“A Call for U.S. Leadership”: Congressional Activism on Human Rights*

Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) was one of four junior Democrats to assume House Foreign Affairs subcommittee chairmanships in 1971, and along with his three colleagues, he ushered in what one contemporary observer termed a “more critical appraisal of U.S. foreign policy from the House than anyone on Capitol Hill can recall.” Most significantly, Fraser’s Subcommittee on International Organizations and Social Movements held hearings on human rights in 1973 that fundamentally recalibrated U.S. foreign policy formulation. Previously, the issue had only sporadically captured sustained or high-level governmental interest, whereas in the subsequent three years Congress held at least seventeen hearings explicitly about international human rights, focusing on conditions in fifteen different countries. The subcommittee’s hearings precipitated a wave of legislation that reshaped the State Department’s bureaucracy and formalized human rights as a factor in U.S. policy. Such steps slowly changed attitudes at the State Department and in the United States more broadly about prioritizing concern for human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Importantly, congressional efforts in the mid-1970s established a strong foundation upon which Jimmy Carter’s administration could build and assured that attention to human rights would last beyond Carter’s presidency.

In recent articles in this journal’s pages, Barbara Keys and William Michael Schmidli have both examined the later institutionalization of human rights in

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1. The three other members of Congress to take over subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were John Culver (D-IA), Lee Hamilton (D-IN), and Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY). See Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York, 2006), 180.

2. Between 1961 and 1971, the only congressional hearings held on human rights related to the United Nations (UN). In 1971, there were two hearings on Soviet human rights abuses. No hearings were held on the issue in 1972.


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U.S. foreign policy. Their scholarship analyzed the influence of congressional and nongovernmental actors who pressured the State Department to take greater account of human rights in its foreign-policy formulation during the Ford and Carter administrations. Keys’s story is one of limited, begrudging steps taken by Henry Kissinger’s State Department under Gerald Ford to stave off potentially more far-reaching concessions. She is focused largely on the consequences of congressional activism for Kissinger’s Foggy Bottom. Schmidli explores the shift in U.S. policy toward Argentina from the Ford to Carter administrations, focusing particularly on the new approach taken by Carter’s Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian. Both are concerned with how human rights became incorporated into U.S. foreign policy in the mid- to late 1970s.

Fraser’s hearings, the subcommittee’s resulting report, and legislation implementing much of its recommendations marked a key turning point in the rise of human rights as a priority in U.S. foreign policy, and both Keys and Schmidli highlight the significant consequences of Fraser’s hearings. Schmidli argues that the subcommittee was a “foundational element in integrating human rights NGOs into the policymaking process.” In his view, Fraser’s efforts were “instrumental in setting the stage for congressional human rights legislation.” Keys asserts the subcommittee’s resulting report “led directly to the institutionalization of human rights in the State Department.” Yet, existing scholarship has not sufficiently explored the genesis and content of these human rights hearings. Given the enormous significance of Fraser’s initiative, the impetus for such hearings warrants greater attention, particularly as examining Fraser’s subcommittee helps us understand the influence of congressional activism on the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

Given the significant literature on U.S. foreign policy in the “Nixinger” years, it is surprising how little attention has been devoted to Fraser, human rights, and Kissinger’s efforts to rebuff congressional activism. As an illustration, Fraser is absent from Robert Dallek, Raymond Garthoff, Walter Isaacson, and Jussi

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Hanhimäki’s important accounts of the period. In addition, Kissinger’s lengthy *Years of Upheaval* neglects to mention Fraser’s hearings. Of those significant secondary works, only Isaacson discusses human rights in the Nixon and Ford years. Within a smaller subset of scholarship on U.S. human rights policy, earlier accounts have highlighted the role of members of Congress, such as Fraser and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) in pressing human rights concerns onto the American diplomatic agenda in this context, and my research builds upon these works.

Human rights had fallen off the American agenda in the early 1950s, and the issue did not reemerge as a policy priority until increasingly vocal members of Congress questioned the tenets that underpinned American foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s. Heightened concern for human rights among members of Congress was influenced by interventions abroad and developments at home. Specifically, moral opposition to the policy of containment, which had led to American involvement in Vietnam, fueled critiques of U.S. policy. Support for human rights internationally was also closely linked with domestic concerns about civil, political, economic, and social rights that had developed during the Kennedy and Johnson years. At issue for many was the extent to which Cold War priorities

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10. Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York, 1994), 156. In what will be an important contribution to our understanding of the 1970s when published in revised form, Daniel Sargent’s dissertation notes the significance of Fraser’s hearings. He sees increased attention to human rights in these years to be due to “larger transformations of the international system in the 1970s.” Daniel Sargent, *From Internationalism to Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of International Politics in the 1970s* (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2008), 405–9, 427.


12. Others have suggested congressional interest in human rights in the early 1970s was spurred by attention to the issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Richard Schifter Interview, “The Life and Legacy of George Lister: Reconsidering Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Bernard and Audre Rapoport Center for Human Rights and Justice, University of Texas School of Law (in author’s possession).

13. One example can be seen in the overlap in personnel active in organizations focused on rights in the domestic and international spheres such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the International League for Human Rights, Freedom House, the National
were diminishing America’s image abroad and undermining the morality of U.S. foreign policy.

In Washington in those years, concerns about human rights were advanced primarily by members of Congress, reacting to actions, or inaction, on the part of the Nixon administration. Historian Robert David Johnson has characterized members of Congress who wanted to emphasize cultural and economic elements of foreign policy over military ones as the “new internationalists.” These members of Congress believed the United States had been too willing to support right-wing dictators and had become overly reliant on military solutions; they pushed instead for a more moral foreign policy. Members of Congress who subscribed to these tenets increasingly asserted themselves as early as the Johnson administration, criticizing U.S. policy and pressing for changes in U.S. relations with the world. For example, Fraser began publicly questioning the principles guiding U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s. He believed the Cold War framework inhibited consistency between American morality and the government’s foreign policy, and his calls for greater attention to human rights were part of an effort to develop a new approach to relations with the wider world. Explaining his support for human rights, Fraser suggests that by emphasizing the issue in foreign policy, the United States would be “consistent with [its] values.”

The subcommittee’s hearings should be viewed as part of a larger pattern of congressional activism in foreign policy in these years, spurred to a large degree by the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal. Increasingly at odds with the White House, Congress sought to reassert itself against the embattled president and his


14. Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, xiv, xix. Richard Falk terms the same group “pragmatic idealists” for believing that “American national interests are best served by conducting foreign policy mainly within a moral framework.” Richard Falk, “The Human Rights Country Reports,” World Issues (October/November 1978): 19. Sargent suggests two worldviews, with considerable middle ground, informed those committed to increasing attention to human rights in U.S. foreign policy in the early 1970s. First, those he terms “globalists” believed “human rights were both an expression of new kinds of social interdependence and a necessary legal-ethical foundation for the new global order.” Others whom he refers to as “idealists” are said to be drawn to human rights as “a means to reaffirm America’s leadership among nations after Vietnam.” Sargent, From Internationalism to Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of International Politics in the 1970s, 415–18.

