Perforating the Iron Curtain
European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985

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The Rise of the Helsinki Network

"A Sort of Lifeline" for Eastern Europe

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The 1975 Helsinki Final Act’s human rights principle, human contacts provisions, and follow-up mechanism spurred an explosion of dissident activity in Eastern Europe, eventually leading to the development of a transnational network committed to reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.1 In the years after the Helsinki Final Act was signed, those committed to its implementation succeeded in unifying and supporting Helsinki activism, advancing a human rights agenda on an international stage, offering incentives for change in Eastern Europe, and facilitating the transition to a new Europe at the end of the Cold War.2

The text of the Helsinki Final Act contained elements that stimulated and facilitated the development of a transnational network devoted to the accord’s fulfillment. Principle Seven, which committed Helsinki Final Act signatories to respect “human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,” offered Soviet and Eastern European opposition figures important leverage in their protests against communist regimes.3 In addition, by consenting to the Helsinki Final Act, states pledged to facilitate human contacts such as family reunifications, bi-national marriages, and travel, providing other grounds for activists to press their governments to liberalize. Furthermore, the inclusion of Principle Seven and the human contacts provisions in the Helsinki Final Act meant that these rights were now under the purview of international relations, supplying justification for external observers to question the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries on their human rights practices.

The Helsinki Final Act’s follow-up mechanism, which set a meeting to assess compliance in Belgrade in 1977, was similarly significant to the network’s development. The promise to evaluate Helsinki implementation in two years time prompted the establishment of groups to monitor adherence to the accord; these groups ultimately became the core of a transnational advocacy network.4 Unlike the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and other international attempts to elevate the importance of human rights, the Helsinki Final Act was uniquely formulated to give rise to a transnational network because the terms of the agreement established that the CSCE states could exchange views on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. This meant that internal matters such as human rights abuses would now be subject to international diplomacy. In the intervening years, the Helsinki Final Act inspired a range of people inside and outside government to develop formal and informal mechanisms to monitor Helsinki implementation. Importantly, the first review meeting in Belgrade led to a second; a whole series of meetings followed, fostering links among Helsinki advocates and locating human rights advocacy on the international diplomatic agenda.

In order to understand how human rights activism developed in response to the Helsinki Final Act and went on to shape Soviet and Eastern European attitudes towards human rights advocacy, it is necessary to examine the components, agenda, and tactics of this transnational network. The network operated through the intertwined efforts of dissidents, human rights activists, and Western politicians and diplomats to champion human rights and East-West contacts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As a result, human rights became an important element of Cold War diplomacy. This chapter analyzes the development of what I see as the three essential components of the transnational network: the establishment of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the formation of international human rights groups, and an increasing American role in the CSCE follow-up meetings.

Shortly after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, United States Representative Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) traveled with a Congressional delegation to the Soviet Union and returned determined to enhance the United States role in protecting human rights. Fenwick described meeting Soviet dissidents and refuseniks “in heartbreaking meetings, in small shabby flats and hotel rooms” and hearing “the cries of all these desperate people.” Yet, she viewed Soviet citizens as “hopeful” that the Helsinki Final Act would improve their political and social rights. In her memoirs, Fenwick notes how important Soviet dissidents viewed international recognition as “a sort of lifeline.” Fenwick was inspired by her encounters in the Soviet Union to take action, describing her trip as “a somewhat distant and theoretical exercise in international diplomacy” that “became a dramatically present and personal issue.”

Fenwick returned to the United States convinced of the importance of creating a formal body to monitor Helsinki implementation, especially related to human contacts: “The trip made a lasting impression on many of us who realized, after talking for many hours with dissidents and Soviet citizens wanting to emigrate, that the hopes of these people had been pinned to the implementation of the Helsinki Accord which had been signed just before our arrival.”

Fenwick proposed a joint legislative and executive commission to examine compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and to press for greater international implementation.

