



Unlike some of his comrades from the sixties who scoffed at what they saw as a lack of political action in the age of George W. Bush, Zimmerman considered the anti-Iraq War movement a success. “Unlike the antiwar movement in the sixties,” he wrote, “the movement against the war in Iraq learned to work within the mainstream, avoid extremist tactics and rhetoric, raise money at the grass roots, and find messaging that united young and old, rich and poor, students and workers” (421).

It is hard to find fault with *Troublemaker*. This is memoir at its best, brilliantly told, and ultimately one of the most fulfilling participant-memoir histories ever written. Lists of iconic sixties activists do not typically include Bill Zimmerman. That is too bad. They should. One can only hope that Zimmerman’s odyssey through these eventful years of American history will correct that major flaw in our collective understanding of the past.

Andrew Hunt  
*University of Waterloo*

Sarah B. Snyder. *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

One story about the end of the Cold War starts with Ronald Reagan’s dramatic 1987 challenge at the Brandenburg Gate: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” Sure enough, two and a half years later, dancing East and West Germans, with Gorbachev’s assent, began tearing down the Berlin Wall. (Why hadn’t anyone thought of making the demand so clearly in the decades prior?) A *slightly* fuller narrative contends that forty years of military containment amplified Reagan’s voice and made the Wall more vulnerable. Don’t buy either story.

In her magnificent book, Sarah Snyder offers just a piece of a much more complicated story, one filled with contradictions and contingencies. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act provided a resource for a range of actors advancing human rights to alter balances of power between reformers and conservatives throughout the West and in the Soviet Union. Bolstered by an exemplary array of archival material (in Russian and English), Snyder presents the far more compelling argument.

The Soviet Union had begun pressing for an international conference on collective security in Europe, excluding North American nations, as early as 1954. Including countries in both the East and West bloc, they hoped it would supplant NATO. The United States blocked this conference for exactly the same reasons. By the 1970s, however, for very different reasons, the leaders in both the West and the East had made substantial concessions and commenced negotiations. The resultant Helsinki Final Act, ratified in 1975, included elements that were problematic for each side—inviolability of borders for the West and human rights for the East—but both hoped to use the propaganda value of the agreement to their advantage, domestically and abroad. It's not clear that anyone involved expected a broad and variegated transnational network would grow around an agreement that was so much less than what the major players had wanted. The network would include government officials, activists, and non-governmental organizations in East and West, including actors working at all kinds of cross-purposes.

Representative Millicent Fenwick, a moderate Republican from New Jersey, on a junket days after President Ford signed the agreement, asked Soviet officials to live up to the letter of the agreement on human rights. She also met with Soviet citizens, including political dissidents, and returned to the United States determined to establish an institution to monitor compliance with the Final Act. She introduced a bill that would establish a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which would provide a formal body charged with promoting international exchange and monitoring compliance.

Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter picked up the torch of human rights, initially to campaign against Ford, who had signed an agreement Carter saw as grossly deficient. Then, as President, he vigorously, if inconsistently, promoted human rights, in part to try to win support for the ratification of an arms control agreement. Score one victory and one critical defeat. But conservatives continued talking about human rights with the intent of scuttling arms control. Even when Ronald Reagan's administration explicitly demoted human rights on its foreign policy agenda, people inside the administration still talked about human rights—and some seemed to believe in them. Reagan himself, contrary to the prevalent image of being a tough talking ideologue, agreed to stop public pressure on the Soviets in exchange for real progress. He saw increased Soviet openness because reformers within the Soviet Union, most notably Mikhail Gorbachev, saw domestic lib-

eralization as a critical ingredient in two interrelated projects. In foreign policy, the reformers gave on human rights to secure arms control agreements, which would ameliorate pressure on the Soviet economy. In domestic policy, political liberalization supported and legitimated economic restructuring. Ultimately, this all spun out of control as well.

Throughout, governments of the East and West were pressed by activists. Dissidents in the East pointed to the Soviet signatures on the Final Act to buttress their own claims for substantial reforms. Vaclav Havel, a founder of the Charter 77 movement, explained a politics of irony based on exploiting the contradiction between articulated standards and actual practice. Reformers in the West set up transnational monitoring groups, including Helsinki Watch, to try to bring the Final Act into action.

In telling this extended and elaborated tale, Snyder emphasizes contingency and the importance of individuals seizing upon an opportunity that was created almost inadvertently. There's no structural determinism and lots of human agency in this book. People, after all, make history. It's an exceptionally important story, told extremely well.

David S. Meyer  
*University of California, Irvine*

**Richard P. Unsworth.** *A Portrait of Pacifists: Le Chambon, the Holocaust, and the Lives of André and Magda Trocmé.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2012.

The French Protestant pastor André Trocmé and his wife Magda are well known as rescuers of Jews in Le Chambon-sur-Lignon during the Second World War. Beginning in 1941, thousands of Jewish refugees, mostly foreigners, flocked to the isolated plateau in the Haute Loire to evade the Vichy police and later the Germans. There they were housed in Protestant institutions or hidden in individual homes throughout the region, supplied with false papers, and protected until Liberation. The local pastor Trocmé and his wife, along with assistant pastor Edouard Theis and his wife Mildred and other colleagues, encouraged and supervised the rescue effort. They were true heroes.

While the story of rescue in Le Chambon has been told by Pierre Sauvage, Phillip Hallie, Patrick Gerard Henry, and others, the lives of André and Magda Trocmé before and after the Second World War