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## The CSCE and the Atlantic alliance: Forging a new consensus in Madrid

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This article analyzes how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) delegations coalesced behind a common stance at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Madrid Review Meeting held from 1980 to 1983. It demonstrates that United States Ambassador to the Madrid Meeting Max M. Kampelman and international events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish imposition of martial law, and the Soviet downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 fostered allied unity at the talks. Eventual agreement among the NATO allies about their strategy for the meeting gave the West a firmer and more effective negotiating position at Madrid, which it used to push proposals on human contacts, Helsinki monitors, the flow of information, terrorism, and religious freedom, among other issues. The reestablishment of consensus on CSCE issues within the Atlantic alliance at Madrid proved important because the ability of the NATO states to remain united despite internal disagreement over negotiating tactics and objectives was significant to the long-term influence of the Helsinki process.

**Keywords:** CSCE; NATO; human rights; diplomacy; Helsinki process

As the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was one of the only multilateral forums for East–West discussions, it offers an important opportunity to study intra- and inter-alliance dynamics, and examining North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) cooperation within the CSCE in the early 1980s suggests allied relations were far more nuanced in this period than previous accounts have suggested.<sup>1</sup> NATO states engaged in regular consultations in advance of and during the CSCE negotiations in an effort to ensure allied agreement, but national interests and disagreements over objectives and tactics at times complicated its early stages. The 1980–1983 CSCE Madrid Review Meeting, however, marked a shift toward greater accord among the NATO states. As these years are generally seen as a discordant period in transatlantic relations given the many contentious issues among the allies, it is important to understand how and why the NATO states were able to formulate and maintain a united position in Madrid. Furthermore, the achievement of allied unity at Madrid heightened NATO's subsequent effectiveness in pressing for greater Eastern European adherence to CSCE agreements, which in turn required reform that would contribute to the demise of communism there. This article draws upon research conducted in a range of government and manuscript collections on both sides of the Atlantic to examine the role of a CSCE diplomat,

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United States Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, as well as the influence of external events in the achievement of allied consensus.

Since 1949, the NATO alliance offered security to Western Europe in the face of the Soviet threat, and NATO members were dedicated to containing Soviet influence and rebuffing Eastern aggression. NATO members had long worried about Soviet efforts to foster divisions among the NATO states and in particular to separate the United States from its Western European allies, as the maintenance of unity demonstrated the continued strength of the Western military alliance and the United States' commitment to Western Europe. In the Cold War mindset, evidence of disagreements within the alliance offered the Soviet Union the opportunity to encroach upon Western Europe. Ensuring cohesion among the allies, even on matters such as the CSCE, was essential to convincing Warsaw Pact states that NATO members remained committed to one another's defence.

The NATO countries initially feared that agreeing to the Soviet 1954 proposal for a conference on European security could threaten allied unity, but they discounted those concerns in the early 1970s due to overriding policy objectives such as a strong interest in East–West détente. Divergent national interests and the complexity of the CSCE negotiations from 1972 to 1975 tested the NATO alliance but did not fracture it.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the talks, the Western states worked to achieve maximum gains without succumbing to Soviet manoeuvring and manipulations. Although NATO members were in general agreement about their defensive goals, countries disagreed as to the balance between extracting concessions from the Soviets and their allies versus risking European détente with confrontational negotiations. Intra-alliance tensions in the first years of the CSCE often centred on tepid United States support for Western attempts to gain concessions from the Soviets on human rights.<sup>3</sup> Divergent views on these and other questions complicated allied relations throughout the early years of the CSCE.

Allied unity in the CSCE context, like alliance cohesion more broadly, was critical because it facilitated achievement of Western negotiating objectives. For example, the NATO allies were able to secure greater concessions from the Soviets during the Geneva phase (1973–1975) of the CSCE once they developed common positions and eschewed bilateral negotiations. In contrast, the Soviets had hoped dealing directly with individual NATO members would enable them to secure allied concessions, and there were a number of cases in which Soviet objectives were achieved in this manner. In one instance, the French eased their position on the question of the level of representation at the final stage of the CSCE negotiations during a 1974 Franco-Soviet summit, undermining NATO negotiating efforts in Geneva.<sup>4</sup> In the final months of the Geneva talks, however, NATO diplomats were increasingly effective at projecting a unified position, leading the Soviets to make several key compromises to conclude the lengthy negotiations.<sup>5</sup>