The result of her efforts, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, became a strong advocate for United States activism on human rights and an essential part of the transnational Helsinki network. For many years, the Commission was the most comprehensive source on Helsinki compliance in the United States and it served as an informal clearinghouse for research related to Helsinki. Commissioners and their staff highlighted Helsinki violations through hearings, publications, and press releases. The Commission frequently served as a conduit for information from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to United States policymakers, and it used its unique position to exert influence on American policy. As such, it played a critical role, connecting different activists and policymakers across interests and national lines. Through their efforts to press for Helsinki compliance, members of the Commission succeeded in making the Helsinki process a more potent international force for change.

The early establishment of the Commission offered an outlet for the Eastern monitoring groups, which would emerge shortly thereafter, and their research on violations of the Helsinki Final Act. As one of the first bodies to undertake Helsinki monitoring, the Commission facilitated the development of a network of groups and individuals committed to the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and heightened the influence of the Helsinki process over time. Once established, it fostered a transnational network of Helsinki activists and gave a voice to their grievances through its hearings, reports, and advocacy. The Commission relied heavily on documents and reports from Eastern Europe, at times invited exiled dissidents to testify, and ultimately championed these Helsinki monitors. The significance of the Commission rests in its connections with a broader Helsinki community, and the influence it was able to bear on the implementation of Helsinki obligations and the broader protection of human rights.

At the same time Fenwick established the Commission, human rights activists in the Soviet Union, prompted by publication of the Helsinki Final Act in Soviet newspapers, began organizing efforts to ensure compliance with the agreement. Representative and Commission member Robert F.
Drinan, a Democrat from Massachusetts, describes Jewish refusenik Anatoly Shcharansky and human rights activist Andrei Sakharov as “amazed but jubilant” to read the full text of the act in a Soviet newspaper. Ludmilla Alekseeva, Moscow Helsinki Group founding member and later its representative in the West, further reported, “Soviet citizens, reading the text of the Final Act in the papers, were stunned by the humanitarian articles; it was the first they had heard of any kind of international obligations in the human rights field of their government.” Prompted by the publication of the Helsinki Final Act, dissidents in the Soviet Union debated how they could pursue its implementation. Shcharansky had the idea to form an international movement of seminars and discussions on human rights. In his conception, the groups would start in the West first, at Soviet activists’ invitation, and then a Soviet group would be formed. Instead, dissident Yuri Orlov changed the objective to the creation of a Helsinki-focused group in Moscow with well-known dissidents. Orlov wanted the group to monitor the positive and negative sides of Soviet Helsinki implementation. Shcharansky responded to Orlov’s new proposal, “This is far more risky than what I had suggested, but since I am the one who got you thinking about it, there is nothing I can do but join.” Orlov’s initiative led to the establishment of the Public Group to Promote Fulfillment of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR, which was formed on 13 May 1976, by eleven prominent Soviet dissidents and popularly known in the West as the Moscow Helsinki Group or the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. The group included activists with a range of agendas but a common goal of monitoring Helsinki implementation. In Alekseeva’s words, the Helsinki process enabled the “unification of the human rights movement with religious and national movements” because all were working towards rights outlined in the Helsinki Final Act, proof of which could be seen in the composition of the Moscow Helsinki Group—Jewish refuseniks, ethnic nationalists, and human rights activists.

Groups such as the Moscow Helsinki Group served as an essential conduit of evidence of Eastern human rights abuses. They exposed Eastern practices, often succeeding in focusing international attention on a particularly troubling case. The Moscow Helsinki Group drafted reports on a range of abuses such as repression of Helsinki monitors and forced psychiatric treatment as well as accounts of struggles for rights not yet granted under the Soviet system: freedom of conscience, national self-determination, and freedom of movement and residence within the USSR. Initially, the Moscow Helsinki Group made thirty-five copies of each document and sent them by registered mail to the thirty-four foreign embassies in Moscow affiliated with the CSCE and directly to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. As that proved ineffective due to Soviet postal interference, varied methods were used to deliver Moscow Helsinki Group documents to foreign embassies, including through Western news correspondents.