15. Sikkink has examined the “identity conflict,” between vigilant anticommunism and liberal values, that Fraser and others saw as inherent in U.S. foreign policy. Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 53.

16. Donald M. Fraser, “Freedom and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 26 (1977): 143. Interestingly, Fraser’s interest in human rights did not reflect the concerns of his constituents, who he suggested were unaware of his activism on the issue. Brad Simpson Interview with Donald Fraser, May 2008; and Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 49. I appreciate Brad Simpson’s willingness to share his interview with me.
“imperial” style of conducting foreign policy. In a letter to the editor of the Washington Post, Representative Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) wrote, “The rebellious mood prevalent in the Senate reflects the high-handed way Mr. Nixon has treated the Congress in regard to Vietnam.” Fraser asserts, however, that concerns about human rights violations in certain countries, not a desire to reassert congressional authority, drove his interest in the issue.

The key for Fraser was that when he became subcommittee chair, he could “set the agenda.” Therefore he hired like-minded staff and made his subcommittee, in his words, the “international human rights committee.” In his first two years as chair, there were few signals of the sustained attention he would devote to human rights. Similarly, for its 1973 agenda, Fraser’s subcommittee contemplated a broad range of issues, including hearings related to Rhodesia, the Law of the Sea, the Atlantic Union, financing for the UN, UN peacekeeping, and what it termed “International Civil Liberties.” Of the possible agenda items considered, the subcommittee’s 1973 attention to human rights, or “international civil liberties,” generated the widest interest and had the most far-reaching impact on U.S. foreign policy. In explaining his motivations for holding the human rights hearings, Fraser wrote, “Because many concerns had developed over the years about the U.S. role with regimes committing serious human rights violations, I felt that a more systematic approach to this topic made sense.”

In order to adopt a “more systematic approach,” Fraser hired John P. Salzberg who had previously served as the International Commission of Jurists.

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17. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, 1973). By the early 1970s, Senator Frank Church (D-ID) identified a more “self-assertive, more mindful of its constitutional rights and prerogatives, more independent of the Executive Branch” approach by Congress. Frank Church, “American Foreign Policy in Transition: Who Will Shape It? The Role of Congress,” February 3, 1971, Folder 3, Box 11, Series 7.9, Frank Church Papers, Special Collections Department, Albertsons Library, Boise State University, Boise, Idaho. (Hereafter Church Papers.)


20. Martha Grant Interview with Donald Fraser, April 6, 2008. I appreciate Daniel Sargent’s generosity in sharing this interview with me.

21. Martha Grant Interview with Donald Fraser, April 6, 2008.

22. The ACLU had used the term “international civil liberties” to characterize its work outside the United States. Fraser to Members, February 27, 1973, Foreign Affairs 1973-Correspondence, Box 63, Paul Findley Papers, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois (Hereafter Findley Papers). With the exception of “international civil liberties,” the topics considered by the subcommittee correlated to issues they had addressed in 1971 and 1972: the U.S. role in the UN, the Law of the Sea, killing of marine life, and economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

23. Donald Fraser in written communication with the author, January 27, 2009.
representative to the UN and had completed graduate work in international human rights. When Salzberg joined Fraser’s staff, he outlined the “legal structure” of human rights for Fraser. According to Salzberg, Fraser believed that U.S. support, and especially military assistance, for dictators was not in the long-term interests of the country.\textsuperscript{24} Salzberg characterized Fraser as “a very liberal congressman, and idealistic . . . in many respects” who “had been concerned with the lack of attention to human rights, [the] lack of priority in the Kissinger/Nixon foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{25} Fraser has said international events, including the war in Vietnam, coups in Chile and Greece, and U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, all influenced his interest in human rights and attention to it as a member of Congress.\textsuperscript{26} Speaking to past and present federal government lawyers on “the importance of a Human Rights policy,” Fraser said:

When I began my first term in Congress in 1963 I was assigned to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs—a field in which I had long been interested as a private citizen. I soon became very unhappy with United States policies toward countries like the Dominican Republic, Greece and Chile. The Dominican Republic was invaded by U.S. marines a little over 2 years after I was first elected to Congress. I was dismayed to see our alleged security interests override the rights of the people of the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{27} Fraser suggested “the continuing erosion of human rights in the world” motivated the hearings.\textsuperscript{28} He also believed his hearings might develop a more bipartisan

\textsuperscript{24} John P. Salzberg Interview, “The Life and Legacy of George Lister: Reconsidering Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Bernard and Audre Rapoport Center for Human Rights and Justice, University of Texas School of Law (in author’s possession); Sikkink, \textit{Mixed Signals}, 65; Schoultz, \textit{Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America}, 160–61; Brad Simpson Interview with Donald Fraser, May 2008; and Martha Grant Interview with Donald Fraser, April 6, 2008.

\textsuperscript{25} Salzberg Interview, “The Life and Legacy of George Lister.” Fraser was one of a number of members of Congress who identified a problem in U.S. foreign policy in these years. In the Senate, Frank Church opposed U.S. support for “dictators” as it was “an affront to our democratic traditions” and argued the United States needed a “general reorientation” of its foreign policy. Church articulated his opposition to U.S. support for Latin American dictators, “When we supply the tanks later used to batter down the gates of the Presidential Palace during a military coup d’etat in Lima; when we furnish the tear gas and mace, along with the training, for putting down protest in the streets of Rio de Janeiro; then we have, by our own choice, identified the United States with that element in Latin America which epitomizes static, authoritarian rule.” Church to Moore, November 19, 1969, Folder 12, Box 44, Series 2.2, Church Papers; and Speech at the Center for Inter-American Relations Inc., October 10, 1969, Folder 15, Box 17, Series 8.1, ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} He has said that U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic “turned me around on Vietnam.” Brad Simpson Interview with Donald Fraser, May 2008.

