anyway. The question is how to make this process both more artful and more meaningful, so that we may indeed move beyond the grief and grievance that is our legacy from the bloody twentieth century barely behind us.

Stephan Feuchtwang is uniquely qualified to write about this weighty subject; he has been engaging the comparative literature on history and memory for over four decades. Therefore, he has been able to add something truly new to the large corpus of scholarship that began with Maurice Halbwachs's explorations of collective memory and grew to encompass the works of Jacques Le Goff, Pierre Nora, and Patrick Hutton, just to mention a few of the researchers working in this field. Feuchtwang's questions go beyond memory and memorialization to the more subtle mechanisms through which different cultures pass on the experience of loss both in the public and in the personal realms.

His book honors distinctive voices, not the least being his own as a child refugee from the horrors of the Shoah. The grandson of the chief rabbi of Vienna (who had been accorded Jewish honors and official recognition when he died in 1936, before the horrors of Nazism totally engulfed his community and his country), Feuchtwang wrestles with the uniqueness of the Holocaust in a thought-provoking, comparative context. While other writers—most notably Ian Buruma in *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (1994)—also deploy a wide range of linguistic and analytical skills to reach across cultures, this particular researcher brings a depth of engagement that makes this book utterly unique. It combines interview work and field notes with an impassioned concern with how Jews, Chinese, and Germans continue to express an ambivalent relationship to historical trauma decades after memories are assumed to have been put to rest.

This book is unabashedly about apples and oranges, as it were. How can one possibly compare the murderous policies of the Shoah to the political consequences of China's Great Leap Froward, or the Nationalist Party's repression of a small band of leftists in Taiwan after 1949? The numbers themselves are incommensurate: six million Jews killed in Europe; thirty-six million dead from starvation and political repression in Mao's China; "only" 164 communist sympathizers disappeared in the small hamlet of Lukou. Feuchtwang gives us the figures, as well as the courage—and a methodology—to elicit shared meanings from totally different historical contexts. He makes subtle distinctions between targeted violence and politically motivated indifference to human suffering on a large scale. He is also careful not to use or assign the language of victimization to the different individuals whom he (and his research assistants in China, Taiwan and Germany) sought out. The goal is to listen and thereby create a framework in which strategies for the transmission of grief gain meaning across time and space.

In this project, Feuchtwang's own fieldwork from 1968 becomes a springboard for a return to Taiwan in 2011. Forty-three years later, the author is not only much older but has been building an edifice of questions based upon extensive readings and interviews on the Chinese mainland as well as in Berlin. In China, Yang Jisheng's monumental study from 2009, *Mubei* (*Memorial Tablet*), allows Feuchtwang to begin to fathom the weight of unassuaged loss that followed the great famine of 1958–1960. In Germany, the collection of interviews from the 2002 study entitled *Opa war kein Nazi* (*Grandpa Was No Nazi*) provides a base line from which more personal voices and experiences emerge, so that readers are brought into the intimate world of Berliners seeking to recover some sense of *Heimat* unsullied by Nazi memories.

Through the book's keen focus on disparate ways of "historical repair," the author manages to highlight both public policy changes as well the personal strategies that lead individuals to, literally, back into historical memories. As a result, we are able to envisage both victims and commemorators alike as "ghosts"—fragments of a lived experience that hovers on the edges of public remembrance, reminding us of what is still unspoken, singular as well as intimately familiar. It is, therefore, no poetic exaggeration to conclude (as Feuchtwang does) that each of us has become a site where ruins reign, where grief speaks mutely. On this terrain, the study of history meets its greatest challenge: to give voice to the unspeakable by listening to what lies buried in cultures and languages flung far from our own loss.

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Sarah B. Snyder. *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network*. (Human Rights in History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. x, 293. $85.00.

Sarah B. Snyder brings together two debates—how to understand the rise of human rights movements and the fall of the Soviet empire—with a fresh look at the way human rights activism, unexpectedly unleashed by the inauspicious Helsinki Accords of 1975, hastened the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The book presents a detailed account of the two and a half years of negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that produced the Helsinki Final Act, an unlikely agreement among thirty-five nations that was originally conceived as a Soviet project to gain international ratification of postwar boundary arrangements and the principle of nonintervention, thereby protecting its sphere of influence. "If Helsinki is held, then I can die," Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev reportedly remarked, showing that the Soviet leadership regarded its initiative as crucial to national security (p. 24). Snyder draws on extensive archival research in the United States, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, supplemented by interviews with some of the principals, to produce an account that specialists will find a valuable addition to work by Padraic Kenney on the grass-roots revolutions of 1989 and

work on the history of human rights by Samuel Moyn (one of the series editors for the present volume). Snyder demonstrates how a combination of diplomatic wrangling and pressure from below wrested the agenda away from Soviet control and transformed an agreement about borders and sovereignty into a promise to allow international monitoring of internal human rights conditions. It was a promise of great consequence.

