's civil rights policy had engendered in African leaders, American preference to avoid a confrontation with South Africa over apartheid, and American economic and strategic interests on the continent. In the view of several observers, the Johnson administration made a political calculation that it could curry favor by opposing Ian Smith, the leader of Rhodesia, without being forced to follow suit against South Africa, which would have had far greater costs.⁶⁵ Given American efforts to win adherents in Africa, US policy created a record of opposition to racial discrimination and enabled it to claim support for self-determination and human rights in Africa.⁶⁶ Its foreign policy toward Rhodesia throughout the Johnson years was largely modeled after the British lead, as the United States did not have considerable material interests in the territory. Indeed, before Smith's UDI, the United States had devoted far more attention to South Africa and Angola than Rhodesia.⁶⁷

Following the American and British lead, the UN Security Council repeatedly acted in response to the situation in Rhodesia. In November 1965, the United Nations passed Resolution 217, which repudiated the UDI and charged Great Britain with resolving the crisis. The Security Council implemented economic sanctions against the regime in December 1966, and in April 1966 the Council voted that United Nations states should "do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia." Furthermore, it authorized Great Britain to "prevent by the use of force if necessary" the delivery of oil to Rhodesia.⁶⁸ The execution of five political prisoners in March 1968 led the UN Security Council to target Smith's government with comprehensive sanctions.⁶⁹ African nations had demanded a stricter approach to Smith's regime, urging the use of force and cutting off all communications, but they could not gain sufficient support for their agenda.⁷⁰ The United States regarded the comprehensive sanctions as "livable from our point of view and which avoids more drastic action previously demanded by the Africans."⁷¹

There were divisions within the US government about the importance of opposing Smith.⁷² Some, such as Under Secretary of State George Ball, argued that the United States had little interest in Rhodesia and should leave the problem to Great Britain.⁷³ Ball, who oversaw policy on Rhodesia, was

focused on the economic aspects of US policy.⁷⁴ The main potential cost would be lost access to Rhodesian chrome, of which the United States bought 300,000 tons in 1965, about 20 percent of the country's total chrome imports.⁷⁵ Others in the administration argued that US interests did not necessitate opposing Smith and risked the spread of communism in Africa. Critics of Johnson's stance further argued American support for the British position was unnecessary given what they perceived to be lackluster British support for the United States in Vietnam.⁷⁶ Arguments against the American position also linked Smith's declaration of independence to the United States' in 1776 and pointed out that, given the Cold War concerns about the fate of Africa, the United States should support Smith and his government given that they were Christian and anti-communist.⁷⁷ Opponents argued the United States was not bound to act just because it disagreed with the racism of Smith's government. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his former aide, Charles Burton Marshall, were some of the administration's principal opponents on the Rhodesia issue, with Acheson arguing against UN sanctions on legal grounds. Marshall suggested a transition to full democracy in Rhodesia would take some time, as it had in the United States.⁷⁸

American interest in disavowing Smith's regime was driven by several factors. First, US leaders felt a connection to the Rhodesian situation given its own struggle to improve the conditions of African Americans. Second, the United States was committed to self-determination and anti-colonialism. Third, the United States was concerned about the respect for human rights. Finally, given the concerns about black African leaders' views of the United States, some saw a cost in black African and African American support of the Johnson administration if it did not act against Smith.⁷⁹

The National Security Council urged Johnson to support British response to Smith in order to "stay on the right side of all the Afro-Asians."⁸⁰ American officials were highly cognizant of the potential positive public relations aspects of their policy: "The US public position on [Rhodesia] is one about which we can crow as we are standing on such honored principles as racial equality, human rights and government by the consent of the governed."⁸¹ In a National Security Council meeting, Arthur Goldberg explained the American position on the recent UN vote limiting the importation of minerals and goods, as well as curtailing most sales of arms, munitions, and materials to be used by the military in Southern Rhodesia: "We were obliged to vote in the U.N. as we did because to do otherwise would have caused us domestic racial difficulties and hurt our business interests in every African country."⁸² Yet, American opposition to Smith did not

precipitate stronger pressure against his regime as the interest in what White House aide Robert Komer termed the "Rhodesian mess" was limited. He wrote, "Rhodesia itself isn't very important to us. But the point is that it's critical to all the other Africans. They see it as a straight anti-colonial issue, and all their anti-white instincts are aroused. So our stance on this issue will greatly affect our influence throughout Africa—it will be a test of whether we mean what we say about self-determination and racialism."⁸³