\textsuperscript{27} 5/30/79—Human Rights Conference for the Fed Bar Association, Box 140.C.13.4 (F), Donald M. Fraser Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota. (Hereafter Fraser Papers.)

approach to human rights:

I had noted that in the preceding years, expressions of concern about countries tended to follow ideological lines in the U.S. Congress. The Republicans would tend to focus on left-leaning countries, and the Democrats on the rightist countries. I believed it would be useful to find a framework for viewing countries’ human rights practices that would provide a more objective measure of the abuses that were occurring.29

The objectivity Fraser sought would also be achieved through testimony from observers other than State Department officials, who were circumscribed in their assessments. Furthermore, over time, Fraser came to see concern for human rights as a new framework for U.S. foreign policy that moved beyond Cold War concerns of ideology and containment. During the subcommittee’s human rights hearings, Fraser had said:

Because we have been so preoccupied with the context of ideologies that formed the framework of the cold war that we have not replaced that way of measuring events, judging nations and looking to international relationships with some new framework. It is my impression that one useful framework would be an increased emphasis on the observance of human rights by various societies around the world, which has the value, in pragmatic terms, of putting to societies, both the left and right, a rather standard set of ideas in terms of how they treat their own people.30

At a more basic level, support for human rights also generated public support.31

Eleven members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, including four who demonstrated a similar level of commitment to human rights as Fraser, comprised the subcommittee.32 In Salzberg’s memory, “there were times when Fraser was the only member of the subcommittee present,” highlighting his central role in the process.33 A review of the hearings record, however, shows that although Fraser dominated the hearings, Dante Fascell (D-FL), Jonathan Bingham (D-NY), Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY), and Paul Findley (R-IL) also contributed regularly and throughout their questioning revealed concerns about violations of human rights.34 Fascell was a longtime representative from South Florida

29. Donald Fraser in written communication with the author, January 27, 2009.
31. Notes, October 15, 1975, Binder, Box 149.C.12.4 (F), Fraser Papers.
32. According to Fraser, “only a few members of the subcommittee took an active interest.” Donald Fraser in written communication with the author, January 27, 2009.
33. Salzberg, “The Life and Legacy of George Lister.”
34. Interestingly, although H. R. Gross (R-IA) complained that more subcommittee members might be able to attend the hearings if they not held on afternoons when the House was in session, his participation indicated his lack of support for Fraser’s agenda, and he disclaimed the Subcommittee’s resulting report. According to Fraser, Gross may have seen the hearings as
who regarded his experience in the African and Italian campaigns of World War II as formative to his desire to enter public service, saying, “If Americans are going to be sent to war, I want to know why and be part of the process that decides whether they should go.”

Fascell served nineteen terms in Congress and had a seat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee for thirty-six years. For nine of those years, he served as its chair. Before his election to Congress, Bingham had served as a diplomat at the UN. He represented New York City and was interested in Soviet Jewish emigration. Rosenthal also hailed from New York City where he had practiced law before serving in Congress for over twenty years. In addition, he was an early opponent of the war in Vietnam, openly dissenting by 1965. As the representative from Abraham Lincoln’s district in Springfield, Illinois, Findley consciously supported civil rights and sought to “encourage the Republican party to take the leadership” in that area. In addition, his congressional correspondence demonstrates sympathy for the victims of the coup in Chile, support for the ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, concern for the plight of Jews wishing to emigrate from the Soviet Union, and condemnation of the My Lai massacre.

The subcommittee held its hearings between August 1 and December 7, 1973, investigating the efforts of international organizations, regional organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations to protect human rights. In addition, it considered U.S. policy toward states that abused human rights. The subcommittee intended to examine potential bureaucratic reorganization at the UN, as Fraser believed it was not adequately organized to protect human rights effectively. The hearings were also formulated to address the content of


36. Findley to Beaty, December 9, 1974, Civil Rights, 1974, Box 132, Legislative File, Findley Papers.

37. See, for example, Findley to Ran, October 18, 1973, Foreign Relations (General), 1973, Box 127, Legislative File, Findley Papers; and Findley to Knapp, November 29, 1973, ibid; Findley to Herig, February 23, 1973, ibid; and Findley to Gardner, May 24, 1971, Vietnam – Calley Letters (1), Box 121, Legislative File, ibid.

38. Fraser to Rogers, July 26, 1973, Foreign Affairs Committee, [1973], 149.G.12.5 (B), Fraser Papers. One of his most concrete proposals was to raise the Commission on Human Rights to the level of a council. At the time, the commission was a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council. Fraser to Abram, 6 August 1973, Foreign Affairs: International Human Rights Hearings, 149.G.12.5 (B), Fraser Papers.
U.S. foreign policy. Fraser said, “For its part, the U.S. cannot ask the UN to be forceful in protecting human rights without at the same time giving human rights considerations the highest priority in conducting its own affairs.” In addition, the subcommittee focused on the human rights situations in a number of individual countries; specifically, the hearings considered human rights abuses in Bangladesh, Northern Ireland, and Chile, among other countries, as case studies for examining the successes and failures of American and UN attempts to protect human rights. Fraser said, “This is not a theoretical study. . . . We are going to take a close look at actual situations involving gross violations of human rights in many places around the world.” Additionally, the hearings considered human rights outside of geographic-specific hearings, examining questions such as human rights in armed conflicts, U.S. ratification of human rights treaties, and the status of women. Fraser’s subcommittee elicited testimony from a broad spectrum of those active on human rights, including religious officials, law professors, State Department officials, and many active on human rights such as the heads of organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

Witnesses often highlighted the aspects of human rights most salient to them, including problems presented by American non-ratification of UN human rights treaties, flaws in the American domestic record, U.S. policy toward South Africa, and the extent to which commercial concerns were trumping human rights, whereas others tried to consider U.S. attention to human rights comprehensively.


In his testimony, Thomas Buergenthal, who was already at this point a distinguished professor of international law, highlighted the lack of American administrative attention to the issue: “At the present time, international human rights issues do not receive, in the Department of State, the professional attention and resources they deserve.” Illustrating this quantitatively, Buergenthal pointed out that although 20 percent of the UN’s time was focused on human rights related questions, the State Department’s Bureau for International Organizations had only one person staffed on human rights matters. As part of his subcommittee’s investigation, Fraser wanted to know who in the State Department was responsible for human rights issues that developed outside of the UN framework and if the department had a mechanism for studying the “human rights impact of policy decisions.”

Buergenthal argued that directing certain State Department personnel to focus on human rights issues could positively influence the position of the United States in the world. For example, he suggested American policy toward Greece in the wake of the 1967 coup suggested an absence of concern for human rights, which might have been considered if the United States had specialists on the issue. In his view, U.S. neglect of human rights put it at odds with many of its Western European allies who demonstrated “revulsion” toward the new Greek regime.

During the subcommittee’s hearings, Fraser repeatedly criticized American reluctance to condemn governments that violated their citizens’ human rights. He said:

Our Government . . . does not believe that human rights should be a significant factor in determining our bilateral relations with other states. Human rights issues are not raised with other states—except in the most discrete manner—for fear of jeopardizing our friendly relations. To the victims of the human rights violations, we may appear to condone these practices in order to retain the economic, political and other benefits which flow from our maintenance of friendly relations with the repressive government.