### **Allied divisions in Belgrade**

The first follow-up meeting to the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, held in Belgrade from 1977 to 1978, posed significant challenges to the maintenance of a unified NATO position within the CSCE.<sup>6</sup> Just as in the initial negotiating phases, disagreements existed inside the NATO caucus as to negotiating objectives and how concerns about human rights should be expressed. Allied differences at Belgrade

centred on competing priorities: continuing the Helsinki process; achieving tangible progress on new commitments; and increasing compliance with existing agreements. Most Western European states were more concerned than the United States about a potential Soviet withdrawal from the meeting, which led some Western European delegates to express anxiety about the specificity of American charges of Soviet and Eastern European human rights abuses at Belgrade.<sup>7</sup> United States President Jimmy Carter was ostensibly committed to a unified approach at Belgrade, yet he was also focused on vocally defending the rights of private citizens engaged in monitoring the Helsinki Final Act as part of his human rights policy. At Belgrade, some allies questioned what they saw as American overemphasis on human rights as well as the confrontational style of the United States Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, a former Supreme Court Justice, Secretary of Labor, and Ambassador to the United Nations.<sup>8</sup> In a signal of their frustration at his tactics, some European diplomats described Goldberg as an ‘unguided missile’.<sup>9</sup> Yet, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance notes that as the meeting progressed into the working group stage, the NATO allies were more willing to support Goldberg’s strategy of naming individual cases of human rights abuses.<sup>10</sup> Despite this shift, significant differences remained among the NATO delegates regarding their approach to what was known as the Helsinki process.<sup>11</sup>

No new commitments were made in Belgrade, and the inability to reach a substantive concluding document at the meeting raised questions about the long-term durability and efficacy of the Helsinki process, particularly as the Western alliance struggled to maintain a unified approach during the negotiations and repression in Eastern Europe continued. But as the Soviet Union and Eastern states ultimately did not withdraw from the CSCE process, the United States considered its aggressive approach vindicated.<sup>12</sup>

### **Striving for allied unity in Madrid**

Given the strain in Belgrade, the NATO states worked to improve their coordination in advance of the opening of the talks in Madrid. The North Atlantic Council and NATO diplomats engaged in significant discussions to try to develop a unified position. Canadian records indicate some level of divide between Western Europeans and North Americans in advance of the meeting regarding how to approach discussions on humanitarian issues at Madrid. One Canadian diplomat reporting NATO preparations to Ottawa wrote, ‘Throughout the discussion there was constant undercurrent of European concern that anticipated aggressive style of North American [delegations] on human rights issue could endanger prospects of West Europeans achieving their goals for Madrid Meeting in security and human contacts fields.’<sup>13</sup> NATO discussions before the meeting began included a West German desire to talk about human rights in a ‘straight forward but dignified manner avoiding polemics’, and French and Italian hesitations about pursuing a confrontational approach.<sup>14</sup> The Dutch, who were characteristically strong supporters of the Helsinki Final Act’s humanitarian provisions, suggested the allies should strongly criticise Warsaw Pact states for their records and ‘cautioned allies against placing too much emphasis on prospects for even modest new proposals’.<sup>15</sup> Griffin Bell, former United States attorney general and ambassador to the Madrid Meeting under Carter, also supported a more assertive stance at Madrid, saying, ‘I’m not going to create a situation where we can’t make any progress, but I never thought there was

anything wrong with telling the truth. I don't think that's anything to get upset about and take your marbles and leave and I don't expect the Soviet Union will do that.'<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, Canadian diplomats identified potential for unity at Madrid:

The Allies recently conducted their first consultation on preparations for Madrid. We agreed that our object [sic] there should be to stimulate the CSCE process by promoting the full implementation of the Final Act. The Americans want a thorough review of implementation. Other Allies place more emphasis on a discussion of new proposals, while agreeing that a review should be held, when the issues of human rights could be debated, although in more general and in less strident terms than at Belgrade.<sup>17</sup>

The NATO allies also prepared for Madrid bilaterally. For example, when German Chancellor Schmidt met Carter in March 1980, the two discussed the CSCE and agreed the Allies should pursue a full review of Helsinki compliance.<sup>18</sup>

### **Kampelman's personal contribution**

A primary cause of the pronounced difference in allied relations between the Belgrade Follow-up CSCE Meeting and the Madrid Meeting was the arrival of a new United States ambassador. Though not a career diplomat, Washington lawyer Max Kampelman was a veteran of Washington politics, playing key behind-the-scenes roles both inside and outside the government. Kampelman served both Carter and Ronald Reagan as the American ambassador to the Madrid Meeting working diligently to hold the caucus together through the sessions in Madrid. As Goldberg had been a lightning rod for NATO criticism in the previous negotiations, understanding Kampelman's careful efforts to reach out to the United States' allies and forge common positions is essential. Most importantly, Kampelman was able to gain allied support for the practice of citing specific cases of human rights abuses in the opening and plenary statements at the meeting. As this had been a particularly divisive issue between the allies at Belgrade, his ability to gain consensus on the practice of naming names was necessary for re-establishing allied harmony.