Goldberg would have liked an even firmer approach, not only against Rhodesia, but also with respect to South Africa.⁸⁴ He spoke out repeatedly against the system of racial discrimination in Rhodesia. His strong opposition to Smith's regime was consistent with his commitment to civil rights and position at the United Nations, and he advocated a harder stance by the United States.⁸⁵ Speaking about Rhodesia, Goldberg said, "Experience demonstrates that in Africa today peace and stability are inseparable from orderly progress toward self-determination and equality for all the people of that continent."⁸⁶ He explained US policy was intended "to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia—not just six percent of them."⁸⁷ He also linked the US position on Rhodesia to historic anti-colonialism, to UN Charter language on support for "human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race," to the civil rights movement in the United States, and to American interests in Africa.⁸⁸

As with Greece, a number of influential actors outside the US government tried to influence the American approach to Southern Rhodesia. Civil rights leaders, for example, repeatedly weighed in on American policy. James Farmer, Executive Director the Congress for Racial Equality, wrote to the White House in advance of Smith's UDI:

I urge you take all possible steps to prevent unilateral declaration of independence by white minority strong public statement by you regarding US positions imperative urge public announcement of intent to boycott independent Rhodesia and to move to forbid US investment urge you instruct Ambassador Goldberg to initiate action through United Nations aimed at terminating 1961 Constitution and calling new constitutional conference in which Rhodesia's black majority is given its fair voice.⁸⁹

Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY), one of the most prominent African American elected officials at the time, wrote to Johnson as well: "I strongly urge your leadership in adopting a world economic boycott of Rhodesia and severance of all diplomatic relations. . . . Colored peoples of the world look to our great democracy to bring about the moral imperatives of freedom and equality

throughout Africa. I am confident all Americans will rally behind you in this unfortunate international crisis."⁹⁰ In addition, Farmer, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, all wrote to Johnson to encourage strengthened sanctions including an oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia.⁹¹ Wilkins wrote to the White House several months later, drawing links between the administration's domestic and foreign policies: "We in the NAACP believe it is essential that the United States ally itself with the cause of racial equality in Africa, as it is doing at home, rather than with an isolated and embattled minority."⁹²

Civil rights language influenced those committed to opposing racial discrimination in Rhodesia. Goldberg made the link between the domestic civil rights movement and opposition to Smith's regime explicit in a letter to Benjamin Bradlee of the *Washington Post*: "Frankly I don't see how we can have a double standard with respect to civil rights—one at home and another abroad."⁹³ Goldberg later suggested that the United States needed to be more consistent in its approach to racial discrimination: "The President's outstanding record of civil rights at home is not matched by our attitudes abroad. We have had, in my opinion, an unnecessarily cautious attitude concerning apartheid and discrimination in South Africa and the Portuguese Territories."⁹⁴ In Goldberg's view, American opposition to Smith's regime was necessary for US policy to remain consistent with the country's values: "First, the basic issue in Rhodesia is self-government for all the people, regardless of race. Our country, founded on the proposition that all men are created equal—and currently engaged in a vigorous nationwide program to make that equality real for our own Negro citizens—cannot honorably turn its back on what is happening in Rhodesia."⁹⁵ Goldberg was not the only official to emphasize this theme; National Security Council staffers Charles E. Johnson and Ulric Haynes wrote to Johnson, "Your accomplishments in race relations and civil rights here at home make it essential that our position on similar issues abroad be consistent with domestic policy. Failure to do so if this issue becomes widely publicized would alienate some members of Congress, American Negroes, civil rights groups, labor, church groups and liberals in general."⁹⁶