Furthermore, the Moscow Helsinki Group offered an important connection between dissidents in Moscow and concerned people around the world. The group immediately sought to join a broader network of those dedicated to Helsinki implementation by sending its reports to Western NGOs. Although there were not always formal links between human rights groups in the Soviet Union, the Helsinki Final Act served as their common foundation. In Ludmilla Alekseeva’s view, the agreement produced a “collective phenomenon of Soviet dissent.” The development of grass-roots monitoring groups first expanded within the Soviet Union to Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine, with the establishment of such groups as the Christian Committee for the Defence of Believers’ Rights in the USSR; the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes; and the Ukrainian Public Group of Assistance to Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR. In the wake of the Moscow Helsinki Group’s establishment, monitoring efforts extended beyond the USSR, spreading to Poland and Czechoslovakia, among others. Some of the most prominent new groups in Poland were the Polish Workers’ Defence Committee, created in the spring of 1976, and the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCIO), which focused on Helsinki monitoring. Later, Charter 77 would develop as a group of loosely affiliated activists in Czechoslovakia committed to dialogue with the government on increasing human rights protections, and in April 1978, the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS) was established to monitor judicial actions and more directly challenge the Czechoslovak regime. These activist groups generally utilized similar non-violent tactics: working within their Constitutions and calling on governments to honor obligations to international agreements; and they faced the same punishments: expulsion and loss of citizenship, long prison terms, or harassment, to name a few.

The myriad of international responses to the Helsinki Final Act represented the beginning of the development of a transnational Helsinki network. In time, the broader transnational Helsinki network, of which Moscow Helsinki Group members were key parties, was able to effect implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, secure improved observance of human rights, and fundamentally shift Eastern European politics and society. The establishment of the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Commission within a month
of each other raised the international profile of the Helsinki agreement and ensured that Helsinki compliance would remain in the forefront of East-West relations.

The 1977 Belgrade meeting was a critical turning point in the rising influence of the Helsinki network as it focused international attention on Helsinki compliance and provided a forum for the development of transnational links among those committed to Helsinki implementation. Eastern European dissidence increased as the Belgrade meeting approached, with activists realizing that the meeting was an opportunity to highlight their plight and grievances to the international community. The Helsinki Final Act and the Belgrade meeting enabled Eastern dissidents to petition outside observers, an important fact given how unresponsive domestic governments were. As Soviet dissident Valery Chalidze said, “During the past few years, Soviet dissidents have almost given up appealing to their own government, preferring to try world public opinion, international human rights organizations and other governments that have dealings with the Soviet government. We have no other recourse if Moscow is unwilling to listen to us.” As such, when the Soviet leadership gave no indication that it was listening in the years immediately following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, international connections among those monitoring Helsinki implementation increased.

The Belgrade meeting offered the first opportunity to evaluate Helsinki adherence publicly, and thus it spurred considerable output from Helsinki monitoring groups. Many critics of Eastern practices utilized Moscow Helsinki Group documents to support their condemnations, marking the beginning of a productive collaboration between NGOs and CSCE delegations. Each monitoring group, therefore, worked to document violations of the Helsinki Final Act and distributed their research to sympathetic CSCE delegates. During the course of the negotiations, United States Ambassador to the Belgrade Follow-up Meeting Arthur J. Goldberg and other CSCE diplomats drew upon documentation provided by Eastern monitoring groups and the Commission.