Kampelman undertook several steps to enhance allied unity at Madrid, suggesting the United States recognised it needed allied support to pressure the Soviets effectively. First, he made a tour of European capitals, consulting with allied leaders in advance of the Madrid Preparatory Meeting in an effort to avoid some of the problems that had plagued European–American relations during Belgrade.<sup>19</sup> Second, he worked to re-establish regular consultation among the NATO ambassadors to the Madrid Meeting. Before the Madrid Meeting, CSCE diplomats such as those from Britain and West Germany doubted that a strong NATO caucus could be brought together again given the intra-alliance problems at Belgrade.<sup>20</sup> Kampelman was determined to reconstitute the group, and in his account, manipulated the NATO states, including France, in order to get them to attend an inaugural session by promising to brief them on his talks with the Soviet ambassador. Given the near breakdown in Soviet–American relations at the time, the United States' allies were interested to hear the content of the ambassadors' discussion. His ploy worked and led to regular caucus meetings during the Madrid negotiations.<sup>21</sup> The NATO ministers similarly met repeatedly when the meeting was in session. Kampelman's extensive efforts during the meeting to ensure unity with the NATO allies prompted Richard Schifter, who became Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and

Humanitarian Affairs later in the Reagan administration, to write subsequently to Kampelman: 'You accomplished what Arthur [Goldberg] did not: you enlisted the West Europeans in the cause.'<sup>22</sup>

Despite far greater agreement in Madrid among the allies on raising human rights violations than at Belgrade, disagreements remained about what tactics were most likely to improve respect for human rights in Eastern Europe. A number of diplomats in Madrid sought consensus on new human rights and human contacts provisions. Kampelman, frustrated at the idea of agreeing to new formulations the East would never uphold, instead proposed to Secretary of State George Shultz that as a prerequisite to a concluding document at Madrid, the United States require the release and possible emigration of a number of human rights activists and Jewish refuseniks from the Soviet Union.<sup>23</sup> With Shultz's and Reagan's approval, Kampelman engaged in negotiations with the Soviets to reach a bilateral agreement on individual cases the Soviets could address to demonstrate compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. Kampelman foresaw the allies might 'explode' given the shift in American objectives for the negotiations, and some allies did criticise American emphasis on individual gestures.<sup>24</sup> Nonetheless, the United States' interest in a Soviet performance requirement did not significantly undermine the strengthened relations Kampelman had forged.

### **The NATO agenda**

An additional challenge for the Western allies was how to address proposals for a conference to develop confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).<sup>25</sup> There were significant differences between Western and Eastern ideas about the conference mandate. The Soviets wanted a conference solely devoted to disarmament, but eventually realised they would have to settle for a two-stage conference in which talks on CSBMs would precede a session on disarmament.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the geographic zone to be subject to the conference was a contentious question at Madrid, as the Soviets were willing to concede applicability to a larger area of their territory only if the West would include American and Canadian territory as well as the water and air spaces that were connected to Europe. NATO was committed to a conference that formulated CSBMs that were verifiable, militarily significant, politically binding, as well as applicable to all of Europe, and allied diplomats effectively negotiated a mandate that met their objectives.<sup>27</sup> NATO diplomats lauded the eventual agreement, which they saw as an 'important part of the CSCE process and provides new possibilities for increasing security throughout Europe'.<sup>28</sup>

Intense Soviet interest in security issues enabled the United States and its allies to push harder on human rights issues. Western states, in particular Canada and the United States, pressed for and, in exchange for agreeing to hold a security conference, secured two other experts meetings to follow Madrid: one in Ottawa on human rights and fundamental freedoms and one in Bern on human contacts.<sup>29</sup> There had been some division among the allies at Madrid on the importance of advocating for the two human rights follow-up meetings, with the United States very committed but with less cohesive allied support.<sup>30</sup> A more unified position developed as the meeting progressed. The balance in experts meetings was grounded in an overall allied commitment to maintain equilibrium between human rights and military security within the CSCE process.<sup>31</sup> Allied accomplishments such as these

were the result of a more unified approach to the negotiations at Madrid than had prevailed in Belgrade. Kampelman succeeded in reconstituting the NATO caucus at the outset of the negotiations, and NATO diplomats maintained sufficient unity to pressure the Soviets, in part by prolonging the talks, until the allies achieved their objectives.

### **The Cold War context**

Broader East–West dynamics also contributed to increased allied unity at Madrid. The international context in which the meeting opened, and in particular the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, played a role in fostering allied cohesion. NATO countries' reactions to other international events, such as the Polish imposition of martial law in December 1981 and the Soviet downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 in September 1983, signalled growing NATO unity within the CSCE and enabled important progress in the Madrid negotiations. Eventual agreement among the NATO allies about their strategy for the meeting gave the West a firmer and more effective negotiating position at Madrid, which it used to push proposals on human contacts, Helsinki monitors, the flow of information, terrorism and religious freedom, among other issues.<sup>32</sup>

Western and neutral dismay at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan initially prompted questions about cancelling or postponing the Madrid Meeting, as many charged that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan violated the Helsinki Final Act. Nonetheless, reflecting the value attributed to the CSCE by its participants, the Council of Europe decided to support the planned timetable for the Madrid Conference at a ministerial meeting in April 1980.<sup>33</sup> Other Western and neutral states agreed the Madrid talks should proceed as planned, but Soviet actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere led to diminished support for détente and reduced opportunities for the Soviets to exploit differences among the Western states.