Like Goldberg, Donald Fraser wanted the United States to implement more aggressive sanctions against Rhodesia: "We should not wait until we are pushed by the African and Asian nations and then try to achieve the weakest possible compromise."⁹⁷ Fraser suggested the United States needed to do more than support the British boycott of Rhodesia: "If we are the leader of the free world, we should take the initiative." He wrote, "I feel that

we should work toward majority rule in Rhodesia because I think the United States [has a] moral commitment to equal treatment for all persons regardless of race." Fraser strongly disagreed with the "smokescreen" or "fiction" of those who sought to connect the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence with that of the United States.⁹⁸ In addition, Fraser rebutted those who suggested that American civil rights problems meant the United States should not criticize Smith's government, "We shun minority rule at home, and we cannot stand for this position abroad."⁹⁹

Examining US policy toward Southern Rhodesia during these years demonstrates the extent to which Cold War politics shaped the administration's approaches to human rights violations. Studying the Johnson administration's response to Smith's UDI in the context of its approach to South Africa further highlights the tension in US policy. Given the White House's support for civil rights domestically, officials such as Goldberg argued the United States needed to oppose racial discrimination abroad as well. The United States highlighted its progress on civil rights and stance on Rhodesia when it sought to appeal to newly independent African governments. The White House, however, was only willing to adopt such a position with regard to Southern Rhodesia, which had little strategic value and where it had few interests. With respect to South Africa, other concerns outweighed its opposition to that government's policy of racial discrimination, and it adopted a double standard regarding civil rights at home and human rights abroad. The cases of Southern Rhodesia and Greece serve to illustrate that human rights had a place on the policy agenda in the 1960s but not a prominent one.

The predominance of concerns about communism, a commitment to containment, and overall adherence to the primacy of a Cold War framework had moved human rights off the American agenda in the early 1950s. The issue did not reemerge as a policy priority until changes in the composition of the United Nations, the rise of nongovernmental human rights activism, domestic advocacy of civil, political, and social rights, and increasingly vocal members of Congress prompted questioning of the tenets that underpinned US Cold War policy.

Activists inside and outside the Johnson administration raised questions about US foreign policy that remain critical today, in particular how to balance morality and adherence to American values with the preservation of national security. After the Cold War ended, many observers believed the United States would no longer face such quandaries as its ideological adversary had ceased to exist. American foreign policy in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, however, has resurrected such questions. For example,

did the United States' ambiguous stance on torture and its tactics in the War on Terror undermine American soft power? Do persistent questions regarding its stance on human rights weaken its role in the world? Like the administration that preceded it, the Obama administration in its first term did not seek to integrate concern for human rights into its foreign policy consistently. For those hoping for a re-emergence of attention to human rights in US foreign relations, it may be important to note that many years elapsed before congressional hearings and legislation were able to effect change in the 1970s even though members of Congress such as Fraser had been concerned about the direction of US foreign policy for some time.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 3; David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," *Political Science Quarterly* 105, no. 3 (autumn 1990): 436–441; Kristen Sellars, *The Rise and Rise of Human Rights* (London: Sutton Publishing, 2002), 114; Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 115; and Madeleine K. Albright and Alfred Friendly, Jr., "Helsinki and Human Rights," in *The President, The Congress and Foreign Policy*, ed. Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth Rush, and Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986), 294–295.

2. Robert G. Kaufman, *Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 4–5; John Dumbrell, *The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 117; Hauke Hartmann, "U.S. Human Rights Policy under Carter and Reagan, 1977–1981," *Human Rights Quarterly* 23 (2001): 404; Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," 439, 448; and John P. Salzborg, "A View from the Hill: U.S. Legislation and Human Rights," in *The Diplomacy of Human Rights*, ed. David D. Newsom (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America for Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1986), 16–17.

3. See, for example, John Dumbrell, *American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 17; Karl E. Birnbaum, "Human Rights and East-West Relations," *Foreign Affairs* 55 (July 1977): 783–799; Jeffrey D. Merritt, "Unilateral Human Rights Intercession: American Practice under Nixon, Ford, and Carter," in Newsom, ed., *The Diplomacy of Human Rights*, 46; David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, "Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 28 (January 2004): 113, 117; and Jerel A. Rosati, *The Carter Administration's Quest for Global*

Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 119–120.

4. Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," 436–441.

5. The conference concluded with agreement on the Proclamation of Tehran, calling for states to uphold their international commitments to respect human rights. Proclamation of Tehran, May 13, 1968, http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/b_tehran.htm (accessed October 30, 2008).

6. Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 5.

7. In addition to writing letters to government authorities, Amnesty members wrote to prisoners directly and to their families, offering support to those relatives. Jonathan Power, *Like Water on Stone: The Story of Amnesty International* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 122.

8. Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xiv, xix.

9. Although not discussed in this chapter, examination of Fraser's papers at the Minnesota Historical Society, the records of the International League for the Rights of Man, and records at the LBJ Library shows that members of Congress, academics, and human rights activists were also deeply concerned with the human rights in Vietnam, raising questions about the record of the South Vietnamese government and American conduct there. See, for example, Hans Göran Franck to Johnson, August 4, 1966, AMMO, box 142, WHCF-Name File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereinafter LBJL); and "Human Rights in the Vietnam War," April 21, 1968, U.S. Vietnam Correspondence, 1964–6, box 36, International League for Human Rights Collection, New York Public Library, New York, New York.

10. Pauline Mian, "Infringement of Human Rights in Greece and the Response of the United States and the United Nations," 1974, *Congressional Research Service*; Effie G. H. Pedaliu, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 18 (2007): 195; and Adam Garfinkle, "The Nadir of Greek Democracy," in *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma*, ed. Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 73.

11. According to Keys, there was considerable overlap among the "well-meaning liberals" who had worked against the Greek junta and those who led similar efforts against repressive regimes in Latin America and Asia in the 1970s. Barbara Keys, "Anti-Torture Politics: Amnesty International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins of the Human Rights 'Boom' in the United States," in *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History*, ed. Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William Hitchcock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 214.

12. Amnesty International, "Situation in Greece," January 27, 1968, Trip to Greece—May 1968, box 149G.2 (F), Donald M. Fraser Papers, Minnesota Historical

Society, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Keys, "Anti-Torture Politics." A second Amnesty International report based on a March 1968 visit to the country alleged the Greek government had condoned the use of torture. Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms*, 41 (hereinafter Fraser Papers).

13. Garfinkle, "The Nadir of Greek Democracy," 71.

14. Fraser et al. to Rusk, November 17, 1967, Greece, 1967, box 145.C.3.2 (F), Fraser Papers. According to Andreas Papandreou, Talbot told him after his release that the junta had never planned to kill him, and that the leaders had told Talbot that they would treat Papandreou well before Johnson's message arrived. Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), 294.

15. Macomber to Fraser, May 10, 1967, Greece, 1967, box 145.C.3.2 (F), Fraser Papers; Rostow to Fraser, May 3, 1967, CO 94 Greece 1/9/66-5/10/67, CO box 36, WHCF, LBJL; and Fraser to Johnson, April 28, 1967, *ibid.*

16. Fraser to Matsas, July 23, 1968, Greece, 1967-1968, box 151.3.2(F), Fraser Papers.

17. Memorandum, n.d., Trip to Greece-May 1968, box 149.G.9.2 (F), Fraser Papers.

18. 5/30/79—Human Rights Conference for the Fed Bar Association, box 149.C.13.4 (F), Fraser Papers.

19. Donald Fraser, May 27, 1968, *Congressional Record*, box 151.H.3.2 (F), Fraser Papers.

20. Lyons to Colleague, n.d., Greek Committee, 1968, box 151.H.3.3 (B), Fraser Papers.

21. U.S. Committee for Democracy in Greece, "Greece—A Call to Conscience," Trip to Greece-May 1968, box 149.G.9.2 (F), Fraser Papers; and Keys, "Anti-Torture Politics."