Goldberg, an outspoken American jurist, was appointed to head the United States delegation by President Jimmy Carter as part of his commitment to making human rights a centerpiece of his foreign policy. After his election to the presidency, Jimmy Carter raised the American profile within the CSCE such that the United States was the most forthright advocate of Helsinki compliance at the 1977-1978 Belgrade Follow-up Meeting. Goldberg’s outspokenness at the meeting ensured a rigorous review of Helsinki compliance. Without United States leadership, the Belgrade meeting could have offered Eastern states the opportunity to tout their efforts at Helsinki implementation with little dissent. Instead, Goldberg challenged international diplomatic norms by “naming names” and citing individual cases in his speeches. In particular, Western delegations successfully raised the international profile of Helsinki monitors at Belgrade; NSC staffer Robert P. Hunter argued that “virtually nobody had heard of the Orlov Group before Belgrade began” whereas afterward the plight of Helsinki monitors was well known. Goldberg’s tactics represented a shift in international diplomacy but ultimately strengthened the Helsinki process by imbuing the follow-up meetings with real repercussions. Through their complementary efforts, Helsinki monitoring groups and CSCE diplomats such as Goldberg established a standard whereby those who flaunted their Helsinki obligations would be publicly humiliated in an international forum.

Because Goldberg’s diplomacy required heavily documented briefs to support his charges of Eastern human rights abuses, his tenure as ambassador strengthened links among the Commission, which acted as an international clearinghouse for Helsinki information, Eastern monitoring groups, and United States diplomats. To this end, Goldberg suggested in the aftermath of Belgrade that the transnational network would benefit from a United States-based monitoring group made up of private citizens. His idea became Helsinki Watch, the most prominent Western NGO devoted to Helsinki monitoring. Helsinki Watch’s establishment proved critical because as Eastern repression of Helsinki activists escalated, Western NGOs were needed to lead the monitoring effort.

The Commission and Helsinki Watch worked together closely in the subsequent years. According to Commission Staff Director R. Spencer Oliver, the two bodies communicated almost weekly, coordinated hearings, and were in near agreement about questions such as the United States approach to the Madrid CSCE Review Meeting. In Oliver’s view, Helsinki Watch was a strong ally to the Commission, in particular as it shaped United States public opinion in support of pressing for Eastern compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

By the opening of the Madrid meeting in 1980, Helsinki monitoring groups had proliferated in both the East and the West and, importantly, had developed networks of supporters more extensive and better coordinated than at Belgrade. Helsinki Watch Executive Director Jeri Laber describes the opening of the Madrid meeting as a “circus” because so many groups had emerged to participate. For human rights activists, the review meetings
enabled an exchange of information—the opportunity to disseminate their work more widely and to influence international and domestic public opinion. At Madrid, an informal network of dissidents, human rights activists, and members of ethnic groups with varying degrees of connection to one another attempted to influence CSCE delegates to adopt their agendas. According to political scientist H. Gordon Skilling, the activities of the press, public opinion, and human rights activists created an "Alice in Wonderland atmosphere" at Madrid.32 NGOs used Madrid to coordinate lobbying efforts and to provide delegations with first-hand research on the situation in Eastern Europe.33

By 1981 Helsinki Watch had decided that it needed to move beyond its strategy of collecting information and begin conducting its own research into human rights practices of the countries it was monitoring. Thus, in the fall of 1981, Laber embarked on a solo research trip to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. At the end of her 25-day trip, Laber stopped in Madrid, where United States CSCE ambassador Max Kampelman arranged a luncheon with fourteen North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Neutral and Non-Aligned ambassadors to the ongoing review meeting. To her surprise, as she reported her findings, she realized she was educating the ambassadors about the situation in these countries: "I realized that many of them were focusing for the first time on the personal tragedies caused by human rights violations. Their response led me to believe that in the future they would raise human rights issues more vociferously with the Eastern bloc delegates at the conference."34 Her experience offers evidence of the influential connections between NGOs and CSCE diplomats that continued to develop at Madrid, as activists and NGOs convinced CSCE delegates and domestic political leaders to press for Helsinki compliance.

