ships of Margaret Mead and her colleagues between 1939 and 1953 reveals a more complicated and nuanced story. Treating the copious professional correspondence between Mead and her circle with great sensitivity and insight, Mandler shows that these anthropologists strove, with varying degrees of success, to balance the exigencies of wartime and containment with their discipline’s founding commitment to cultural diversity and cultural pluralism, ideals whose fulfillment required professional autonomy from policy pressures.

Mead’s tenacious adherence to these ideals derived from American anthropology’s origins in the cultural relativism of Franz Boas. Boas challenged the turn-of-the-century “ladder of civilization” model of anthropology, which assumed that all peoples must inevitably “evolve” toward the Western-industrial model of social and cultural organization. Instead, he demanded acceptance of the diversity, integrity, and internal coherence of the world’s cultures. His most prominent students, Mead and Ruth Benedict, actively promoted cultural relativism in the public sphere during the interwar years as a means of coping with the pressures and disorientations of modernity. In Mead’s words, “education for choice” would equip Americans to thrive amidst heterogeneity and rapid social change. Anthropologists would thus “return from the natives” with illuminating lessons for modern societies facing their own novel predicaments.

With the outbreak of World War II and the sudden demand for anthropological insight into societies caught up in the worldwide struggle, cultural relativism stood at odds with demands for national unity and the repudiation of “enemy cultures.” For Mead and Benedict, as well as their closest—and sometimes thoroughly intimate—associates, wartime service against fascism and militarism required a shift away from mere “education for choice” and toward the intensive study of both Allied and enemy cultures, the former in order to foster greater understanding and cooperation between the U.S. and Britain, and the latter for the formulation of tactics against Axis elites and their populations. Mandler acknowledges limitations within the “national character” studies that resulted, ranging from their reductionist neo-Freudian assessments of national personality types to their often insufficient access to the full diversity of subject populations, but he concentrates here on the deeper dilemma for Mead, that of contributing to an Allied victory without sacrificing her vision of “a new world order with cultural relativism embedded at its heart” (p. 63).

At World War II’s end, Mead, and also Benedict, sought to return undeviatingly to this internationalist project but now confronted the growing democratic universalism and chauvinistic Americanism of the Cold War. In place of anthropological respect for cultural diversity, U.S. policymakers demanded increasingly that social scientists commit themselves to their own national culture and its institutions in the name of national strategic advantage, and even “victory,” over communism. Mead sought to adjust to these new realities by joining the internationalist initiatives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the State Department’s Foreign Services Institute, hoping thereby to retain her influence over the direction of U.S. policy without sacrificing her cherished intercultural and cooperative ideals. By 1952, however, the Korean War and McCarthyism had rendered such anthropological work virtually impossible to sustain; cultural relativism, Mandler observes, was now perceived to be “soft on communism.” Moreover, the putatively “masculine” orientation of the nationalist cold warriors now stood more acutely at odds with “feminine” (that is, inclusive, open-minded, and cooperative, but also, and extraordinarily often, female) anthropologists and their associates.

Mandler explores how Mead’s deep disappointments during these early Cold War years brought her full circle, as she rededicated herself to the “smaller and more vulnerable cultures” whose destinies lay in the hands of the “Great Powers” (p. 255). In working with international development initiatives, she returned to anthropology’s proper terrain, the world’s “natives,” who required the very “education for choice” that she had originally advocated for Americans: “the tools to cope with modernity as much on their own terms as possible” (p. 272). Mead’s adversaries this time were the disciples of modernization, who placed economics above the value and integrity of indigenous cultures. Ultimately, modernization prevailed, but Mandler concludes persuasively that this final and monumental defeat of Mead’s intercultural goals for the postwar world meant that the legacy she left for American anthropology—and American social science in general—was one not of service to power and compromised professional ethics, but of enduring commitment to her original cultural-relativist vision. His book thus adds an important dimension to the history of policy-involved social science at mid-century, one that exonerates, albeit selectively, a group of scholars who faced profoundly difficult moral choices under dire conditions.