In addition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish imposition of martial law in December 1981 provided the West with actions to oppose uniformly.<sup>34</sup> Although some governments were relieved the Soviets did not intervene as they had in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland's imposition of martial law nonetheless contravened the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and was a significant blow to the CSCE negotiations at Madrid. NATO diplomats and others condemned Polish actions extensively in speeches at Madrid before the meeting recessed on 18 December. Though these incidents furthered allied consensus, they also produced differences over tactics and responses.

Thereafter, disagreements ensued within the Western bloc about how to respond to Polish actions. Some, including the United States, advocated a session after the holiday break that focused entirely on the Polish situation and then would disband to indicate that negotiations could not continue as normal. Others, sensitive about being blamed for destroying the Helsinki process and interested in securing a concluding document, advocated continuing the meeting but with an emphasis on Poland.<sup>35</sup> When the meeting resumed on 9 February 1982, NATO foreign ministers delivered sharp rebukes on Poland. Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued Polish actions had undermined the Helsinki Final Act and East–West cooperation; Western ambassadors were so committed to delivering their criticisms of Polish actions that even Brezhnev's death in the midst of the resumed talks did not deter them. For

example, when Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigned, he wrote to Kampelman saying: 'One of the greatest sources of satisfaction, however, was the Madrid Special Session on Poland. At a time when the Alliance seemed frayed and unable to assert itself we pulled together at Madrid and stood up for those unable to raise their own voices.'<sup>36</sup>

The NATO states pushed to recess the Madrid Meeting, but at first could not secure the necessary consensus from the other CSCE states. The Soviets demanded a period of four weeks before a recess could be called. As the Western states thought this would appear to be 'business as usual', which they were avowed against, the competing objectives led to an eventual standoff.<sup>37</sup> Instead, NATO diplomats organised a 'night of silences' in which the West would not agree to the work schedule for the upcoming weeks. Western pressure eventually forced a temporary end to the negotiations, leading to a nine-month recess until 9 November 1982.<sup>38</sup> In conjunction with broad-based criticism by the foreign ministers, Western representatives made three demands of the Polish leadership before agreeing to resume talks: the release of unionists and activists; an end to marital law; and dialogue among the Catholic Church, Solidarity and the government.<sup>39</sup> Throughout the recess that followed, NATO ministers regularly condemned the state of martial law in Poland.<sup>40</sup>

The 1983 downing of Korean Airlines flight 007, a civilian airliner that mistakenly strayed into Soviet airspace, inspired further cohesion among the non-Warsaw Pact states. The Soviet attack on the airliner, which coincided with the final days of the Madrid Meeting, produced an additional session of allied condemnation of the East.<sup>41</sup> The unified allied response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish imposition of martial law and the Soviet downing of the Korean airplane signalled growing NATO strength within the CSCE and enabled effective Western activism in Madrid.

### **A 'high degree of allied unity'**

As noted previously, Kampelman's personal outreach in advance of the meeting was critical to NATO unity in Madrid. In his travels through Europe before the meeting, Kampelman had spoken repeatedly of the United States' commitment to continuing Goldberg's policy of naming names. Beginning with Ambassador to the Madrid Meeting Griffin Bell's opening statement, the United States resumed its Belgrade practice of citing specific cases of abuse, and unlike at Belgrade, here the allies eventually unified behind this strategy, albeit after considerable dissent.<sup>42</sup> As Western European governments had lost hope in *détente* with the Soviet Union in the aftermath of Afghanistan and then Poland, they were more willing to champion human rights monitors by name and explicitly criticise Eastern violations than they had been at Belgrade. Over the course of the Madrid Meeting, 14 countries raised the names of 123 people suffering human rights abuses.<sup>43</sup>

According to Kampelman, the review period was 'highly successful', as the Soviet Union was severely criticised for its invasion of Afghanistan and record on human rights.<sup>44</sup> In Kampelman's view,

At the Madrid CSCE meeting under the Helsinki Final Act, a united NATO helped forge a Western front that insisted that the words and promises of the Helsinki Final Act



be taken seriously by the 35 countries that signed it. We served notice that its standards were the criteria toward which to aspire and by which states were to be judged. We patiently and persistently kept at it for three years and we prevailed.<sup>45</sup>

Albert Sherer, Jr, a United States diplomat actively involved in much of the earlier CSCE negotiations, wrote to Kampelman, 'I am very glad to hear about the "high degree of Allied unity."' This was not always the case at the Belgrade meeting – a situation easily exploited by the Soviets.<sup>46</sup> Disagreements among NATO diplomats about Goldberg's approach to the negotiations had enabled the Soviets to deflect criticism of their implementation record. They deftly disparaged Goldberg as 'the judge' and portrayed him rather than Warsaw Pact intransigence on Helsinki compliance as the obstacle to productive negotiations.<sup>47</sup>