While discussing the UN and U.S. reactions to massacres in Burundi, Fraser advocated more aggressive and comprehensive American responses when clear evidence of human rights abuses was available: “When a government commits gross violations of human rights, such as massacre, torture, and apartheid, it should be our policy to terminate all military assistance and sales to the government and to suspend any economic assistance directly supportive of the

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44. Fraser to Rogers, August 9, 1973 in ibid, 816.


government.” Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) echoed Fraser’s sentiment when he testified: “A policy of silence toward human tragedy, wherever it occurs, violates the traditions of our people and does a disservice to the best interests of our country.” Importantly, despite the range of options available to U.S. policy makers, Fraser’s prescriptions were the cancellation of U.S. support to a repressive regime or in Kennedy’s case, public condemnation. Given the high costs these congressional activists saw in terms of U.S. prestige, such steps could be seen as relatively easy and inexpensive.

Jerome J. Shestack, head of the International League for the Rights of Man, framed potential U.S. concern of human rights violations differently, emphasizing that defending human rights was in the United States’ national security interests. According to Shestack, “One of the critical concepts that must be accepted if we are to advance human rights is that human rights and peace in the world community are interrelated . . . if history teaches us anything it is that today’s violations are the seeds of tomorrow’s armed conflicts.” Shestack and others concerned about the close identification of the United States with authoritarian regimes warned that such relations were not in the United States’ long-term interests. Furthermore, they raised the specter that subsequent governments could adopt anti-American policies given U.S. support for previously repressive governments. Given the Cold War framework at the time, talking about human rights as a national security concern could have made the issue more palatable to policy makers operating in an era of realpolitik. Making a case based on the need to introduce morality into U.S. foreign policy was likely to be unconvincing to Kissinger and his like-minded aides.

Other observers of U.S. human rights policy, such as Rita Hauser, former U.S. representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, criticized the American approach to human rights as lacking consistency. In her testimony before the Subcommittee, Hauser said, “We speak out against violations of countries we are not particularly close to or where we feel we can do so with some measure of safety politically, and we are largely silent, as are other countries, when human rights violations occur on the part of our allies or friendly countries we do not wish to offend.”

The double standard described by Hauser frustrated many.

47. Ibid, 54.
48. Ibid, 222. Kennedy noted the establishment of a bureau within the State Department devoted to humanitarian issues had been recommended in 1969 by the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Refugees.
50. Kissinger, in his memoirs, indicates his suspicion that some liberal attention to human rights was motivated by political rather than moral considerations. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 240.
human rights advocates who believed American policy was undermined by Cold War politics.

Members of the Nixon administration testified, explaining U.S. policy and actions while trying to prevent new legislation. For example, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Kempton Jenkins defended Kissinger’s record on human rights, arguing the secretary of state was attentive to the importance of the issue given his youth in Hitler’s Germany but remained unconvinced the United States could influence, for example, the Soviet human rights record. In questioning Jenkins and Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs David Popper, Fraser asserted that the costs of American criticism of a country’s human rights record would be reduced if the United States expressed such concerns more regularly, suggesting it was in U.S. interests to have such commentary become routine.

After fifteen different sessions in which more than forty witnesses testified, the subcommittee drafted a report entitled “Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership.” The report made a series of suggestions, many of which were eventually implemented. First, the subcommittee formulated ideas about how Congress could enhance U.S. support for human rights internationally. The subcommittee advised the Senate to ratify the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and other human rights treaties not yet approved by the U.S. Senate. The subcommittee also offered suggestions for how the UN could more effectively ensure the protection of human rights. First, it proposed the creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights at the UN. The report’s authors also hoped its hearings and resulting report would encourage the UN to enhance the system by which it responded to human rights petitions. The subcommittee specifically mentioned the lack of self-determination in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portuguese colonies as warranting close international attention. The report also enumerated specific types of human rights violations, such as massacre and torture, which the Subcommittee hoped would incur interest at the UN.

In its report, the subcommittee pressed the State Department to “treat human rights factors as a regular part of U.S. foreign policy decision-making”:

The human rights factor is not accorded the high priority it deserves in our country’s foreign policy. Too often it becomes invisible on the vast foreign policy horizon of political, economic, and military affairs. Proponents of pure power politics too often dismiss it as a factor in diplomacy. . . . Our relations

52. Ibid, 433. See also Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, 766.
55. Ibid, 18.
with the present Governments of South Vietnam, Spain, Portugal, the Soviet Union, Brazil, Indonesia, Greece, the Philippines, and Chile exemplify how we have disregarded human rights for the sake of other assumed interests.  

In the subcommittee’s view, “The State Department too often has taken the position that human rights is a domestic matter and not a relevant factor in determining bilateral relations.”  

In its report, the subcommittee implicitly questioned the administration’s definition of U.S. national interests. Explicitly, the subcommittee’s members criticized U.S. policy in a number of ostensibly allied countries including Chile where importantly, Augusto Pinochet’s coup against Salvador Allende had taken place during the course of the hearings. In addition, it outlined a range of tactics the United States could use to influence governments to end abuse of human rights, such as discreet, bilateral conversations; public efforts in international organizations; and ending military and economic assistance. The subcommittee advocated repealing the Byrd amendment on Rhodesian chrome and suggested human rights abuses in the Soviet Union such as refusal of permission to emigrate should not be overlooked in deference to Soviet-American détente. Finally, the subcommittee recommended the State Department study the human rights treaties the United States had not yet acted upon.

Up until this point, human rights were the purview of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Office of the Legal Adviser. During Fraser’s hearings, Stanton Anderson, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, had said the Department of State was “disinclined” to consider adding a new bureau or office to focus on human rights barring a “clear and compelling justification for altering the existing structure.” Yet, the hearings led Fraser to believe that “some structural and functional changes in the Department might be helpful toward accounting human rights the attention and priority it deserves.”

56. Ibid, 9.
57. Ibid, 46.
59. The Byrd Amendment, introduced by Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-WV), was intended to undermine the U.S. boycott of Southern Rhodesia by stipulating that the United States could not embargo a strategic material from a noncommunist country if it imported the same material from a communist country. Fascell would press the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries on their human rights records in subsequent years as chair of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The subcommittee’s report advocated reorganizing the State Department to better equip it to consider human rights as an element of U.S. foreign relations. First, it suggested the establishment of an Office for Human Rights in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Second, it proposed designating a human rights officer in each regional bureau in the Department. Third, the subcommittee urged the Department to appoint an Assistant Legal Adviser on Human Rights and form an Advisory Committee on Human Rights. The report’s authors also suggested expanding the mandate of the United States Civil Rights Commission to include international human rights. Lastly, it proposed facilitating the development of an association of legislators interested in human rights internationally. Some of the subcommittee’s report reads like a grab-bag of possible solutions, but its underlying sentiment was that the organization of the State Department inhibited consideration of human rights in foreign policy formulation.