Eastern Helsinki monitors also tried to influence the Madrid meeting, although government repression made such efforts more difficult. Those activists who were prohibited from traveling to Madrid raised their concerns through a range of activities, including issuing open letters and conducting hunger strikes to protest human rights abuses in their countries. For example, in conjunction with an appeal by his wife Irina Valitova-Orlova to Madrid diplomats, imprisoned Moscow Helsinki Group leader Yuri Orlov declared a two-day hunger strike on 15 May 1980 to press for amnesty for all political prisoners. In a similar plea, prisoners from Mirov, Czechoslovakia, wrote to the Madrid conference in January 1981 declaring that, contrary to what Czechoslovak representatives were saying, they had been sentenced because they "raised the question of violations of human rights." In addition, three Charter 77 signatories wrote to the Madrid delegates to encourage a commission to study the conditions of imprisonment of political prisoners.35

Faced with a profusion of groups trying to advance their objectives at Madrid, Helsinki Watch recognized that forming connections between like-minded groups across CSCE states could facilitate more effective human rights advocacy. As such, Helsinki Watch initiated the formation of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, or the IHF as it was called, which proved to be a significant development in the Helsinki process. The IHF served as a formal umbrella for Western, neutral, and Eastern national Helsinki committees.36 For the myriad of monitoring groups spread across CSCE countries, the IHF created an easier means to connect with one another while establishing a central organization to better guide the overarching network.37

The establishment of the IHF marked a transition to a more formal Helsinki coalition, enabling Helsinki advocates to pursue joint strategies and tactics, which heightened their effectiveness.38 First, greater consultation prevented duplicative efforts. Second, the ability to compose an international delegation or to speak with a united, international voice heightened the IHF's influence with political leaders. Third, locating the IHF's headquarters in Vienna created greater physical proximity between human rights activists and the countries they monitored.

At the same time that Western activists were succeeding in improved organization and coordination efforts, Eastern monitoring groups were declining in influence, as NGOs such as the Moscow Helsinki Group had been severely depleted in strength and numbers by arrest, exile, and imprisonment. The Moscow Helsinki Group officially suspended its activities on 6 September 1982, announcing: "The Moscow Helsinki Group has been put into condition where further work is impossible... Under these conditions the group ... has to cease its work."39 Although the group decided to disband, the years of the Madrid meeting were nonetheless highly productive for Helsinki monitoring efforts overall. Furthermore, despite the formal end to the Moscow Helsinki Group, its influence on the movement for reform in the Soviet Union and Helsinki activism more broadly extended throughout the final years of the Cold War.40

Faced with ongoing Eastern non-compliance with the Helsinki Final Act, many Western diplomats transitioned from highlighting abuses and negotiating new non-binding agreements to pressing Eastern governments to demonstrate progress towards existing commitments. The United States,
for example, pushed the Soviets to take meaningful steps on human rights and hoped for resolution of divided spouse cases, increased emigration, and the release of Helsinki monitors and other prominent political prisoners. Eastern progress on human rights during and soon after Madrid was minimal but established a pattern that accelerated with later meetings, where making new commitments on human rights and humanitarian issues was insufficient and as demonstrating progress on compliance became essential.

Those groups and individuals that made up the Helsinki coalition worked tirelessly over the subsequent years at CSCE review meetings and outside the formal CSCE negotiations to influence Western and Eastern governments. Their ultimate success came in the context of new leadership and efforts at reform in the Soviet Union, which finally led to some acquiescence of the Soviets to respect human rights. By the end of 1988 there were significant improvements in the Soviet human rights situation: 600 political prisoners had been released, emigration had swelled to 80,000, and jamming had ended.

The influence of transnational Helsinki activism can be further seen in the events that shaped the end of communism across Central and Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of the Vienna Meeting, Helsinki monitors, long persecuted by Eastern regimes and championed by supporters in the West, led grass-roots movements in pursuit of human rights and freedoms that fueled change across Europe. Governing in a new atmosphere without a security guarantee from the Soviet Union, Eastern European leaders acceded to their population’s demands, many of which were tied explicitly to Helsinki principles.