### **The Soviet spectre at Madrid**

In Madrid, allied unity similarly faced the risk of Eastern manipulation and the spectre of Soviet withdrawal from the CSCE. The Soviets threatened to pull out of the CSCE prior to Madrid if the review process was not made more amenable to them. Furthermore, at the Madrid Preparatory Meeting the Soviets attempted to convey disinterest in the upcoming negotiations in order to limit the time devoted to reviewing implementation of the Helsinki Final Act thus far.<sup>48</sup> Although some European nations took the Soviet threats seriously, the United States, and particularly Kampelman, refused to modify the American strategy of public criticism. Soviet officials continued to complain that the American approach to the Madrid Meeting interfered in their internal affairs, and Soviet Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Leonid Ilichev warned against turning the Madrid Meeting into a 'verbal bullfight'.<sup>49</sup> The Soviets nonetheless remained at the meetings and endured four solid weeks of implementation review. Soviet objectives for the Madrid Meeting as well as broader interest in the continuation of the CSCE ensured its participation in the negotiations, diminishing one of the most significant threats to allied unity. Soviet leaders may have hoped to undermine allied cohesion with their threats but given the strengthened relations among the allies at Madrid, concrete actions would likely have been necessary to precipitate meaningful division.

### **Conclusion**

Due in part to sustained American involvement and coordination among the Western allies, the 1980–1983 Madrid Review Meeting produced important progress in the CSCE process. The Madrid Concluding Document ensured the Helsinki process would continue at least until the next review meeting opened in Vienna in 1986. Moreover, the Madrid agreement included enhanced language on trade unions, protections for Helsinki monitors, religious freedom, human rights, access to embassies and consular missions, working conditions for journalists, and freedom of information, which Western states had supported. In addition, the Document called for a number of experts meetings to follow the close of Madrid – the meetings on human rights in Ottawa and on human contacts in Bern particularly sought after by Western states, and the CDE.<sup>50</sup> Given the contested nature of East–West relations at the time, Western gains at the negotiating table were all the more impressive.

Although a significant achievement for the West, especially in contrast to the Belgrade Meeting that had ended without a substantive document, the Madrid Concluding Document's content lay primarily in the mandates for the interim meetings; its new commitments were, not surprisingly, less ambitious than those of the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, agreement on the Madrid Concluding Document was bittersweet for many in light of the still unfulfilled Helsinki Final Act provisions.

The re-establishment of consensus on CSCE issues within the Atlantic alliance at Madrid proved important because the ability of the NATO states to remain united despite internal disagreement over negotiating tactics and objectives would be significant to the long-term influence of the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE. Through effective coordination and strong leadership, the NATO allies maintained pressure on Helsinki signatories to uphold their obligations, which slowly led to fulfilment of the Helsinki Final Act in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Over time, Soviet assent to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, to adhere to provisions governing East–West contacts and to review progress toward Helsinki implementation at a subsequent follow-up meeting all had far-reaching influence on the transformation of Eastern Europe. Allied efforts throughout the follow-up CSCE meetings to press for greater adherence to the Helsinki agreement therefore succeeded in contributing to the peaceful end of the Cold War.<sup>51</sup>

Given their experience at Belgrade, NATO members' ability to achieve a high degree of unity regarding objectives and strategy at the Madrid CSCE Review Meeting was important to the long-term significance of the Helsinki process. Furthermore, the development of a united NATO position at Madrid offers an example of productive transatlantic cooperation in the early 1980s. Transatlantic conflicts over the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan's anti-communist rhetoric, the Falklands War, the United States' invasion of Grenada, the Siberian pipeline project and United States economic sanctions against Poland complicated the first years of the Reagan administration, yet the NATO allies were able to find common ground at the Madrid Meeting. NATO concern for human rights, interest in CSBMs and outrage at Soviet and Polish actions led the CSCE to be an important forum for cooperating to achieve jointly held objectives.

## Notes

1. Earlier accounts that explored NATO diplomacy during the Madrid Meeting largely chronicled the negotiations without the benefit of international, multi-archival research. See, for example, Alexis Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972–1992* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993); Fred Chernoff, 'Negotiating Security and Disarmament in Europe,' *International Affairs* 60, no. 3 (1984): 429–37; Lynne A. Davidson, 'The Tools of Human Rights Diplomacy with Eastern Europe', in *The Diplomacy of Human Rights*, ed. David D. Newsom (Lanham: University Press of American for Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1986), 22–8; Jan Sizoo and Rudolf Th. Jurrjens, *CSCE Decision-Making: The Madrid Experience* (Hague: Nijhoff, 1984); and William Korey, *The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Institute for East West Studies, 1993).
2. For further discussion, please see Sarah B. Snyder, 'The U.S., Western Europe, and the CSCE, 1972–1975', in *The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter*, ed. Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 257–75.