Not surprisingly, the recommendations of the subcommittee were not well received by the administration. In describing executive-legislative relations during the subcommittee’s hearings, Fraser reports that the subcommittee did not have “a cordial relationship” with the Nixon White House and the State Department and that Kissinger wasn’t “particularly sympathetic to human rights concerns.” Salzberg was more explicit, suggesting the relationship between Congress and the State Department was actually “confrontational.” In Fraser’s recounting, the palpable conflict emerged when the hearings were critical of American policy toward certain countries: “It was in the specifics where tension would develop.” Despite the conflict it produced, Fraser believed that “congressional prodding [resulted] in limited upgrading of human rights in U.S. foreign policy” and argued that with their efforts, “At least, the seed had been planted.”

Kissinger’s opposition to congressional legislation and changes in the State Department’s bureaucracy were rooted in two factors. First, his adherence to realpolitik meant that he saw concern for human rights as a lower priority than his congressional critics did. Second, he resented the interference of Congress in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. Despite its resistance to Fraser’s hearings, the department nonetheless tried to anticipate and blunt the subcommittee’s suggestions by making administrative changes before the report’s release. Specifically, the State Department named Warren E. Hewitt as

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63. Donald Fraser in written communication with the author, January 27, 2009; and Brad Simpson Interview with Donald Fraser, May 2008.

64. Salzberg, “The Life and Legacy of George Lister.”

65. Donald Fraser in written communication with the author, January 27, 2009.

66. Notes, October 15, 1975, Binder, Box 149,C.12.4 (F), Fraser Papers.

67. Schifter, “The Life and Legacy of George Lister.”

At the same time, Kissinger spoke about the administration’s stance on human rights in an October 1973 address to the Pacem in Terris Conference, which he later characterized as “an appeal for a new national consensus on America’s role in the world.” Despite his disdain for prioritizing human rights, that Kissinger addressed the topic suggested the issue was moving onto the foreign policy agenda. He said:

So let us not address this as a debate between those who are morally sensitive and those you are not, between those who care for justice and those who are oblivious to humane values. . . . We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts.

In this formulation, particularly given the sense of constraints on U.S. power in these years, most audiences must have found Kissinger’s argument sensible. Yet, the record shows Kissinger’s efforts to address human rights violations were limited and cynical. His speech served to articulate the administration’s position on human rights, including that the United States could not transform the domestic systems of foreign countries and that in an age of nuclear weapons, human rights concerns were at times less significant than achieving détente and the stability of the international system. Kissinger’s emphasis on the threat to humans from nuclear weapons could possibly be used as a rationale for minimizing criticism of Soviet human rights abuses in a period of détente. It does not, however, explain the lack of United States’ attention to human rights in other countries, particularly where those governments depended on U.S. military assistance. According to his memoirs and a conversation with his staff, Kissinger’s address at the Pacem in
Terris was partially motivated by his opposition to Henry Jackson’s proposed amendment targeting Soviet emigration restrictions.\textsuperscript{72}

After the publication of the subcommittee’s report in March 1974, it remained committed to investigating international violations of human rights and held hearings on the situation in Chile and South Korea as well as on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.\textsuperscript{73} The hearings on South Korea were intended to examine “the increasingly repressive nature of the South Korean Government,” in particular, suppression of dissent and courts martial of demonstrators.\textsuperscript{74} Partly in response to reports of South Korean abuses, Fraser proposed an amendment that the president “shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”\textsuperscript{75} Fraser believed that “military assistance to Korea cannot [be] in the interests of human rights.” He suggested that in this case the United States needed to assess how to “reconcile the requirements of international security with our commitment to human rights.”\textsuperscript{76} Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Robert S. Ingersoll disagreed in principle with ending assistance to human rights violators. Explaining the Department’s position, Ingersoll argued the suspension of aid removed a potential restraint on future repressive actions and deprived the United States of any leverage with the government.\textsuperscript{77} Executive-legislative dialogue on South Korea suggests that although disagreements remained regarding how the United States should respond to human rights violations abroad, the question was being considered as the United States formulated its policy.\textsuperscript{78}

Following the subcommittee’s report, there were three key consequences for U.S. human rights policy. First, in subsequent years, members of Congress interested in human rights internationally increasingly shifted their focus to curbing U.S. military assistance to repressive governments. Given low levels of congressional interest in earlier years, that 104 members wrote to Kissinger to articulate

\textsuperscript{72} The Jackson–Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Reform Act linked Soviet most favored nation (MFN) trading status with the freedom to emigrate. Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, 255; and Memorandum of Conversation, December 17, 1974, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976}, Volume E-3, Document 245. The speech itself, Kissinger’s first major address as secretary of state, warrants further historical inquiry, having been neglected by Kissinger biographers Robert Dallek, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Walter Isaacson.

\textsuperscript{73} Human rights violations in South Korea, Chile, the Philippines, and Indonesia remained pressing issues for Fraser’s subcommittee in 1975, and Uruguay became a greater focus as the year progressed. Fraser to McCloskey, June 24, 1975, Foreign Affairs Committee, 1975, Box 149.G.9.6 (F), Fraser Papers.

\textsuperscript{74} Press Release, July 26, 1974, Press Release File 1974 Book II, 152.L.9.5 (B), Fraser Papers.


\textsuperscript{76} Fraser to Reischauer, July 17, 1974, Human Rights, Box 149.13.7 (B), Fraser Papers.

\textsuperscript{77} Ingersoll to Morgan, June 27, 1974, Human Rights, 149.G.13.7 (B), Fraser Papers.

\textsuperscript{78} In a meeting with Kissinger several months later, Fraser expressed his appreciation for Ingersoll’s “assistance” on human rights in South Korea. Memorandum of Conversation, December 17, 1974, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976}, Volume E-3, Document 245.
their strong opposition to providing military assistance to repressive governments in August signaled growing concerns about U.S. support of regimes that abused human rights. In particularly strong language, they wrote:

In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, we do not believe that long-term U.S. foreign policy interests are served by maintaining supportive relationships with oppressive governments, especially in the military field, since military power is directly associated with the exercise of governmental control over the civilian population. Unless U.S. foreign policies—especially military assistance policies—more accurately reflect the traditional commitment of the American people to promote human rights, we will find it increasingly difficult to justify support for foreign aid legislation to our constituents.79

Responding to the letter, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Lynwood Holton suggested the Department was working on assessing international human rights violations. Holton also argued careful attention was needed to the direction of a country’s record and highlighted South Korea particularly as a country that might be making improvements that would alleviate congressional interest in reducing assistance.80 In a meeting between Kissinger and members of Congress to discuss the role of human rights in foreign policy, Kissinger emphasized that in some instances, national security interests needed to dominate.81 This emphasis on national security concerns certainly shaped the rhetoric and rationale offered by human rights advocates. Kissinger, however, was obviously not convinced by their arguments.