The broader Helsinki network’s activism throughout this period influenced the scope and pace of change, contributing to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. Initially, the rise of Helsinki monitoring groups in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe precipitated a wide range of government repression including harassment, forced exile, and imprisonment. Yet transnational activism persisted, and by the time Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet general secretary in 1985, Soviet progress on human rights had become a prerequisite to Gorbachev attracting Western support for his policy agenda.

Notes

1 The Helsinki Final Act was the culmination of three years of negotiations by representatives of thirty-five European and North American countries at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and contained principles to govern East-West interactions in Europe. In addition to reaching an agreement on the inviolability of frontiers, which was the original impetus for the Soviet desire to hold the conference, the Helsinki Final Act committed the CSCE states to respect human rights and facilitate human contacts across East-West borders.

2 A number of scholars have written about the influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and on the evolution of Soviet policymaking in this period and my work builds upon their ideas. Historian Akira Iriye has described the development of a human rights network as fostering the growth of civil society in the Soviet bloc. In his work, political scientist Robert D. English explores changing Soviet ideas about political and human values, the transformation of which political scientist Daniel C. Thomas argues was due to what he calls the “Helsinki effect.” Thomas contends that the establishment of human rights as a “formal norm” transformed Soviet bloc states and East-West relations. My work complements Thomas’ in a number of ways. We agree that in the wake of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, transnational monitoring efforts developed that ultimately influenced the end of the Cold War. Our different methodologies, however, have led us to emphasize different actors and organizations’ influence within the Helsinki network. Furthermore, Thomas attributes greater significance to the role of international norms whereas I regard pressure exerted in bilateral and multilateral forums to be more important. Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley 2002); Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War (New York 2000); and Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton 2001), 258.


4 Transnational advocacy networks are bound together by a commitment to shared values, as was the case with the Helsinki network. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca 1998), 1.

5 Elizabeth Bourguet has argued that the 1941 Atlantic Charter should be considered the first international declaration on human rights, but as its purpose was conceived differently, its successor the Universal Declaration is a more appropriate point of comparison. Elizabeth Bourguet, A New Deal for the World (Cambridge, MA 2005), 1-11.

6 Fenwick also talks about being inspired to propose the Commission after meeting
a woman with a "desperate expression" as a result of her husband's detention. News Release, "Impressions of the Trip to Russia," 11 September 1975, Folder 33, Box 7, Travel Series, Carl Albert Collection, Carl Albert Center Congressional Archives, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma; and Millien Fenwick, Speaking Up (New York 1982), 16. The term refusenik referred to those, usually Jewish, who had been denied permission to emigrate. Amy Schapiro, Millien Fenwick: Her Way (New Brunswick 2003), 169; and Reminiscences of Millien Fenwick (1988), on pages 404-411 in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection, New York.

7 Testimony, 4 May 1976, Folder 1, Box 181, Millien Fenwick Papers, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
8 Fenwick, Speaking Up, 161.
9 Ibid.
10 Millien Fenwick, 17 May 1976, Congressional Record, Folder 1, Box 181, Fenwick Papers.

In addition, the Commission received and translated many samizdat documents and forwarded them to other CSCE states and interested groups. Samizdat can be translated as "self-published" and refers to documents such as banned literature or reports of abuses that were produced and distributed clandestinely. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "A Thematic Survey of the Documents of the Moscow Helsinki Groups," 12 May 1981.

13 Robert F. Drinan, The Mobilization of Shame: A World View of Human Rights (New Haven 2001), 73. Anatoli Shcharansky changed his name to Natan Sharansky when he emigrated to Israel. I have chosen to use the original spelling of his name when writing about his activism in the Soviet Union.