3. James E. Goodby, 'The Origins of the Human Rights Provisions in the Helsinki Final Act' (unpublished manuscript, in the possession of the author), 6. Interestingly at the 1977–78 CSCE Belgrade Follow-up Meeting, the roles were reversed and Western European diplomats often worried the United States was too focused on defending human rights.
4. The French acceded to Soviet demands that the negotiations conclude with a summit before other NATO diplomats were prepared to agree to such terms. Sarah B. Snyder, 'The Helsinki Process, American Foreign Policy, and the End of the Cold War' (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2006), 68.
5. Briefing Memorandum, 29 May 1975, Folder CSCE 1975 (3) White House, Box 44, National Security Council Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, National Security Adviser, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Memorandum of Conversation, 30 May 1975, Folder Britain 1975, Box 4, Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
6. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act was the culmination of three years of negotiations at the CSCE and contained principles to govern East–West interactions in Europe. In addition to reaching an agreement on the inviolability of frontiers, which was the original impetus for the Soviet desire to hold the conference, the Helsinki Final Act committed the CSCE states to respect human rights and facilitate human contacts across East–West borders.
7. In anticipation of the Belgrade Meeting, some observers suggested a failed conference could lead to the collapse of the CSCE process. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 'The Belgrade Follow-up Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,' Folder 19, Box 274, Millicent Fenwick Papers, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey; and Log Belgrade II, Box 6, Albert William Sherer, Jr. Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut (hereafter Fenwick Papers).
8. In Goldberg, Carter had appointed a public figure, who would be willing to criticise the Soviets at Belgrade and whose appointment would enhance the stature of the talks.
9. Albert W. Sherer, Jr, 'Helsinki's Child: Goldberg's Variation', *Foreign Policy* 39 (1980): 154–9; R.J. Vincent, 'The Response of the Europe and the Third World to United States Human Rights Diplomacy', in *The Diplomacy of Human Rights*, ed. David D. Newsom (Lanham: University Press of American for Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1986), 33; and Michael Clarke, 'Britain and European Political Cooperation in the CSCE,' in *European Détente: Case Studies of the Politics of East–West Relations*, ed. Kenneth Dyson (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), 244.
10. Memorandum, Friendly to CSCE Commissioners, 31 October 1977, Folder 16, Box 274, Fenwick Papers; and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing, 7 June 1977, First Session, 95th Congress.
11. The CSCE meetings subsequent to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act were known collectively as the 'Helsinki process.'
12. Memorandum, Oliver to CSCE Commissioners, 9 January 1978, Folder 16, Box 274, Fenwick Papers.
13. Telegram, From BNATO to EXTOTT GEPR, 1 December 1979, File 20-4-CSCE-MDRID, Volume 3, Volume 9115, RG 25, National Archives, Ottawa, Canada (hereafter National Archives).
14. Telegram, From BNATO to EXTOTT GEPR, 1 December 1979, File 20-4-CSCE-MDRID, Volume 3, Volume 9115, RG 25, National Archives.
15. Basket Three of the Helsinki Final Act included measures on increasing contacts through family reunifications, bi-national marriages and travel.
16. Bell did not remain as part of the United States delegation after the 1980 presidential election. David Morrison, 'Bell Will be America's Advocate,' *Atlanta Constitution* 12 September 1980, Helsinki: Madrid, 1980–1980, Box 1116, Old Code Subject Files, Soviet Red Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives, Budapest, Hungary (hereafter Open Society Archives).
17. Memorandum, 'Canada/Spain Bilateral Consultation on CSCE Madrid Meeting,' File 20-4-CSCE-MDRID, Volume 9114, RG 25, National Archives.