If Brezhnev hoped that the Helsinki process would forever enshrine Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger dismissed the whole enterprise as "meaningless," in line with his realist doctrine: "No matter what goes into the final act, I don't believe that the Soviet Union will ever do anything it doesn't want to" (p. 32). Snyder carefully documents how both men were proved wrong as the Helsinki process took on a life of its own, surprising Soviet leaders and American cynics alike. Other international agreements such as the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights had been ignored. What made the Helsinki Accords relevant was a clause stating that CSCE members could exchange views on its implementation. That provision formally made human rights an international concern, and, as Snyder demonstrates, opened a political space that Western governments and non-governmental organizations on both sides of the Iron Curtain widened.

Kissinger did his best to make his prophecy self-fulfilling, sidelining CSCE to the point that U.S. diplomats yearned for instructions. He was eventually outflanked by the U.S. Congress, which frequently played a substantive role in making foreign policy during the 1970s. Legislators insisted on the creation of a joint congressional-executive Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe headed by Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL), a noted human rights advocate. The Fascell Commission kept a spotlight on human rights NGOs, political prisoners, and refuseniks during the years of Kissingerian neglect. Yuri F. Orlov, Anatoly B. Shcharansky, Yelena Bonner, and other founders of the Moscow Helsinki Group worked closely with the Fascell Commission to publicize violations. Helsinki monitoring groups sprang up in Poland and Czechoslovakia, becoming a network of grass-roots organizations.

President Jimmy Carter took up the issue out of the dual conviction that it was a moral imperative and would strengthen the Democratic Party with "ethnic" voters. He had campaigned against what he called Helsinki's approval of the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. Once in office, he found the accords useful for challenging the Soviets on their treatment of dissidents. Ronald Reagan similarly saw the CSCE as a stick to beat the Soviets with, then was surprised to find Mikhail Gorbachev increasingly willing to discuss human rights in exchange for cooling anti-Soviet rhetoric. Snyder narrates the Gorbachev policy of *glasnost* largely as the product of Western demands. However, she acknowledges that Gorbachev's reforms had gone much further "than was required by external pressure" by the end of Reagan's second term (p. 215).

The Helsinki Final Act endorsed international monitoring of the treatment of Eastern dissident groups and human rights activists, while encouraging a dramatic increase in their activities and launching Western NGOs such as Helsinki Watch that gave them a modicum of protection and kept the issue on the international diplomatic agenda. Václav Havel once flattered Helsinki Watch: "I know very well what you did for us, and perhaps without you, our revolution would not be" (p. 226). The Helsinki process, far from preserving the system Brezhnev thought would be his legacy, catalyzed the transnational network of human rights activists, their Western supporters, and reformers headed by Gorbachev into an unwitting coalition that ended the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall fell, to paraphrase Reagan hagiography, it was because they pushed it.

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James Siekmeier. *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2011. Pp. xiii, 210. $64.95.

This book is a welcome update to the history of Bolivian-U.S. relations. James Siekmeier argues that U.S. policymakers eschewed the use of force and instead opted for economic assistance to Bolivia because they believed it would be the most effective way to maintain positive relations. Likewise, Bolivian leaders understood U.S. concerns about communism during the Cold War and were active players in eliciting U.S. aid and crafting "workable compromises" with the U.S. government. As Siekmeier points out, recent comments by Bolivia's President Evo Morales, who called upon South American leaders to oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas, while tapping a deep well of resentment, overstated the influence that the United States exerted on Bolivia going back to 1952. Indeed, during the Cold War, Bolivia was mostly able to get what it wanted from the United States—particularly economic assistance.

Siekmeier's book updates scholarship on Bolivian-U.S. relations in three ways. First, it takes advantage of more recent scholarship and declassified documents to examine foreign relations in the 1970s. Second, it does an excellent job of treating the cultural, social, and political transformation of Bolivia between 1952 and the present. Finally, this book gives perhaps the definitive word on the Bolivian Revolution and shows how that seminal event affected relations between the United States and Bolivia through the 1970s.

Particularly noteworthy is Siekmeier's treatment of Victor Andrade Uzquiano, Bolivia's ambassador to the United States at various times between 1944 and 1962. Perhaps more than any other recent scholar, Siekmeier emphasizes Andrade's use of charm, knowledge of U.S. culture, and diplomatic skills to secure a near continual stream of aid to Bolivia during his time as ambassador and in the years subsequent to his tenure. Indeed, Andrade's role cannot be understated, given that most key