In the aftermath of the subcommittee’s hearings, Congress took incremental steps to curb assistance to repressive governments.82 First, it passed Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which said, “It is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that

79. Fraser to All Signatories, September 18, 1974, Dear Colleague—Kissinger, 1974, Box 151.H.3-3 (B), Fraser Papers; and Press Release, September 22, 1974, ibid.
80. Holton to Fraser, October 23, 1974, Captive Nations, 1973-1974, Box 151.H.3-3 (B), Fraser Papers.
81. Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 1974, Human Rights, 1974-1978 (3), Box 151.H.4-2 (F), Fraser Papers.
82. Keys’s article argues that Kissinger’s intransigence on human rights led Congress to pass increasingly restrictive legislation to force him to address the issue. Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy.” In the view of some State Department officials, these human rights amendments were the work of “a handful of activists” who had successfully built support in the interested committees as well as in Congress more broadly. “U.S. Policies on Human Rights and Authoritarian Regimes,” 1974, General Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files, Box 348, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. I appreciate Daniel Sargent’s willingness to share this document with me. (Hereafter RG 59.)
country’s citizens for political purposes.” After sharing Section 32 language with foreign governments, especially in East Asia, the State Department reported that some governments raised questions about the “difficulty of defining” political prisoners. Congress therefore included far more specific language in the subsequent year’s legislation. Section 502B of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, stipulated that:

Except under extraordinary circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Those violations are defined to include torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty and security of person.

In addition, the act’s authors sought to restrict U.S. assistance to Chile and South Korea until they made more progress in respecting “internationally recognized standards of human rights.” The executive branch, however, ignored the spirit of Section 502B of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act and routinely cited “extraordinary circumstances.”

Beyond specific legislative measures targeting foreign assistance, Fraser’s hearings and congressional activism more broadly prompted the State Department to undertake two studies; the first examined how the bureaucracy of the State Department could better address human rights concerns and the second assessed current U.S. human rights policy. At a high-level State Department meeting in June 1974, Kempton Jenkins noted only two people were currently working on human rights issues in the Department, one in from the Office of the Legal Adviser and one in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. An exasperated

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83. Importantly, in contrast to later legislation such as the 1975 Harkin amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 32 did not mandate that the government deny military or economic assistance. Foreign Assistance Act 1973, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.; Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 108. In April 1974, the State Department asked for widespread reporting on the treatment of political prisoners from its embassies.


85. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Clair Apodaca sees the language of “gross violations” as presenting a problem in definition, in that it was connected with the degree of violation as well as the number of people affected and for a significant duration of time. Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy, 38.


Jenkins reported, “They cannot handle their mail.” William Buffum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, suggested that many observers did not regard the United States as supporting human rights, which created a problem. According to Buffum, “We are under increasing criticism on the Hill, I find, for not taking enough of a lead and not taking a forthcoming enough approach.” State Department officials discussed Fraser’s role in the debate, noting that whereas he had once been “a lone Indian” on the issue, he wasn’t anymore. Jenkins reported that Fraser had “worked very hard on the issue,” had been “very even-handed.” Jenkins warned that rising attention to the issue in Congress would likely produce legislation that prevented military assistance to Chile and could potentially affect U.S. forces in Korea. The officials present both recognized that their hands could be forced by congressional action and that the Department was increasingly understaffed to address growing attention to human rights in the United States and the UN.

Deputy Undersecretary of Management L. Dean Brown drafted a briefing memorandum for Kissinger on the degree to which it should reorganize to address human rights concerns, outlining several broad approaches: “do nothing”; a “minor reorganization”; steps that went beyond a “cosmetic” reorganization; a substantive and institutional reorganization; or acceding to the Senate-proposed creation of a Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs. Brown noted that at issue was “how far we want to go and how fast.” He evaluated options in terms of the degree of disruption they would cause for the Department, their effect on the burdens of the Secretary, and the message such steps would signal to external observers, among other factors.

The second study undertaken by the State Department was more comprehensive and had potentially considerable consequences for the subsequent direction of U.S. foreign policy. The State Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS) authored what was a significant evaluation of U.S. policy toward authoritarian

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88. Buffum proposed tasking one person within each regional bureau to follow human rights issues as a temporary measure to improve the Department’s image on the problem while the broader studies were undertaken. Transcript, The Acting Secretary’s Principals’ and Functionals’ Staff Meeting, June 12, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-3, Document 236.

89. Ibid. Jenkins’ characterization may have been important given Kissinger’s claims that politics motivated those ostensibly concerned with human rights for moral reasons, but the Secretary State was not in attendance. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 240.


91. Ibid.

92. Brown to Kissinger, August 8, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-3, Document 241. This article focuses on the House human rights hearings, but Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) and the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance that he chaired also examined the issue.

93. Before this study, the State Department had not comprehensively studied human rights nor formally considered how the issue should or should not be incorporated into U.S. foreign policy.
regimes. It was intended to stave off more drastic congressional action, enhance the coherence of American policy, and develop greater domestic consensus. The PPS attributed increased attention on American human rights policy to several disparate developments in the fall of 1973: repressive measures undertaken by the government in South Korea, political upheaval in Greece, and the coup in Chile. Other developments seen as shaping increased interest in human rights included the imposition of martial law in the Philippines in 1972, the continuing impediments to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, U.S. violation of the UN embargo of Rhodesia due to the Byrd Amendment, and repression in South Vietnam by Nguyen Van Thieu’s regime. Press accounts of human rights violations including torture by governments with which the United States was closely identified, were also cited. As the report’s authors indicated, “It is becoming increasingly clear that nothing ‘turns off’ large segments of the natural foreign policy ‘constituency’... than the appearance of insensitivity on the part of US officialdom toward human rights issues around the world.” The authors noted, “What official Americans say in public about the US position on human rights and authoritarian regimes, either in general terms or in regard to specific situations is not just a matter of public relations. It is an essential element of our policy in this field.”