22. Greece, 1967-1968, box 151.H.3.2 (F), Fraser Papers.

23. Wendy to Fraser, August 8, 1967, Greece, 1967, box 145.C.3.2 (F), Fraser Papers.

24. Papandreou to Fraser, November 17, 1970, Greece, 1968-1974, 149.G.9.5 (B), Fraser Papers.

25. James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 138; and Margaret Papandreou, *Nightmare in Athens* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 162-163, 170, 191, 298. See also Nick Papandreou, *Father Dancing* (New York: Penguin, 1996), 102-110, for Papandreou's son's perspective on the activity surrounding his father's imprisonment.

26. Academics from Harvard University, Stanford University, Tufts University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Wellesley College, University of California at Berkeley, University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, the University of Miami, Colorado State University, Purdue University, University of Washington, State University of New York-Buffalo, and University of California Santa Barbara

wrote to the White House to express their concern for Papandreou. See, for example, Calhoun to Johnson, May 5, 1967, CO 94 Greece 11/9/66-5/10/67, CO box 35, WHCF, LBJL; and Martin Gansberg, "Johnson to Appeal to Save Jailed Son of Papandreou," *New York Times*, May 8, 1967, 1. Senator Walter Mondale (D-MN) was also among those who wrote to the White House on Papandreou's behalf.

27. John Kenneth Galbraith, *A Life in Our Times: Memoirs* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 459-460; and Gansberg, "Johnson to Appeal to Save Jailed Son of Papandreou," 1. According to Robert Keeley who served in the US embassy in Athens at the time, "Like Johnson, Talbot was surprised if not dismayed that the most urgent telegraphic traffic he was receiving from Washington, officially and privately, did not carry instructions on the attitude to be taken toward the new regime but consisted mainly of appeals on behalf of Andreas." Robert V. Keeley, *The Colonels' Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat's View of the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 133.

28. Galbraith conveyed the economists' pleasure at Johnson's intervention. John Kenneth Galbraith, *Name-Dropping: From F.D.R. On* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 150-151; and Gansberg, "Johnson to Appeal to Save Jailed Son of Papandreou," 1. Johnson's slur likely only coincidentally coincided with the State Department view of Andreas. A State Department memorandum described Andreas Papandreou as "politically naïve, unscrupulous, unstable (with paranoiac tendencies), venal, and above all [with] such an overweening ambition that he would resort to almost any means to achieve his goals." According to Keeley, "anti-Andreas animus" "pervaded" the American government. Keeley, *The Colonels' Coup and the American Embassy*, xxv, 27.

29. Heller to Johnson, April 27, 1967, Foreign Policy Greek Crisis, 04/26-27/67, box 176, Personal Papers of Joseph Califano, LBJL.

30. Saunders to Rostow, April 26, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, NSF Country File, LBJL.

31. Califano to Eisner, April 27, 1967, Foreign Policy Greek Crisis, 04/26-27/67, box 176, Personal Papers of Joseph Califano, LBJL.

32. Saunders to Rostow, April 27, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, NSF Country File, LBJL; and Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 138.

33. Telegram, April 21, 1967, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XVI, 581.

34. Telegram, April 21, 1967, *ibid.*, 580.

35. Telegram, April 28, 1967, *ibid.*, 594-597.

36. Memorandum for the Files, April 27, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, NSF Country File, LBJL.

37. Battle to Secretary, April 23, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, Country File, National Security File, LBJL; and Keeley, *The Colonels' Coup and the American Embassy*, 95.

38. "Greek Junta's Plans for Andreas Papandreou," Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2], 1/66-7/67, box 126, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

39. AmEmbassy Athens to SecState, May 13, 1967, Greece Cables Vol. II 1/66-7/67, box 126, Country File, NSF, LBJL. Hoping to enlist American pressure on her husband's behalf, Margaret Papandreou wrote to Johnson again in September to ask him to use his influence with King Constantine to secure her husband's release. Papandreou to Johnson, September 3, 1967, Greece Cables and Memos Vol. IV3/6811/68, box 127, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

40. Intelligence Memorandum, July 6, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

41. Papandreou was eventually released after eight months' imprisonment and visited the United States in March 1968. Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), 27.

42. Papandreou to Johnson, June 21, 1967, CO 94 Greece, CO box 8 [2 of 2], WHCF Confidential File, LBJL; and Papandreou, *Nightmare in Athens*, 298.

43. Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, 294. Talbot reported to Papandreou after his release that the United States "had not discovered any indication that the regime ever planned to execute him." Nonetheless, Papandreou thanked the embassy for intervening to "save" his life. Telegram, 9 January 1968, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XVI, 721-722. See also Keeley, *The Colonels' Coup and the American Embassy*, 165.

44. A White House memorandum in the wake of the coup noted that Dean Rusk had explicitly decided against trying to influence the upcoming Greek election with several hundred thousand dollars of funding because "the possible political gain is outweighed by the security risks." Rostow reported to Johnson that his aides had decided "that it was becoming less and less appropriate for us to try to influence elections in places like Italy and Greece." Rostow also suggested the small amount of money under consideration was unlikely to affect the outcome of the election. Rostow to Johnson, May 15, 1967, Greek Coup, 1967, box 10, Intelligence File, NSF, LBJL; and Memorandum for the Record, March 16, 1967, *ibid.*

45. Rostow to Johnson, April 22, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [2 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, NSF Country File, LBJL.

46. Rostow to Johnson, April 21, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, Country File, National Security File, LBJL.

47. Rostow to Johnson, April 27, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, NSF Country File, LBJL.

48. Read to Rostow, June 8, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

49. In Keeley's view, the partial suspension of military assistance was motivated only by concern for the American public image. Keeley, *The Colonels' Coup and the American Embassy*, 97.

50. Rusk to Johnson, July 21, 1967, Greece Memos & Misc. [1 of 2] 1/66-7/67, box 126, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

51. Rostow to Johnson, July 22, 1967, Greece Cables III 8/67-2/68, box 127, Country File, NSF, LBJL; and Rostow to Johnson, July 21, 1967, Greece, Volume 2, 1/66-7/67, box 126, *ibid.*

52. In the view of one observer, the United States had reduced its interest in human rights in Greece much earlier due to concerns about communist aggression in the context of the Korean War. Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 31.

53. See, for example, Rostow to Johnson, July 22, 1967, Greece, Volume 3, 1/66-7/67, box 126, NSF Country File, LBJL; and Rostow to Manatos, February 21, 1968, Greece, Volume 3, 8/67-2/68, box 127, *ibid.*

54. Rostow to Johnson, July 22, 1967, Greece Cables III 8/672/68, box 127, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

55. Rostow to Johnson, July 22, 1967, Greece, Volume 3, 1/66-7/67, box 126, NSF Country File, LBJL; and Rostow to Johnson, September 11, 1967, Greece Cables and Memos, Vol. IV 3/68-11/68, box 127, *ibid.*

56. Rostow to Mantos, June 5, 1968, CO 94 Greece, CO box 8 [2 of 2], WHCF Confidential File, LBJL.

57. Katzenbach to Johnson, June 20, 1968, Greece Cables and Memos, Vol. IV 3/68-11/68, box 127, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

58. Press Release, July 22, 1968, Press Releases 1968, 152.L.9.3 (B), Fraser Papers.

59. Rostow to Johnson, October 8, 1968, Greece, Vol. VI 3/68-11/68, box 127, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

60. Memorandum, Rostow to Johnson, October 8, 1968, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XVI, 767.

61. AmEmbassy Athens to SecState, October 21, 1968, Greece, Volume 4, 3/68-11/68, box 127, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

62. Only 6 percent of the Rhodesian population or 220,000 of four million people were white.

63. Embargoing oil to Rhodesia required a considerable financial and logistical commitment, as it necessitated implementing an airlift to bring oil to Zambia, which was blocked from access to the sea by Rhodesia. Press Release, April 9, 1966, Rhodesia, 1977 (3), box 151.H.3.7 (B), Fraser Papers; and Thomas J. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 197-198, 203-204.

64. Southern Rhodesia: Background, CO 250 Rhodesia-Nyasaland, Federation of, box 11 [1 of 2], WHCF Confidential File, LBJL.

65. South Africa supplied the United States with needed minerals, port facilities, and supportive votes in the United Nations. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, 186; and Andrew DeRoche, *Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, Inc., 2001), 105-106.