14 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, CT 1985), 336. I have chosen to use the anglicized version under which she published in the United States only in the notes. Discussion of Alekseeva's role in the main text will use the proper transliteration of her name.


19 Joshua Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Boston 1983), 221.

20 As evidence of the informal links between these Helsinki groups, the Lithuanian Helsinki group formally announced in itself a press conference in Moscow on 27 November 1976 in Orlov's apartment. In the same vein, Sharansky writes about spending time in Chistopoly Prison with Victorias Patkulis, leader of the Lithuanian Moscow Helsinki Group. Goldberg, The Final Act, 122; and Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil (New York 1988), 246.

21 Statement, Tad Szulc, 24 February 1977, Folder 17, Box 274, Fenwick Papers.

22 Valery Chalidze, "Human Rights: A Policy of Honor," Wall Street Journal (8 April 1977). Links between different components of the Helsinki network developed due to what scholars of social movements and transnational activism have called a "boomerang" pattern. The "boomerang" effect describes the method by which domestic actors, confronted with obstacles to influencing their own governments, identify external actors who can raise their concerns internationally and exert pressure more effectively on the state. When internal, domestic activism is ineffective, individuals or groups seek out external advocates who can champion their cause more effectively. At his 1978 trial, Orlov noted that the Moscow Helsinki Group appealed to foreign governments because "approaching our own government through the governments of other nations was more effective than a direct approach." Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 121 and Robert Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratization and Radical Nationalism in Russia (New York 2005), 63.

23 For example, Charter 77 published 150 books and many periodicals as well as distributed 1,000 samizdat materials, all to spread information about human rights violations to politicians, delegates, and the public. News Release, 24 October 1979, Press Releases, Box 2442, Dante Fascell Papers, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida.


Political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have extensively studied transnational advocacy networks and identified different methods by which networks gain support for their agenda, including what they term "information politics," which includes the collection and distribution of relevant information. Information politics was clearly an effective strategy for monitoring groups in Eastern Europe who sought supporters of their campaigns for Helsinki implementation. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 16. This proliferation of activity, however, sparked a corresponding wave of repression; even the specter of the Belgrade meeting did not inhibit Soviet plans to crack down on domestic dissidents. "USSR Weekly Review," 26 January 1978, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives, College Park, Maryland; and William E. Griffith, "East-West Detente in Europe," in Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau (ed.), *Uncertain Detente* (Alphen aan den Rijn 1979), 12.

Keck and Sikkink also outline the utility of "leverage politics," or using an influential figure to champion the network's agenda when it has less influence, which was an essential element of the Helsinki network's methods. Such a method relied upon Western diplomats and political leaders to advance their agenda, pressing for greater observance of human rights and the release and emigration of Helsinki activists. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 16.


28 Press Briefing Transcript, 2 February 1978, IT 5/15/78-12/31/78, IT – 1, White House Central Files, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

29 R. Spencer Oliver Interview, 26 February 2008.


31 By the Madrid meeting, the Moscow Helsinki Group had drafted 149 documents, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "A Thematic Survey of the Documents of the Moscow Helsinki Groups," 12 May 1981.


34 When it was first formed, the IHF was made up of Helsinki Committees from France, Norway, the Netherlands, the United States, with groups developing quickly in Austria, Belgium, Canada, and Sweden. Initially it was deemed too dangerous for groups in Eastern Europe or Turkey to join officially. Later the IHF came to include groups from Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, among others.


39 Memorandum, Kampelman to Burt, 18 January 1983, Box 14, Kampelman Papers.

40 Through the use of "accountability politics" leaders are held responsible for upholding policies to which they have committed themselves. Reliance on "accountability politics" by Helsinki activists can be seen throughout the Helsinki process, but especially during the reviews of implementation that occurred at the CSCE review meetings. Those devoted to fulfillment of the Helsinki Final Act repeatedly pressed Eastern European and Soviet leaders to uphold their commitments. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 16.