As the State Department studied U.S. policy, it remained engaged with its opponents. As evidence of the continuing pressure the administration felt on human rights, Richard Nixon attempted to defuse criticism of the administration’s record in a commencement address in June 1974. In his speech, Nixon strongly articulated U.S. support for human rights, “We can never, as Americans, acquiesce in the suppression of human liberties.” Nonetheless, echoing a familiar theme, he suggested the United States at times pursued higher priorities, “We cannot gear our foreign policy to transformation of other societies. In the nuclear age, our first responsibility must be the prevention of a war that could destroy all societies.” Congressional critics and others, however, did not see “prevention of war” as incompatible with attention to human rights.

The Department also conferred with its congressional critics at many levels. The two sides debated the effectiveness of different types of representations and how Congress could make its views on specific issues known. Based on State Department reporting on a July 1974 session, relations between State and Congress seemed more productive than previous accounts have suggested. According to Director for Korean Affairs Donald Ranard, the congressional staffers were “friendlily disposed to work with the Department on this issue.” He reported that John Salzberg “gave the impression that Fraser has deep conviction

about the importance of human rights in foreign affairs but wanted to be as helpful as possible.”

Although key staff members perceived that progress was being made, Kissinger remained reluctant to encounter his critics directly. At a meeting with his top aides, Kissinger expressed frustration at an upcoming session with Fraser and wondered how it could end in his favor. Kissinger asked, “What am I supposed to do—show that I am a humanitarian?” He indicated he expected Fraser to hold a press conference after the meeting had ended that condemned administration policies. His advisers, however, assured him that Fraser would adopt a reasonable approach to the meeting. Lynwood Holton, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, urged Kissinger to “get hold of Fraser” and “get him on your side.” Kissinger dismissed Fraser’s agenda, claiming, “These guys don’t want to stand for human rights—they want grandstand plays. They want public humiliation of other countries.”

Kissinger’s concerns likely led to the decision to make his December 17, 1974 meeting with Fraser and other members of Congress off-the-record. Fraser, however, was conciliatory, telling those in attendance “of the many positive things which have been done recently in the field of human rights.” Yet, he pointed out that congressional support was eroding for foreign assistance to governments with poor human rights records.

Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) reported to Kissinger that a recent study had shown that the United States was sending aid to fifty-eight countries regarded as dictatorships, which Representative Robert Roe (D-NJ) said was leading to decreasing support for foreign aid. Cranston asked, “Is aid to all of these countries necessary?” The Secretary responded by outlining steps the administration had taken to raise human rights with the Chilean and Soviet governments. Furthermore, Kissinger argued that though Congress should “express its view on human rights,” he was “allergic” to “obligatory statutes.” Based on the available records, it can be difficult to assess the true nature of Kissinger’s “allergy,” but it appears to have extended beyond “obligatory statutes”

96. Furthermore, Ingersoll’s regular communication with Fraser seemed to have positively influenced the representative’s appraisal of State Department efforts. Ranard to Sneider, July 17, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-3, Document 239.

97. When an aide indicated the attendees had not been finalized, Kissinger fumed, “Are you telling me you have set up a meeting with an unknown group that is dedicated to a set of propositions which you know they are going to get me into trouble?” Transcript, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, October 22, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-3, Document 244.

98. Kissinger countered that Fraser had opposed his nomination for Secretary of State, asking, “What is the chance of getting Don Fraser on my side?” Ibid.

99. Ibid.


101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.
to any congressional encroachment on the executive branch as well as consider-
ation of human rights in foreign policy formulation.

The PPS proposed the United States work to develop a “coherent” but “suf-
ciently flexible” approach to human rights. As with the study that contemplated
reorganization of the State Department, the PPS outlined four possible
approaches, including the status quo; a “passive approach,” “selective change,”
and a “major initiative,” which would signal a decisive turn in U.S. policy
toward a stronger position generally on human rights.” In determining what
option to pursue, policy planners noted that the government needed to take ac-
count of the bilateral relationship; the extent of U.S. influence; other American
interests; the severity of the human rights violations; if the situation is improving or
worsening; the domestic reaction to the violations; a determination of the conse-
quences of American action; regional context; and American identification with the
abuses. The PPS study’s authors clearly wrestled to balance a potentially more
assertive role on human rights with concerns about respecting the principle of
noninterference in the internal affairs of foreign governments.\textsuperscript{103} The PPS urged
the government adopt a policy of making “modest modification in our high-level
expressions of concern for protection of human rights generally” and to “indicate a
willingness, however, on occasion to give public expression to our disapproval of
human rights violations in countries besides those in the Soviet bloc whenever that
is deemed the best way to achieve results without seriously compromising other
important interests.” The PPS called for the naming of a Special Assistant on
Human Rights and an examination of American export of police equipment, its
visa policies toward emigrants from authoritarian countries, as well as its refugee
and asylum policies.\textsuperscript{104}

Several months after the subcommittee’s report was released, Fraser wrote to
Kissinger to express the subcommittee’s pleasure at administrative changes within
the State Department, including designating someone in the United Nations
Political Affairs office to be in charge of human rights, the appointment of an

\textsuperscript{103} The Legal Adviser determined that “the principle of non-interference is not in itself a
legal bar to official US cognizance of human rights problems in a foreign country.” It argued,
“there is now ample legal justification for diplomatic representations to a state concerning its
treatment of its own nationals where such treatment violates minimum standards of international
law.” Yet, the PPS noted that such a legal determination did not mean that countries would not
nonetheless regard such expressions of concern as interference. Summary: U.S. Policies on Human
Rights and Authoritarian Regimes, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-3,
Document 243. In Wilson’s view, the report had an “unhappy history” given that Kissinger would
not approve or disprove it, which led to it not being distributed internally. James M. Wilson,
“Diplomatic Theology – An Early Chronicle of Human Rights at State,” Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs – Wilson Memoir, Box 1, James M. Wilson Papers, Gerald R. Ford
Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Ingersoll to Kissinger, January 16, 1975, Foreign Relations of
Library.)