66. The documentary record shows the Johnson administration uncomfortable with the policies of the South African regime but unwilling to take a more

aggressive approach. The government seemed under pressure equally from its military, strategic, and economic interests in South Africa and anti-South African sentiment among African and Asian governments whose support the United States sought and wanted to retain. For an extended discussion of American policy options, see National Intelligence Estimate 73-67, May 4, 1967, 73, South Africa, box 8, National Intelligence Estimates, NSF, LBJL. The crisis was not effectively resolved during the Johnson administration. A power-sharing agreement between whites and blacks was not meaningfully implemented until 1980.

67. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, 188.

68. The Security Council made the sanctions more comprehensive in May 1968, Resolution, 9 April 1966, Rhodesia, 1977 (3), box 151.H.4.2 (F), Fraser Papers.

69. Southern Rhodesia, Administrative History of the Department of State: Volume I, LBJL.

70. Some African leaders questioned if economic sanctions would be successful and instead favored a military response. Mann to Johnston, December 22, 1965, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XXIV, 876; and chapter 10 (The United Nations), Administrative History of the Department of State: Volume I, LBJL.

71. Katzenbach to Johnson, May 28, 1968, United Nations, Vol. 10 4/68-11/68 [3 of 3], box 70, Agency File, NSF, LBJL.

72. Some of Britain's steps, such as the ending oil shipments to Southern Rhodesia, were more important psychologically and politically than they were likely to be effective. SecState to USUN, December 8, 1965, United Nations Vol. 3 10/1/65 [4 of 4], box 67, NSF Agency File, LBJL. CIA analysts did not believe economic sanctions would be sufficient to cripple Smith's regime. Repercussions of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Southern Rhodesia, October 13, 1965, 72, Rhodesia, box 8, National Intelligence Estimates, NSF, LBJL.

73. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, 195.

74. DeRoche, *Black, White, and Chrome*, 129.

75. *Ibid.*, 105-106.

76. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, 209.

77. The race of Smith and his regime was also a consideration. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, 221-222, and Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 198-199.

78. Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 112-113; and Charles Burton Marshall, *Crisis over Rhodesia: A Skeptical View* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 63-65.

79. Press Release, April 23, 1968, England (2), box 145.C.3.2 (F), Fraser Papers.

80. Komer to Johnson, October 4, 1965, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XXIV, 814.

81. Haynes to Fred Panzer, October 13, 1965, CHRONO (Haynes) 3/1/65-6/15/66 [2 of 3], box 1, Files of Ulric Haynes, NSF, LBJL.

82. Executive Order, January 5, 1967, United Nations Vol. 6 12/1/66 [1 of 2], box 68, NSF Agency File, LBJL; and Summary of Notes of the 567th NSC Meeting, January 25, 1967, Southern Rhodesia, 1/25/67, box 2, NSC Meetings File, NSF, *ibid.*

83. Komer to Johnson, December 6, 1965, Rhodesia, box 3, Hamilton, NSF, LBJL. The President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, wrote to Johnson to forge a common approach to Southern Rhodesia and noted, "The problem in Southern Rhodesia is a matter of basic human rights." Kenyatta to Johnson, November 10, 1966, CO 250 Rhodesia-Nyasaland, Federation of, box 11 [1 of 2], WHCF Confidential File, LBJL.

84. Goldberg characterized apartheid as unique from other international human rights problems due to its vast scale, and he urged the United States to reconcile its domestic commitment to racial progress with its policy toward South Africa. Chase to Bundy, September 13, 1965, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XXIV, 1040.

85. Before Smith's UDI, Goldberg had said the United States would "take the necessary concrete steps" against an independent Rhodesia. Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 79. Goldberg similarly urged the administration to rethink its approach elsewhere and "embark immediately on a policy of disengagement from South Africa." In Goldberg's view, the US stance was inconsistent with American values and the principles of the United Nations. USUN to RUEHCR/SECSTATE, September 10, 1965, United Nations—Volume I, 1965 [2 of 3], box 66, NSF Agency File, LBJL.