18. Visit of Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany Joint Press Statement, 5 March 1980, *Public Papers of the President, 1980–81: I* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 440.
19. Max Kampelman Interview, 13 March 2007. Kampelman was one of only two Democratic appointees to be retained by Reagan.
20. The NATO states had caucused regularly and effectively during earlier stages of the CSCE talks.
21. Max Kampelman Interview, 13 March 2007.
22. Schifter still maintains Kampelman's efforts were key to the allied unity at Madrid. Schifter to Kampelman, 10 April 1990, Box 35, Max M. Kampelman Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Richard Schifter Interview, 5 May 2008 (hereafter Kampelman Papers).
23. Kampelman estimates he spent 400 hours in bilateral negotiations with the Soviets at Madrid. Max M. Kampelman, *Entering New Worlds: The Memoirs of a Private Man in Public Life* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 239; Kampelman to Kovalev, 23 November 1982, November 1982, Box 13, Kampelman Papers; Kampelman to Haig, 10 September 1981, Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe August–September 1981, Box 15, Kampelman Papers; and William Korey, *Human Rights and the Helsinki Accord* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1983), 55.
24. Interview with Max Kampelman, 13 March 2007; and Max M. Kampelman, 'Rescue With a Presidential Push', *Washington Post*, June 11, 2004, A25.
25. French President Giscard d'Estaing first announced France's interest in a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in a May 1978 United Nations speech. The Carter administration had been hesitant about the CDE, in part because it did not want to isolate security elements of the CSCE from human rights. Just as these European states had favoured the CSCE negotiations in the early 1970s to have a more significant role in pursuing détente with the East, they now favoured broadening arms control negotiations beyond the two superpowers. Carl Krehbiel, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe: The Stockholm Conference* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 10; CSCE/RM.7, 9 December 1980, Book 38, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Archives, Prague, Czech Republic; Chernoff, 'Negotiating Security and Disarmament in Europe,' 435; and 'Effects of Southwest Asian Crises on Key Global Issues,' May 1980, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter OSCE Archives).
26. Krehbiel, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe*, 14–15; Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, 'Developing a Confidence-Building System in East–West Relations: Europe and the CSCE', in *Building Security in Europe: Confidence-Building Measures and the CSCE*, Rolf Berg and Adam-Daniel Rotfeld (New York: Institute for East–West Security Studies, 1986), 96–7; Boutin to CSCE Commissioners, 17 March 1981, Helsinki: Report, Box 112, Fenwick Papers; Statement, 4 February 1985, CSCE/SC, Book 58, OSCE Archives; Statement, James E. Goodby, 18 February 1985, *ibid.*; Kenneth Dyson, 'The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Europe Before and After the Helsinki Final Act,' in *European Détente: Case Studies of the Politics of East–West Relations*, ed. Kenneth Dyson (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 103; Stefan Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986–1989* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 19; and Korey, *The Promises We Keep*, 139.
27. CSCE diplomats agreed the CDE would apply to the entire land territory of Europe as well as to the sea and air bordering European territory. Concluding Document, Book 41, OSCE Archives.
28. Final Communiqué, 8–9 December 1983, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c831209a.htm> (accessed April 23, 2008).
29. Proposals in Ottawa would deal with gender equality, access to health care, the right to participate in religious education and freedom from torture, whereas those at Bern would address such issues as family visits, postal communication, access to a passport, exit visa fees and facilitating tourism. Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 23; CSCE Staff to CSCE Commissioners, 27 May 1981, Helsinki/Madrid, Box 112, Fenwick Papers; CSCE/RM.16, 12 December 1980, Book 38, OSCE

- Archives; CSCE/RM.48, 9 November 1982, *ibid.*; CSE/RM.49, 9 November 1982, *ibid.*; Sizoo and Jurrjens, *CSCE Decision-Making*, 260.
30. CSCE Staff to CSCE Commissioners, 27 May 1981, Helsinki/Madrid, Box 112, Fenwick Papers.
  31. At the May 1981 North Atlantic Council meeting, NATO ministers reiterated their commitment to a concluding document balanced between progress on human rights, human contacts, information and security. Similarly, European Community experts determined more Eastern concessions on human rights and human contacts were necessary to achieve the desired balance if a mandate for a CDE would be included in the concluding document. Final Communiqué, 4–5 May 1981, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c810504a.htm>; Final Communiqué, 10–11 December 1981, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c811210a.htm> (both accessed April 23, 2008); and CSCE Staff to CSCE Commissioners, 16 June 1981, Helsinki/Madrid, Box 112, Fenwick Papers.
  32. CSCE/RM.11, 10 December 1980, Book 38, OSCE Archives; CSCE/RM.12, 10 December 1980, *ibid.*; CSCE/RM.14, 11 December 1980, *ibid.*; CSCE/RM.19, 11 December 1980, *ibid.*; and William E. Griffith, *The Superpowers and Regional Tensions* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982), 43.
  33. *CSCE Digest*, 25 April 1980, Folder 8, Box 138, Aloysius A. Mazewski Papers, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota (hereafter Mazewski Papers).
  34. One observer has argued the European Community adhered to a unified allied position against Polish actions in order to maintain American engagement with the CSCE. Douglas Selvage, 'The Politics of the Lesser Evil: The West, the Polish Crisis, and the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid, 1981–1983,' (paper presented at the conference 'From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation,' Artimino, Italy, April 27–29, 2006).
  35. Davidson, 'The Tools of Human Rights Diplomacy with Eastern Europe,' 170.
  36. Statement, Alexander Haig, United States, 9 February 1982 in Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 'The Madrid CSCE Review Meeting,' November 1983, OSCE Archives. At Madrid, Haig said, 'Nothing endangers security and cooperation in Europe more than the threat and the use of force to deny internationally recognized rights.' Brezhnev died 10 November 1982. The delegates at Madrid noted his passing but returned to their criticism shortly thereafter. Haig to Kampelman, 2 August 1982, Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Correspondence with the Department of State, August–November 1982, Box 15, Kampelman Papers; and *CSCE Digest*, 12 November 1982, Folder 6, Box 141, Part I: Professional File, 1793–1987, n.d. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Arthur J. Goldberg Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, District of Columbia (hereafter Goldberg Papers).
  37. Telegram, AmEmbassy Madrid to SecState, 13 February 1982, [www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/3119.PDF](http://www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/3119.PDF) (accessed May 22, 2006).
  38. Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe*, 64; and Sizoo and Jurrjens, *CSCE Decision-Making*, 203–11.
  39. Dante B. Fascell, 'The Madrid CSCE Meeting', *The Washington Quarterly* Autumn (1982): 204–5.
  40. Final Communiqué, 17–18 May 1982, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c820517a.htm>; Final Communiqué, 9–10 December 1982, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c821209a.htm>; Final Communiqué, 9–10 June 1983, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c830610a.htm> (accessed 23 April 2008). Despite continuing problems in Poland, the Madrid Meeting resumed in November. The NATO delegations returned in the fall with a number of new proposals in response to the Polish crackdown, which addressed such issues as trade union rights, Helsinki monitors, freedom of religion and radio jamming. Negotiations at Madrid thus moved forward, but under a darkened cloud of mistrust and disappointment. CSCE/RM.41, 9 November 1982, Book 38, OSCE Archives; Korey, *The Promises We Keep*, 154–5; Davidson, 'The Tools of Human Rights Diplomacy with Eastern Europe,' 171; and Sizoo and Jurrjens, *CSCE Decision-Making*, 238–40. 'Summary of NNA Document (RM-39) and Proposed Western Amendments,'

- Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, August – November 1982, Box 15, Kampelman Papers.
41. Andrei Gromyko (USSR), 2 November 1983, CSCE/RM/VR.2, Madrid Follow-up Meeting, Volume 41, OSCE Archives.
  42. Plenary statements and related subsequent press releases marked American efforts to publicise human rights abuses in Eastern Europe and invite international condemnation. Due to the closed nature of most of the sessions, the public gained knowledge of the negotiations through leaks, interviews and press conferences. Commission Staff to CSCE Commissioners, 6 January 1981, Helsinki/Madrid, Box 112, Fenwick Papers; William Korey, 'The Unanticipated Consequences of Helsinki', *OSCE ODIHR Bulletin* 3, no. 3 (1995): 8–14; and Memorandum, 'Human Rights in the CSCE After Belgrade,' File 20-4-CSCE-MDRID, Volume 9114, RG 25, National Archives.
  43. The United States, in particular, named 119 individuals of concern during the Madrid Meeting, including prominent human rights activists Yelena Bonner, Jiri Hajek, Václav Havel, Anatoly Marchenko, Naum Meiman, Ida Nudel, Yuri Orlov, Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Shcharansky and Raoul Wallenberg. Statement, Max M. Kampelman, 15 July 1983 in *Three Years at the East–West Divide: The Words of U.S. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman at the Madrid Conference on Security and Human Rights*, ed. Leonard R. Sussman (New York: Freedom House, 1983), 115; and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 'The Madrid CSCE Review Meeting,' November 1983, OSCE Archives; and Millicent Fenwick, *Speaking Up* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 165–6.
  44. Kampelman to Goldberg, 2 October 1981, Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, October–November 1981, Box 15, Kampelman Papers.
  45. 'Human Rights in the Global Village', Augsburg College, Nobel Peace Prize Forum, Feb. 17, 1990, Box 33, Kampelman Papers.
  46. Sherer to Kampelman, 4 June 1981, Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Letterbook Correspondence 'S,' 1980–1982, Box 14, Kampelman Papers.
  47. Michael Dobbs, 'Belgrade Conference Makes Gains', 22 December 1977, Human Rights-CSCE/Helsinki Commission-Articles and Printed Matter 2/77-12/77, Box 53, Office of the Public Liaison, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia.
  48. Sizoo and Jurtjens, *CSCE Decision-Making*, 194.
  49. Sandra Louise Gubin, 'International Regimes, Agenda Setting and Linkage Groups in U.S.–Soviet Relations: The Helsinki Process and Divided Spouses' (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1990), 67; *Novoye Vremya* 21 November in *CSCE Digest*, 4 December 1980, Folder 3, Box 140, Mazewski Papers; and Statement, Leonid Ilichev (USSR), 14 November 1980, CSCE/RM/VR.6, Madrid Follow-up Meeting, Book 40, OSCE Archives.
  50. CSCE Staff to CSCE Commissioners, 10 April 1981, Helsinki/Madrid, Box 112, Fenwick Papers; and Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 20.
  51. For further discussion, see Snyder, *The Helsinki Process, American Foreign Policy, and the End of the Cold War*.

### Note on contributor

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