\textsuperscript{104} Approval of these recommendations is unclear. “U.S. Policies on Human Rights and
Authoritarian Regimes,” 1974, General Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff,
Director’s Files, Box 348, RG 59.
Assistant Legal Advisor for Human Rights, and the selection of human rights officers in three regional bureaus.\(^{105}\) Responding to congressional activism and its own interest in dominating the foreign policy process, the State Department began adopting a more proactive approach, including requesting reports on human rights violations from embassies abroad in January 1975.\(^{106}\) In addition, the State Department was actively soliciting information from its embassies on human rights conditions in the countries they monitored in line with congressional legislation.\(^{107}\) Fraser, however, was not satisfied with the Department’s initial bureaucratic restructuring and continued to press for greater bureaucratic change at the State Department, including a special assistant on human rights to the Deputy Secretary of State.\(^{108}\) In April 1975, Ingersoll named James M. Wilson, Jr. Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs. Ingersoll described Wilson’s appointment as a step “to expand and upgrade the time and attention devoted to human rights considerations in the work of the Department of State” and suggested he was “instituting centralized direction of the Department’s efforts on human rights, refugees, humanitarian assistance, prisoners of war.”\(^{109}\) In a letter to Senator James O. Eastland (D-MS), Chair of the Judiciary Committee, Ingersoll described Wilson’s appointment as bringing “a clear focus on human rights issues to activities throughout the Department, and to assure attention at the highest level, as these issues deserve.”\(^{110}\) Keys has noted Wilson had little experience in human rights issues, which seemingly qualified him in Kissinger’s mind.\(^{111}\)

Increased attention to the issue in Washington, however, did not always ensure that such efforts were supported in the field. According to Wilson, chiefs of mission surveyed about how new human rights reporting requirements might affect them were uniformly negative: “Practically all of them came back saying that they

\(^{105}\) Human rights officers were also appointed in functional bureaus. Fraser to Kissinger, June 27, 1974, Folder 21, Box 7, George Lister Papers, Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas. Though in separate correspondence with Martin Ennals, the Secretary General of Amnesty International, he expressed caution about being “prematurely optimistic” about the State Department actions. Fraser to Ennals, June 28, 1974, Human Rights, Box 149.G.13.7 (B), Fraser Papers.


\(^{108}\) Fraser to Ingersoll, July 10, 1974, Human Rights, Box 149.G.13.7 (B), Fraser Papers.

\(^{109}\) Ingersoll became Deputy Secretary of State in 1974. Ingersoll to Fraser, April 18, 1975, State Department, 1975, Box 149.G.9.7 (B), Fraser Papers. For further discussion of Wilson’s tenure, see James M. Wilson, “Diplomatic Theology – An Early Chronicle of Human Rights at State,” Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs – Wilson Memoir, Box 1, Wilson Papers; and Keys, “Kissinger versus Congress: The Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy.”


thought it would cause major problems. They thought it would mess up considerably many of the programs we were facing in the Cold War.” He elaborated:

They felt that if the U.S. government had to broadcast publicly what was going on, it would be considered a slap in the face by the government concerned and, in terms of human rights, it would be self defeating. They very much preferred to do things quietly, without the glare of publicity, and said it should certainly not be done with a lot of public flagellation along the way.”

Furthermore, Kissinger tried to restrict distribution of the reports that were drafted, leading to new struggles with the legislative branch.112

Beyond the administration’s attempts to address congressional initiatives, the executive branch also sought to ensure public support for its approach to human rights. As part of that effort, Kissinger began a series of “heartland” speeches that summer, which were intended to justify the administration’s foreign policy. In one address, “The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy,” Kissinger echoed familiar themes, saying, “We are told that our foreign policy is excessively pragmatic, that it sacrifices virtue in the mechanical pursuit of stability. Once attacked as cold war-oriented, we are now criticized by some as insensitive to moral values.”114

As the two criticisms are not incompatible, Kissinger’s mention of the latter suggests administration opponents had effectively sharpened their criticisms. Kissinger indicated the United States was pressing the Soviet Union on human rights but had done so “quietly, keeping in mind the delicacy of the problem and stressing results rather than public confrontation.”115

It was unlikely to be a coincidence that Kissinger sought to defend the administration as it prepared to enter a presidential campaign year; former California governor Ronald Reagan announced his challenge for the Republican nomination only four months later. Speaking in Minneapolis, the secretary asserted the United States was trying to influence the “repressive practices” of nondemocratic regimes throughout the world.116

In Kissinger’s formulation, the United States would consider human


115. As many critics of Kissinger’s approach to human rights are aware, he often spoke so “quietly” on the issue that he was not heard at all. Kissinger, “The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy,” 166.

rights in its foreign policy, raise the issue when “appropriate,” but be “mindful of the limits of our reach.” The minimal shift in Kissinger’s approach to human rights could suggest there were real limits to congressional pressure, but his personal conversion was not necessary. The institutionalization process begun in these years ensured that consideration of human rights in U.S. foreign policy would never be tied to one individual.

Fraser’s hearings, the Subcommittee’s resulting report, and subsequent human rights legislation signaled a turning point in U.S. foreign policy formulation. Incremental steps by Congress eventually led to the establishment of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, annual reports on countries’ human rights records, and increasing limits on assistance to repressive regimes. Close observer Sandy Vogelgesang writes that congressional activism was a “catalyst to grudging Executive Branch action” because it “raised consciousness in the ranks, if not at the highest reaches of the Administration.” In Fraser’s view, the legacy of the hearings was “to change the culture of the State Department which in the past had viewed human rights issues generally as not relevant to their work of building and maintaining relationships with other countries.” Richard Schifter, who served as Assistant Secretary of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs during the Reagan administration agrees: “I believe that the basic concept of human rights, as part of U.S. foreign policy, is now embedded in foreign policy and has been as a result, as I say, of the congressional actions in the 1970s.” In Salzberg’s view, the Subcommittee’s “legacy” was that “human rights became a commonly [accepted] factor in U.S. foreign policy.” Specifically, he argues the country reports on human rights are “the most durable aspect of the Fraser hearings.” Fraser similarly regards the annual reports on countries’ human rights practices to have allowed “the U.S. to express our views on a country’s human rights practices without requiring overt intervention.” From a more distant perspective, David D. Newsom, U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, reports he was able to use congressional activism on human rights in his diplomacy with Jakarta, suggesting congressional efforts could curb human rights violations and lead to meaningful change beyond the Beltway. Newsom argues that it enabled him to persuade the government to release communist prisoners in an attempt to

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117. Ibid., 167. For a discussion of the difference between “early” and “late” Kissinger in terms of his rhetoric regarding human rights, which Lars Schoultz sees as shifting in 1975, see Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, 111.


119. Donald Fraser in written communication with the author, January 27, 2009.

120. Schifter, “The Life and Legacy of George Lister.”

121. Ibid.

avoid congressional sanction. Newsom suggests his efforts eventually contributed to the release of nearly 30,000 political prisoners by Indonesia.\footnote{123}

Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations and Social Movements held hearings in 1973 on human rights, the issue had garnered only episodic attention by governmental actors. Fraser’s hearings fundamentally recalibrated U.S. foreign policy formulation and assured that human rights would be considered. As the executive branch commitment to the issue fluctuated depending on who occupied the White House, persistent congressional attention to the issue was essential to its continued salience. Over the course of the 1970s, concern for international human rights deepened, and eventually it grew into an international movement comprising nongovernmental organizations, individuals, and key political actors that had far-reaching implications for international relations.