86. Terrence Lyons, "Keeping Africa off the Agenda," in *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968*, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 291.

87. Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 97.

88. Lyons, "Keeping Africa Off the Agenda," 291.

89. Farmer to Johnson, October 27, 1965, GEN CO 250 Rhodesia 11/22/63-1/5/66, CO box 65, WHCF, LBJL.

90. Adam Clayton Powell to Johnson, November 15, 1965, GEN CO 250 Rhodesia 11/22/63-1/5/66, CO box 65, WHCF, LBJL.

91. Farmer to Johnson, December 16, 1965, GEN CO 250 Rhodesia 11/22/63-1/5/66, CO box 65, WHCF, LBJL; and King to Johnson, December 16, 1965, *ibid.*; and Greenfield to King, November 26, 1965.

92. Wilkins to Johnson, May 4, 1966, GEN CO 250 Rhodesia 11/22/63-1/5/66, CO box 65, WHCF, LBJL.

93. Goldberg to Benjamin Bradlee, December 30, 1966, folder 1, box 45, Part I, Arthur J. Goldberg Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter Goldberg Papers).

94. Goldberg to Jack Valentine, November 15, 1965, folder 6, box 47, Part I, Goldberg Papers.

95. Goldberg Speech, April 23, 1966, folder 8, box 51, Part I, Goldberg Papers. See also Goldberg Speech, June 2, 1966, folder 9, box 51, Part I, Goldberg Papers. At the UN Security Council, Goldberg said, "We are firmly and irrevocably dedicated

to the principle of self-determination and independence for the people of Southern Rhodesia, self determination by and for all the people, independence on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole." Press Release, November 12, 1965, folder 5, box 15, Part I, Goldberg Papers.

96. Johnson and Haynes to Johnson, July 13, 1965, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XXIV, 1030.

97. Fraser's comments also highlight how the agenda of newly independent countries shaped American policy debates. Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 119. Representative Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY) also wrote to Johnson to press him on Southern Rhodesia, saying, "I urge you to pursue new initiatives to defeat the Rhodesian rebellion, and to protect and stimulate the forces of independence and self-determination in southern Africa." Rosenthal to Johnson, December 16, 1965, GEN CO 250 Rhodesia 11/22/63-1/5/66, CO box 65, WHCF, LBJL.

98. Fraser to Hanratty, February 8, 1966, Rhodesia, 66, box 145.C.3.1 (B), Fraser Papers; and 28 April 1966, *Congressional Record* Fraser Reports and Speeches, box 147.G.11.5 (B), *ibid*.

99. Fraser emphasized that the United States must remain consistent with its principles. Fraser Statement, April 28, 1966, Press Releases, 1965-1966, 149.G.8.9 (B), Fraser Papers.

11

GLOBALIZED FAITH, RADICALIZED
RELIGION, AND THE DOMESTIC SOURCES
OF US FOREIGN POLICY

ANDREW PRESTON

Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency marked three important transitional moments—in US domestic politics, in the Cold War, and in the nature of the international system itself—and all three were intimately interconnected. Domestic politics saw changes in individual rights, attitudes toward race, gender, and culture, and the fortunes of American liberalism and conservatism. The Cold War witnessed its longest and bloodiest conflict in Vietnam, the solidification of nuclear deterrence, and the diffusion of power throughout the world, especially the recently decolonized "global South." Finally, the dynamics of the international system changed irrevocably under the pressures of globalization, particularly in the flow of ideas and activists that resulted from rapid improvements in communications and transportation. Most important, these changes all affected and enhanced one another, such as the increasing contact between the West and the global South that resulted in new cultural exchanges, new ideas about race and human rights, and new ways of conducting world politics.

For many Americans, at the heart of these changes stood an ancient, timeless, and yet thoroughly modern phenomenon: religious faith. Just as it did for race relations and foreign policy, the Johnson era represented a crisis within American religion. In referring to one of the decade's many intellectual fads about identity and spirituality, one might even say that American religion underwent a period of existential searching and transformation. America's major faiths saw themselves torn apart to varying degrees by battles between radicals and conservatives, reformists and traditionalists. But