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Glenn Mitoma’s Human Rights and the Negotiation of American Power is clearly argued and fluidly written. Mitoma contends that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played a central role in shaping American postwar human rights policy and the United Nations (UN) human rights regime. Specifically, his book focuses on the efforts of three organizations: the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP), and the American Bar Association (ABA), the latter of which actively opposed ratification of human rights treaties. The positive and negative
roles of the NAACP and ABA have been addressed previously in the literature; Mitoma’s most important contribution is his analysis of the CSOP, which until now has gone unheralded. Mitoma argues that CSOP members “placed human rights on the international agenda.” Quite boldly he claims that “the origins of the UN commitment to human rights [lie] in the research, lobbying, and education efforts of the CSOP” (p. 9). His evidence in support of such an interpretation, however, seems suggestive rather than definitive. For example, he argues that Franklin Roosevelt’s advocacy for human rights was shaped by the influence of members of CSOP. Mitoma’s account would have been more convincing if he had sources, such as memoirs or correspondence, that demonstrated that CSOP members decisively influenced American officials’ positions at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 1945. This is particularly important given his argument that John Foster Dulles, a CSOP member, abandoned his commitment to human rights protections once he began serving in an official capacity.

In addition to integrating NGOs such as CSOP into the story of the UN and human rights in the 1940s, Mitoma reinterprets the roles of Charles Malik and Carlos Romulo, key diplomats in the drafting of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by depicting them less as representatives of different political and cultural traditions—Lebanon and the Philippines, respective-ly—than as proponents for the expansion of American influence abroad. Despite Mitoma’s criticism of limited American leadership on human rights, in his view, and, he argues, in the view of Malik, Romulo, and others, “the rise of the United States as a world power was a necessary though insufficient condition for human rights to become a politically potent discourse” (p. 73).

Moving beyond the Roosevelt years, Mitoma examines what he describes as efforts by the Truman administration to “simultaneously contain and champion human rights” (p. 157). He highlights activism at the UN over what were called the Eastern European Cases (essentially cases of human rights violations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union), arguing that the United States was concerned about the increasing independence of small powers such as Bolivia and Australia in the body and sought to assert authority over their actions. Despite the ideals of CSOP and the seeming promise that the UN offered for human rights internationally, Mitoma’s work demonstrates how the United States and NGOs such as the ABA privileged other priorities due to the Cold War and domestic politics.

_Human Rights and the Negotiation of American Power_ is a historiographically aware book that seeks to make a real intervention in ongoing debates about the periodization of the United States’ role in the protection of human rights internationally. It is an explicit rejoinder to Samuel Moyn’s de-emphasis on the 1940s in _The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History_ (2010). Mitoma, instead, sees a clear link between attention to human rights in the 1940s and 1970s and the intervening drought of interest attributed to the triumph of containment and the Cold War. It is not clear, however, that he wants to upend Whiggish histories of the United States and human rights in the 1940s. He tells, rather, a parallel, more nuanced story of the critical American role (if we take “American” to include Americans acting in official and unofficial capacities) in these negotiations. Mitoma has drawn a more complex picture of the construction of a UN human rights regime by highlighting new actors who, in his words, “recognized the potential of human rights to serve as a singular concept around which a reorientation of the international order could occur” (p. 172). Read alongside the work of Elizabeth Borgwardt, Carol Anderson, and others, his study will be of considerable use to students of human rights, the United States in the twentieth century, and the UN. The one significant drawback to the book is that it lacks a bibliography.

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Scholars interested in human rights diplomacy will find much of value in William Michael Schmidli’s engaging account of the human rights dimension of U.S. president Jimmy Carter’s policy toward Argentina. As Schmidli rightly notes, relations with Argentina’s brutal military dictatorship offered a key test of Carter’s novel approach to foreign policy. Drawing on interviews and rich research in government archives and personal papers, including recently opened materials in the Carter Library and Warren Christopher’s records at the National Archives, the book offers the most revealing account to date of the Carter administration’s day-to-day struggles to implement a foreign policy that gave substantial weight to human rights considerations. With careful attention to bureaucratic battles, diverging national interests, the interplay of personalities, and what we might call “vision problems,” Schmidli’s account offers an unparalleled look at the complexities of human rights diplomacy in a priority case.

After a lengthy survey of U.S. relations with Argentina during the first three decades of the Cold War, including a detailed history of Argentine politics leading up to the 1976 military takeover, the book charts the Carter administration’s sometimes confused efforts to use aid cuts and other sanctions to pressure the junta to curb a rash of state-sponsored violence. The book is particularly strong on the internal conflicts that raged within the State Department, especially between the frank and uncompromising human rights coordinator Patricia Derian and area specialists who viewed her public hectoring as a harmful and counterproductive approach. Schmidli’s accounts of debates over arms transfers, international financial institution loans, and